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Abstract 
Hybrid regimes are those in which only the formalities of representative electoral politics 
are observed. Consequently, political legitimacy is determined on the basis of whether the 
incumbent political leaders have the backing of non-representative political ‘guardians’ 
(such as the monarchy and the military) rather than through the popular vote exclusively. 
The incumbents need to win elections. They stay in power by manipulating the political 
sphere to gain unfair advantages over their political competitors. Individuals in hybrid 
regimes do not enjoy freedom of assembly in the same way as individuals in consolidated 
democracies. This thesis highlights how hybrid regimes in Southeast Asia (Cambodia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand) use legal mechanisms governing public assemblies to thwart the 
effective realisation of the freedom of assembly stipulated by international human rights 
law. Such legal factors are often overlooked by scholars in political science and social 
movement studies in seeking to explain both regime resilience and the repression of 
opposition protest movements. While hybrid regimes may appear to adopt international 
human rights standards on public assemblies, these are inconsistently implemented in 
practice. The resulting gap – between an apparent commitment to  international standards 
and the reality ‘on the ground’ – can partly be explained by the fact that human rights 
standards are themselves primarily oriented to facilitating and protecting public assemblies 
as a part of the democratic process. In contrast, legal frameworks and public order policing 
in hybrid regimes serve a different purpose than to enable a democratic process. In 
particular, in the absence of mechanisms of accountability, hybrid regime incumbents 
manipulate legal rules – and the discretion conferred on law enforcement officials – so as 
to secure their continued dominance. The thesis thus illustrates how such rule by law is 
used to strengthen and ‘street-proof’ hybrid regimes.  
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1. Chapter 1 Introduction 
 Background and motivation 
Freedom of assembly is essential for every democratic society. It is a fundamental freedom 
under international human rights law (IHRL). Legal mechanisms governing public assembly in 
consolidated democracies are guided by IHRL and international standards, emphasizing that 
states have positive obligations to facilitate and to protect peaceful assemblies. Some states, 
however, that are bound to respect these IHRL obligations (having ratified relevant human 
rights treaties) do not comply. Their behaviour fits neither the description of a consolidated 
democracy nor of a closed-authoritarian regime. These states can be classified as “hybrid 
regimes” – an independent regime type standing between democratic and authoritarian 
regimes.1  
A consolidated democracy or an authoritarian regime can be transformed into a hybrid regime.2 
Democratisation is not a one-way process. Hybrid regimes are characterised by their 
institutional features that are mixed between the features which are typical of a democracy and 
an autocracy.3 The typical features of a hybrid regime are the presence of unfair political 
competition and the presence of a not-fully-functioning liberal constitution.4 The authoritarian 
style of governance in hybrid regimes leads to the systematic alteration of the rules guaranteed 
by the constitution.5 The uneven playing field allows the incumbent leaders to abuse state 
resources, manipulate the media, harass opposition politicians and government critics.6 In these 
circumstances, the opposition parties can still win some seats in parliament but they have little 
(or no) chance of winning a general election and unseating the government.7 Civil societies in 
 
1 András Bozóki and Dániel Hegedűs, 'An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European 
Union' (2018) 25 Democratization 1173, 1175. 
2 For example, Hungary after 2010 eroded from a consolidated Western-type liberal democracy to a hybrid 
regime. Thailand in 2008 (the Samak Sundaravej administration) and in 2019 (the Prayut Chan-o-cha 
administration) transformed from a military dictatorship to a hybrid regime.  
3 Andrea Cassani, 'Hybrid What? The Contemporary Debate on Hybrid regimes and the Identity Question' 
13 September 2012) <https://www.sisp.it/files/papers/2012/andrea-cassani-1445.pdf> accessed 10 July 
2019. 
4 ibid. 
5 ibid. 
6  Steven Levitsky and Lucan A Way, 'Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism' (2002) 51, 53. 
7 Larry Diamond, Juan J Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, Democracy in developing countries (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers 1989) 25. 
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these regimes enjoy greater space than in closed authoritarian regimes, but much less than that 
in consolidated democracies. 
A consolidated democracy is often referred to as ‘a democratic regime that relevant observers 
expect to last well into the future’.8 When a democracy becomes consolidated, all political 
actors accept the legitimacy of democracy and regard democracy as the only game in town.9 In 
contrast, closed authoritarian regimes do not select their leaders through general elections. They 
claim legitimacy from other sources such as foundational myths, ideology, personalism, 
procedures, performance, and international engagement.10 Closed authoritarian rulers maintain 
their political power through the use of repression. Opposition political parties, civil society, 
and media are banned or diminished until they are powerless.11 In contrast, political actors in 
hybrid regimes accept the principle of popular consent and citizens generally have more 
strength to check the government than those in closed authoritarian regimes (albeit at a much 
lower level than those in consolidated democracies).12 Democratic principles in hybrid regimes 
are severely constrained as a result of the uneven playing field between government and 
opposition actors.13 The competition between political parties is compromised because election 
outcomes do not represent popular preferences.14 In the same way, I notice that this uneven 
playing field in hybrid regimes substantially affects how the authorities regulate public 
assemblies and how people exercise their freedom of assembly.  
 
8 Andreas  Schedler, 'What Is Democratic Consolidation?' (1998) 9.2 Journal of Democracy 91, 102 
9  Yana Gorokhovskaia, 'Democratic Consolidation' (Oxford Bibliographies, 26 July 2017) 
<https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-
0224.xml#firstMatch> accessed 4 July 2019. 
10  Christian von Soest and Julia Grauvogel, 'Identity, procedures and performance: how authoritarian 
regimes legitimize their rule' (2017) 23 Contemporary Politics 287, 289 – Von Soest and Grauvogel 
propose six claims to legitimacy in authoritarianism: (1) a foundation myth –the leader role in the state-
building process such as war, revolutions, and liberation movements; (2) ideology—the righteousness of 
a given political order such as nationalism and communism; (3) personalism—the charismatic of the 
leaders or the ruler’s centrality to achieve the nation’s stability; (4) procedures—the rule-based 
mechanisms for handing power such as bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes go through a lengthy 
legal framework to exercise their authority; (5) performance—the success in satisfying citizens’ needs 
such as material welfare and security. The rulers present themselves as the guarantor of such success; 
and (6) international engagement—the leader’s role in international arenas such as in international 
negotiations or regional organisations.  
11  ibid 292. 
12  ibid. 
13 S Levitsky and LA Way, 'The rise of competitive authoritarianism' (2002) 13(2) Journal of Democracy 
51, 53. 
14 Leah Gilbert and Payam Mohseni, 'Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes' 
(2011) 46 Studies in Comparative International Development 270, 273 cited Dimond, Linz and Lipset 
(n7). 
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My curiosity was prompted by an observation that Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand have 
faced similar political protests in which the opposition parties and the pro-regime groups both 
mobilise their supporters on the street. Their politics are heavily polarised, and public 
assemblies have been a primary tool used to try and bring about regime change (though not 
always in the direction of transition to a more democratic society). I compared the laws 
governing public assemblies and found that these three countries share a number of further 
similarities. The constitution in these countries guarantees freedom of assembly, and the laws 
governing public assemblies have the declared purpose of allowing people to enjoy the freedom 
of assembly. However, these laws were all enacted as a response to an increase in street protests 
demanding regime change. I suspected that the true purpose these laws was less about 
protecting this fundamental democratic right than protecting the dominant political elites from 
popular challenge.  
The political context in Thailand, Malaysia, and Cambodia 
In Thailand, the contestation between the Red-shirt protests and the Yellow-shirt protests have 
been taking their turn to mobilise their supporters on the street to protest against the incumbent 
government. The Red-shirts are backed by pro-democracy groups and supporters of Thaksin 
Shinawatra and Yingrak Shinawatra, ousted-prime ministers, while the Yellow-shirts are 
backed by pro-military groups and royalists. Both camps organised street protests aiming to 
overthrow the existing government. The Red-shirts demanded that the government dissolve the 
parliament and call for a general election. On the other hand, the Yellow-shirts accused the 
head of the government of corruption and demanded political reform. These assemblies often 
led to violence on the street providing an opportunity for an aggressive security response, 
ostensibly to restore peace and order. For example, on 19 September 2006, following a series 
of Yellow-shirt protests against the government of Thaksin Shinawatra, the military intervened 
and took control of political institutions (regarded by many as a military ‘coup’). The military 
introduced a new constitution and then called for a general election.  
Still, the Red-shirts managed to win the election and establish a popular government on 8 
September 2008. However, from May to December 2008 the Yellow shirts launched series of 
street protests in Bangkok, including the seizure of the government house and two international 
airports in Bangkok. On 2 December 2008, while the Yellow-shirts still occupied these vanues, 
the Constitutional Court dissolved Palang Prachachon Party (the Red-shirt political party) on 
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the ground of electoral misconduct by a member.15 Noticeably, the dissolution of the party 
coincided with one of the demands from the on-going Yellow-shirt protests.16 Ultimately, the 
Yellow-shirt protests paved a way to the Abhisit administration, a military-backed government. 
Similarly, then the Red shirts mobilised supporters to protest against the Abhisit administration. 
However, they were faced with a brutal crackdown from the military. The Red-shirts demanded 
Abhisit to resign and called for a general election. They occupied several streets around 
Bangkok business centre. Then the government responded by using excessive use of force to 
disperse the protests in Rajprasong on 19 May 2010. The crackdown by the military led to a 
dissolution of Parliament and immediate elections. Later, the Red-shirt party won the general 
election. After the Red shirts took office, the Yellow shirts mobilised their supporters on the 
street and created an opportunity for the military to stage a further ‘coup’ on 22 May 2014.  
Thai politics have been travelling through this circle twice in the past two decades. Although 
there are two different political competitors achieving in overturning the government, Thailand 
is a hybrid regime because the political competition has never been fair, and the constitutions 
were drafted to elevate the pro-military camp. Public order policing towards the Red and the 
Yellow was markedly different. The military explicitly sided with the Yellow movement, and 
so the Yellow shirt protesters could occupy many key government sites such as the government 
house and international airports, without being violently dispersed. In contrast, the Red shirt 
rallies (including the attempts to occupy streets around a business district) faced a brutal 
crackdown and were forcibly dispersed by the military.  
The last two coup d’état, in 2006 and 2014 undeniably came after the Yellow-shirt 
demonstrations. A year after the 2014 coup, the military government enacted the Public 
Assembly Act 2015 to govern public assemblies. To me, it was obvious that the military 
government wanted a tool to manage political protests rather than the law’s officially stated 
purpose – to fulfil Thailand’s international obligations under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  I suspected that the Act was another measure to reinforce 
the uneven playing field in terms of governing public assemblies. 
Cambodia and Malaysia have similar laws governing public assemblies that shape the way 
people protest. Cambodia enacted the Law on Peaceful Assembly in 2009 and Malaysia enacted 
Peaceful Assembly Act in 2012. Both laws were enacted in response to the rise in anti-
 
15 Thailand Constitutional Court Decision No.20/2551 on 2 December 2008. 
16  Björn Dressel and Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, 'Coloured Judgements? The Work of the Thai 
Constitutional Court, 1998-2016' (2019) 49 Journal of Contemporary Asia 1, 6. 
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government protests. In 2013, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), the major 
opposition party, ran large public assemblies against the government in the capital demanding 
more transparent politic. When the movements became popular, the military violently clashed 
with the protesters. The Freedom Park, a designated assembly area under the law, was closed 
outright and the Minister of Interior announced an indefinite ban on public demonstrations.17 
Numbers of trainings, meetings and public forums which fall outside of the notification 
requirements of the law were banned.18 Organisers and participants were frequently targeted 
for criminal prosecution and harassment.19 Later, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) was 
accused of deliberately passing legislation to suppress political protests. The Penal Code, the 
Law on Peaceful Assembly and the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisation 
provided a legal basis to contain the escalation of public assemblies. 20  
In Malaysia, the Peaceful Assembly Act was a response to contain massive opposition rallies. 
The opposition parties and several NGOs initiated the Bersih movement urging the government 
to reform the electoral process. The first Bersih rally was launched in 2007. The anti-
government rally was stopped, and the organisers were arrested.21 It was followed by the Bersih 
2.0 in 2011 which attracted around 50,000 protesters. While Bersih 2.0 was a peaceful 
demonstration, the police deployed excessive force to disperse it and arrested 1,667 protesters.22 
After violent clashes, the Malaysian Government enacted the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012. 
This legislation bans any assembly in the form of street protest. Bersih 3.0 was held in 2012, it 
started out peacefully but turned to violence after police used tear gas and water cannons. Bersih 
continued mobilising supporters on the street and advocating regime change until the dominant 
party, UMNO and its alliance, lost the general election for the first time in Malaysian history 
 
17 Amnesty International, ‘Taking to the Street – Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Cambodia’ (4 June 2015) 
< https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa23/1506/2015/en/> accessed 11 May 2016, 6. 
18 ibid 8. 
19 ibid. 
20 Siena Anstis, 'Using Law to Impair the Rights and Freedoms of Human Rights Defenders: A Case Study 
of Cambodia' (2012) 4 Journal of Human Rights Practice 312, 313. 
21 ‘Police block Malaysia protest’ (Aljazeera, 11 December 2007)<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-
pacific/2007/12/2008525131234195960.html> accessed 10 May 2016. 
22 Amnesty International, ‘Malaysia frees activists detained under emergency law’(29 July 2011) 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2011/07/malaysia-frees-activists-detained-under-emergency-
law/> access 10 May 2016. 
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in 2018. Unsurprisingly, the Peaceful Assembly Act did not ease the people’s right to enjoy 
freedom of assembly. In contrast, it was used as a tool to repress street protest. The new 
government was led by Mahathir Mohamad who was the Prime Minister from 1981-2003. 
Although he joined several Bersih rallies and had declared that he would abolish the Peaceful 
Assembly Act, the Mahathir administration only amended the law to decriminalise street 
protests and shorten the notification period requirement.23 Although the amendment made the 
law less restrictive, there are still other restrictions that the government use in shaping the 
exercise of freedom of assembly in Malaysia.  
The experiences in these three jurisdictions inspired me to explore the relationship between 
social movements, politics, and law. Having a legal framework that states its purpose to enable 
people to enjoy the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms does not guarantee that it will be 
implemented accordingly. By examining this relationship, we will learn more about how 
individuals enjoy freedom of assembly in hybrid regimes, and more specifically, about the role 
of law and its institutions in facilitating the mobilisation of social movements. 
 Justification for the research 
The concept of hybrid regimes was proposed to distinguish a type of political regime that 
appears somewhere on the spectrum of transition towards democracy. It is a concept that 
challenges the standard authoritarian/democracy dichotomy. Social movement scholars have 
agreed that there is a strong relationship between patterns of contention and the nature of 
political regimes.24 In particular, Graeme Robertson has argued that the social movement 
studies literature depicts a sharp contrast between protest in democracies and protest in 
authoritarian regimes while the characteristics of protest in hybrid regimes are relatively 
unexplored and tell a different story. He sought to fill this gap by introducing a study of the 
politics of protest in hybrid regimes (focusing on the Russian Federation). He suggests that 
classic social movement theoretical frameworks cannot be applied to hybrid regimes to 
understand the pattern of protests. This is because the protest pattern in hybrid regimes often 
looks like the protest pattern in democracies where there are well-organised and autonomous 
opposition movements (though here such opposition organisations are absent, protest in hybrid 
 
23 Syed Umar Ariff and Arfa Yunus, 'Parliament decriminalises street protests' (New Straits Times, 4 July 
2019) <https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/07/501559/parliament-decriminalises-street-
protests> accessed 10 July 2019. 
24 Graeme B Robertson, The politics of protest in hybrid regimes. managing dissent in post-communist russia 
(New York : Cambridge University Press 2011) 9-10. 
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regimes will look similar to those in authoritarian regimes).25 Moreover, Robertson points out 
that not all protests in hybrid regimes advocate for democracy or liberal revolutions. Protests 
in hybrid regimes comprise both real pressure from below and ersatz social movements 
mobilised by the state itself.26   
Overall, the disciplinary differences between social movement studies, political science, and 
law cause a silo effect in the literature on public assemblies.27 On the one hand, social movement 
scholars use large-scale event catalogues. This method is hardly applied to understand 
contention in countries where there are no systematic newspaper records or well-organised 
databases. Social movement scholars rarely acknowledge the comparative frameworks 
developed by political scientists to understand contention in developing nations.28 They prefer 
to rely on case studies of individual movements, often with a western bias, and focusing on the 
origins and outcomes of contentious episodes. Tarrow noted that Tilly and his collaborators 
overlooked the connections between contentious politics and different regime types.29 On the 
other hand, scholars in political science rarely touch on the rich social movement and revolution 
studies literature in sociology because political scientists are not familiar with the tools and 
methods that sociologists use.  
What makes this thesis particularly significant is that law, as a discipline, is broadly missing 
from the literature in both social movement studies and political science. Comparative legal 
scholarship has paid little attention to freedom of assembly – perhaps because it is assumed that 
any scholarly grand doctrine has already been developed through other similar freedoms such 
as freedom of expression and association.30 This thesis argues that Robertson and other social 
movement scholars have overlooked the significance of legal mechanisms governing public 
assemblies. I believe that legislation and law enforcement practices are by-products of the 
exercise of state power. They provide vitally important insights, and tangible evidence for 
understanding, the repertoires of contention in every state. It is striking, therefore, that the social 
movement studies and political science literature have not yet attempted to explain why legal 
 
25
  ibid 10. 
26  ibid 13. 
27 Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements (Oxford University 
Press 2015) 90. 
28
  ibid 89. 
29
  ibid 91. 
30 Orsolya Salát, 'Comparative Freedom of Assembly and the Fragmentation of International Human Rights 
Law' (2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 140, 141. 
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mechanisms governing public assemblies in hybrid regimes work differently from those in 
consolidated democracies.   
 Research problem and questions 
The central question of this thesis is why laws governing public assemblies and public order 
policing in hybrid regimes do not support individuals to enjoy freedom of assembly according 
to international standards. The main thesis argument is that incumbents in hybrid regimes 
accommodate significant freedom of assembly while minimising the possibility of losing their 
power by curtailing the scope of freedom of assembly through legal frameworks governing 
public assemblies and public order policing. Although laws governing public assemblies in 
hybrid regimes have many components that are similar to those in consolidated democracies, 
these laws are enforced differently in hybrid regimes because they serve a different purpose 
than to enable the democratic process. This is why international standards on public assemblies 
and IHRL do not have much traction in hybrid regimes. The legal frameworks and public order 
policing in hybrid regimes provide the incumbents with opportunities to construct and to 
stabilise the regimes.  
Unlike closed authoritarian regimes, in which opposition protests are generally prohibited, 
incumbents in hybrid regimes allow opposition movements to challenge the regime in the 
public. Therefore, the incumbents need to manage and reduce the threat from the street. On the 
one hand, a hybrid regime needs to effectively dominate the political sphere and ensure the 
continuity of the regime. On the other hand, it needs to be able to absorb pressure from the 
international community to uphold and protect human rights standards, and thus needs to 
provide (at least) the formal appearance of protecting and enshrining oppositional routes to 
power. Indeed, the constitutions in many hybrid regimes themselves guarantee freedom of 
assembly. States have committed themselves (through ratification of international treaties) to 
respect human rights.  However, Robertson overlooks this legal aspect – the role of law and its 
institutions – in shaping protest patterns. Hence, this study aims to link aspects of the legal 
regulation of freedom of assembly in Southeast Asia (focusing on Cambodia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand) with Robertson’s theoretical framework of protest in hybrid regimes. It seeks to 
illustrate the background factors that explain how laws governing public assemblies in hybrid 
regimes function (and are enforced) differently from those in consolidated democracies. 
In short, there is a need to consider the role of law and its institutions in shaping the repertoires 
of political contention in hybrid regimes. The originality and significance of this thesis comes 
from the attempt to connect the relationships between three scholarly disciplines (social 
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movement studies, political science and law) in doing so – as well as from the region that this 
thesis focuses upon. The thesis highlights the effects of the disconnection between IHRL and 
public assembly law in practice. It suggests that there is a correlation between Robertson’s 
understanding of the politics of protest in hybrid regimes and the specific characteristics of 
legal mechanisms governing public assemblies.  
 Methodology 
This thesis follows a doctrinal approach to legal research. It focuses on the international 
standards distilled from the case law of the CCPR and ECtHR as well as court decisions and 
academic commentary involving the legislation on public assemblies and public order policing 
in hybrid regimes. The thesis also draws on inter-disciplinary works from the fields of social 
movement studies and political science. It aims to broaden these fields by inserting observations 
from a legal perspective. First, it identifies the international standards on governing public 
assembly from the CCPR and the ECtHR through their online databases.31 The thesis then 
discusses Robertson’s monograph, ‘The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes’ and suggests 
that Robertson – like other social movement scholars – has overlooked the important role of 
law (and the way in which it shapes public order policing) in understanding protest practices in 
hybrid regimes.  
This thesis seeks to identify the characteristics of legal mechanisms governing public 
assemblies in hybrid regimes by using Robertson’s criteria in the politics of protest in hybrid 
regimes as a foundation. Then, it compares the international standards against the legislation in 
three jurisdictions in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia) governing public 
assemblies and public order policing to illustrate that hybrid regime incumbents essentially 
curtail freedom of assembly through legal mechanisms.  
For legislation and cases from domestic jurisdictions, this thesis uses original documents if they 
are available in English or in Thai. There is no official English translated legal database in 
Cambodia and Thailand. The Malaysian legal database only partly includes English 
translations. To address this gap, and thus to help triangulate the data relied upon, the thesis 
further draws upon English translations of materials in other languages that are found in 
 
31 The CCPR cases can be found from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights  <http://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Documents>; The ECtHR cases can be found in HUDOC database  
<https://hudoc.echr.coe.int>.  
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credible sources such as from well-known newspapers and international human rights NGOs’ 
reports. 
 Parameters of the research  
This thesis draws exclusively from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and UN 
Human Rights Committee (CCPR) jurisprudence due to the rich case law developed by these 
bodies on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. It omits consideration of other regional 
judicial bodies such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights due to the fact that the freedom of assembly jurisprudence of these 
bodies is both limited, and (in any case) is largely derivative of the ECtHR and CCPR standards.  
Regarding the definition of “hybrid regimes”. The two main approaches defining hybrid 
regimes are the diminished democracy approach and the diminished authoritarianism 
approach.32 The diminished democracy approach conceives of hybrid regimes in terms such as 
illiberal democracy33, semi-democracy,34 partial democracy,35 and defective democracy.36 On 
the other hand, the authoritarianism approach refers to competitive authoritarianism37 and 
electoral authoritarianism.38 Instead of referring a non-democracy as a democracy or an 
authoritarianism with adjectives, it should be seen as a regime that is neither a democracy nor 
authoritarian.39 Therefore, this thesis follows Robertson’s generic term of “hybrid regimes” 
referring to ‘a broad range of regimes in which at least some legitimate and public political 
competition coexists with an organisational and institutional playing field that renders this 
competition unfair’.40 
The thesis chooses Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand as the subject countries because they are 
hybrid regimes that have similar political movements. The yellow shirt – Red shirt movements 
in Thailand inspired protest organisers in Cambodia and Malaysia to adopt the same tactics to 
 
32 Gilbert and Mohseni (n 14) 273. 
33 Fareed Zakaria, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy' (1997) 76 Foreign Affairs 22. 
34 Diamond, Linz and Lipset (n 7). 
35 David L Epstein and others, 'Democratic Transitions' (2006) 50 American Journal of Political Science 
551, 555. 
36 Aurel Croissant, 'From transition to defective democracy: mapping Asian democratization' (2004) 11 
Democratization 156. 
37  S Levitsky and L A Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War 
(Cambridge University Press 2010). 
38 Andreas Schedler, The politics of uncertainty. sustaining and subverting electoral authoritarianism 
(Oxford studies in democratization, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013. 2013). 
39 Gilbert and Mohseni (n 14) 281. 
40 Robertson (n 24) 6. 
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advance similar demands. The incumbents in these three countries responded in the same 
manner by introducing legislation governing public assembly within the same decade. All three 
countries had many organised protests challenging long-dominant political factions. Eight other 
countries in Southeast Asia had the potential of being a subject country in this study but the 
selection here is based on an evaluation of those countries that most closely resemble the 
characteristics of a hybrid regime.41  
In this regard, similar uneven playing fields in the political arenas can be found across the three 
countries at different levels. Thailand represents a regime that swings between the military-
backed/junta government and the populist government. Although the populist political parties 
sometimes managed to win general elections, Thailand is still a hybrid regime because the 
uneven playing field continue to exist because the constitution was carefully designed to give 
pro-military parties an unfair advantage. Also, when the populist parties were in power, they 
tended to elevate their political advantage by abusing state resource and manipulated the media. 
Cambodia represents a strong hybrid regime. Prime Minister Hun Sen has been in power for 
more than thirty years. The Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and Hun Sen’s sponsors turned 
Cambodian politics into personalised power networks through patron-client relationships.42 
They created ‘a massive patronage-based vote- driving machine’ to ensure their election 
victory.43 Also, there are several laws creating unfair political advantages to the incumbents.44 
Within the same spectrum, Malaysia represents a mild hybrid regime. The United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO) ruled Malaysia from 1957 to 2018. It exercised semi-legal 
techniques to impose disadvantage on the opposition before any votes were cast.45 The 
opposition parties were banned from organising large public rallies and were limited to small 
indoor gatherings. The election campaign period was short while the government utilised the 
media outlets, state equipment and development grants with a blind eye from the electoral 
commission.46 Although the civil society exists, individuals and NGOs do not operate in the 
same capacity as those in consolidated democracies. UMNO has created ersatz social 
 
41 Eight other countries are Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, 
and Timor-Leste. These countries have specific laws on freedom of assembly and trend to arbitrarily 
enforce them to limit the scope of freedom of assembly. Laos and Vietnam follow communism. Brunei 
is an absolute monarchy.  
42 Mona Lilja, 'Discourses of Hybrid Democracy: The Case of Cambodia' (2010) 18 Asian Journal of 
Political Science 289, 302. 
43 Un Kheang, 'The Cambodian People Have Spoken' (2015) Southeast Asian Affairs 102, 103. 
44 Anstis (n 20) 313. 
45 Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an age of democratization (Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 129. 
46  ibid. 
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movements to drive the party’s agendas and dominate the civil society. The uneven playing 
field in Malaysian politics continued at a lesser degree after UMNO lost the general election in 
2018. 
This thesis is a study on the nature of protest law and its enforcement in hybrid regimes. The 
term ‘protest’ and ‘public assemblies’ are used interchangeably (though it is of course 
recognised that not all protests take the form of an assembly, and not all public assemblies are 
protests). In this study, the focus is on assemblies in public places that demand change in public 
policies or that advocate particular political opinions. This focus encompasses a wide range of 
protest activity (including, for example, labour marches on the international labour day, protests 
by standing silently in a small group, protests by gathering names to submit a petition to the 
authorities, and protests by performing arts). However, it deliberately excludes from the scope 
of the thesis online protest in digital space – primarily because such activism raises a range of 
very different issues that have not yet been the focus of legal (i.e. legislative) initiatives in 
hybrid regimes. Moreover, I suggest that online mobilisation does not demonstrate the 
participants’ worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC) in the same tangible way 
as offline, real-world, physical assemblies.47 Of-course, that does not exclude the possibility 
that online protests may, in future years, take over some or many of the political functions 
currently realised primarily through physical assemblies. Nor is to deny that online mobilisation 
may already play a significant role in political will formation, and thus represent a challenge to 
regime stability, in hybrid regimes. The focus, here, is however on the particular legal 
frameworks enacted to govern real-world demonstrations in the street.    
 Thesis outline 
This thesis is organised into six chapters. Following from this first introductory chapter, the 
second chapter explores international standards on freedom of assembly arising from CCPR 
and ECtHR case law. It examines the particular image of a democratic society that human rights 
law pursues (or perhaps, assumes) – namely, a society that upholds the values of pluralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness. Ultimately, the right to freedom of assembly will be afforded 
protection only if its exercise is deemed to conform with this pluralist conception of democracy. 
The chapter further explores the scope of the right to peacefully assemble; the corresponding 
obligations imposed on states by IHRL; permissible and impermissible restrictions on freedom 
 
47 Cf. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and of association (13 June 2018) A/HRC/38/34 para 80 –freedom of assembly covers the rights to 
assemble peacefully and associate freely online. 
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of assembly; prior notification requirements; and international standards on public order 
policing (specifically in relation to surveillance, arrest and the use of force). These international 
human rights standards – because of the principle of subsidiarity – can only provide a minimum 
baseline of protection (rather than a maximal standard). However, while these minimal 
standards ought to inform the legal framework governing public assemblies, and despite formal 
ratification of the ICCPR in two of the subject countries –Cambodia and Thailand – they 
ultimately fail to gain sufficient traction in hybrid regimes (as later chapters demonstrate).48 It 
is suggested that while IHRL may be capable of constraining the worst excesses of protest 
regulation within established democracies, the gap between the conception of democracy 
underpinning human rights standards and the political and legal realities in hybrid regimes 
thwarts the realisation of an effective right of assembly in the latter. 
The second chapter explores cases law involving time, place, and manner restrictions, content-
based restrictions, and prior notification requirements to illustrate the international standards 
protecting freedom of assembly.  Then, it discusses the international standards on public order 
policing such as the general duties of the police, surveillance, arresting, use of force, derogation 
and judicial review on public order policing. This chapter attempts to show that the CCPR and 
the ECtHR have established a minimum level of protection for the freedom of assembly. 
However, this body of case law also demonstrates that IHRL aims primarily to support and 
underpin democratic processes – and this (instrumental) democratic rationale is repeatedly 
emphasized by these regional and international bodies. In other words, the legal framework 
governing public assemblies and public order policing must conform with IHRL standards to 
ensure that democratic processes function properly. 
The third chapter serves as a literature review exploring the role of public assemblies through 
social movement studies and political science perspectives. Then, it argues that scholars in these 
two disciplines have overlooked the role of law and its institutions, especially the legal 
mechanisms governing public assemblies. Consolidated democracies have incorporated 
international human rights standards on public assemblies (as identified in chapter 2) to ensure 
that freedom of assembly is properly exercised as a part of the democratic process. In contrast, 
hybrid regimes claim that they commit to international standards but it is suggested that the real 
 
48 Although Malaysia is not a party to the ICCPR, some provision of the ICCPR, particularly the freedom of 
assembly, are internationally recognised as binding under customary international law. In addition, 
Malaysia is a party to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration which reaffirms that ‘every person has the 
right to freedom of assembly’.  
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goal is to minimise the political effect of street protests. This chapter then discusses Robertson’s 
theory of the politics of protest and argues that it reveals the incentives of regime incumbents 
in hybrid regimes to restrict freedom of assembly: to impose the restrictions to limit the ability 
of political dissenters to mount public protests and, at the same time, allowing ersatz social 
movements to mobilise and dominate civil society.49 In turn, this thesis seeks to identify the 
characteristics of laws governing public assemblies and of public order policing. This 
assumption is then tested by demonstrating that Russia under the Putin administration has 
curtailed opposition street protests through legal mechanisms while the regime itself has the 
ability to mobilise supporters to create an appearance of invincibility.50 This chapter illustrates 
that the Putin administration controls what Robertson describes as “organisational ecology” 
through a legal framework governing NGOs and also controls “state mobilisation strategies” 
through legal frameworks governing public assemblies and public order policing. The result 
leads us to the question of whether the three Southeast Asian hybrid regimes use the same 
techniques to curtail the scope of freedom of assembly. This question is explored in chapter 4 
and chapter 5.  
The fourth chapter examines the characteristics of the legal frameworks governing public 
assemblies in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand. With the incentives operating on hybrid 
regime incumbents that we have discussed in chapter 3, this chapter explores how the three 
hybrid regimes curtail the scope of freedom of assembly through legal frameworks governing 
public assembly. It demonstrates that hybrid regimes do not simply ban public assemblies but 
rather unfairly limit anti-regime protesters’ ability to organise public assemblies. The legal 
frameworks in these regimes act as the ‘street-proofing’ mechanisms. This chapter argues that 
the legal frameworks in Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand share two characteristics: (1) overly 
broad legal grounds for restricting freedom of assembly without the strict tests of necessity and 
proportionality, and (2) a lack of adequate judicial oversight. The authorities are thus able to 
enforce the law arbitrarily (even though the laws appear to be neutral). Content-based 
restrictions, blanket bans, and onerous notification requirements are imposed to curtail the 
exercise of the right to freedom of assembly. Therefore, the legal frameworks governing public 
assemblies have a clear role in providing the authorities with opportunities to act in favour of 
the regime incumbents.  
 
49 Robertson (n 24) 27. 
50 ibid 32. 
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The fifth chapter examines public order policing in hybrid regimes. It argues that public order 
policing in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand were curtailed to provide the police 
opportunities to swing between democratic approach and authoritarian approach.  It argues that 
the police in hybrid regimes share two characteristics: the lack of insulation from political 
influence and the divergence between the cultural norms of the police and international human 
rights norms. These two characteristics allow public order policing in the three states to ‘swing’ 
between a rights compliant approach and a rights abusive approach. This chapter examines 
public order policing in the three regimes through Pino and Wiatrowski’s description of the 
principle of democratic policing: the rule of law, legitimacy, transparency and accountability, 
and subordination to civil authority. It demonstrates that the incumbents abuse and twist the 
understanding of the principle of democratic policing in order to manipulate the police. Police 
in the three regimes do not always abide by the positive obligations under international 
standards because their legal frameworks and institutional settings grant them unchecked 
power. Therefore, public order policing has a role in shielding the incumbents’ political power 
from anti-regime protests on the street and in facilitating ersatz social movement to show their 
dominance.  
The last chapter concludes how Robertson’s politics of protest reveals the incentives of hybrid 
regimes incumbents in curtailing freedom of assemblies through legal frameworks and public 
order policing. They are street-proofing mechanisms allowing them to accommodate freedom 
of assembly to a minimal degree (so as to appear as democratic) while filtering out protests 
regarded as presenting a potential threat to the regime.51 These mechanisms help the incumbents 
maintain elite unity and allow regime-supporters to display an appearance of invincibility. This 
chapter concludes that laws governing public assemblies and public order policing in hybrid 
regimes are designed precisely to give advantage to the incumbent leaders. This is the reason 
why the scope of freedom of assembly in hybrid regimes is significantly reduced when 
compared to that enjoyed in consolidated democracies. In conclusion, it is argued that social 
movement theorists and political scientists should pay more attention to the legal mechanisms 
governing public assemblies. 
 
51 Robertson (n 24) 168. 
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 Chapter 2 International Human Rights Standards on  
Freedom of Assembly 
Political stability and democratic legitimacy have long been closely connected with 
international human rights norms. Many world leaders after the Second World War believed 
that a strong international organisation with a mandate to address human rights issues could 
have prevented the rise of Hitler and the Holocaust.1 Following from the non-binding 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN member states in 1966 established binding treaty-
based norms and institutions for the protection of the rights of individuals by adopting the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).2  
Notwithstanding this historical backdrop, the aspirational twinning of democratic pluralism and 
human rights has only really become an express hallmark of the international community since 
the 1990s.3 After the ideological confrontation during the Cold War ended, democracy has been 
proven to be the best option allowing individual rights to thrive.4 Moreover, there was a  
recognition that human rights became significant only when international norms are translated 
into real safeguards both domestically and internationally.5  
Notably, the ICCPR and the ECHR provide us with good examples showing that international 
instruments can enhance the protection of human rights. Of particular relevance to this thesis, 
the UN Human Rights Committee (CCPR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
have produced sizeable bodies of case law and legal principles in relation to freedom of 
assembly. Their voluminous jurisprudence allows this study to identify international standards 
on freedom of assembly. As such, this chapter aims to identify the international standards 
emerging from the CCPR and the ECtHR. Both have identified issues where domestic courts 
have failed either to recognise violations or to provide an effective remedy to victims of such 
violations.  
 
1 Thomas Buergenthal, ‘International Human Rights in an Historical Perspective’ in Janusz Symonides (ed), 
Human rights : concept and standards (Unesco 2000) 11. 
2 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were adopted in the same year to make a composite 
package. 
3 Symonides (n 1) 17-8, 24. 
4 ‘The Opening Statement of the United Nations Secretary-General’, World Conference on Human Rights, 
United Nations, DPI/1394-39399, August 1993, 17. 
5 Symonides (n 1) 25. 
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The chapter first argues that IHRL depicts a certain image of a democratic society – namely, a 
polity that upholds the values of pluralism, tolerance, and open-mindedness. Moreover, IHRL 
has recognised that states must be able to defend themselves from anti-democratic behaviour. 
Second, this chapter explores the scope of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, as 
elaborated by the CCPR and the ECtHR. The third part explores international standards on the 
power of a state to impose legitimate restrictions on freedom of assembly (focusing, in 
particular, on content-based restrictions, blanket-bans, and notification requirements). The last 
part identifies international standards on public order policing. Overall, this chapter highlights 
the centrality to a democratic rule of a legal framework and to public order policing of 
compliance with IHRL (and its image of a democratic society). As later chapters then show, 
this stands in stark contrast to (and provides a benchmark against which to assess) the 
significantly weaker protections for the right to assemble in hybrid regimes. 
 Is international human rights law relevant? 
Democratic processes, public assemblies and IHRL are inter-connected. They complement each 
other’s existence. A democratic society values individualism and respects that everyone can 
participate in politics. Hence, people are allowed to exercise freedom of assembly peacefully 
to put pressure upon or influence their government. As we shall see in the next chapter, Tilly 
suggests that the repertoires of contention in a democracy contain three elements: an organised 
campaign targeting authorities, peaceful collective actions, and displays of worthiness, unity, 
numbers, and commitment (WUNC).6 There must be a strong civil society, which operates 
freely to put political pressure on the politicians. Democracy depends on collective actions from 
social movements rather than from particular individuals.7 This process needs rules and 
guidelines to keep it continuing democratically. A democratic society needs to lay down some 
restrictions to prevent public assemblies from corrupting democratic processes and to prevent 
the authorities from the unjustifiable breaching of democratic values. This is where IHRL and 
international standards on public assemblies play a role.   
Although many human rights do not require democracy before they can be implemented – that 
is to say, that democracy or democratic credentials is no a prerequisite of a governmental 
framework that protects human rights – IHRL aims to promote democracy.8 It is at least 
 
6 Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires (University of Chicago Press 2006) 53, 183. 
7 Jean Grugel, Democratization : A Critical Introduction (Palgrave 2002). 
8 Anthony J Langlois, 'Human Rights without Democracy? A Critique of the Separationist Thesis' (2003) 25 
Human Rights Quarterly 990, 1002. 
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conceivable that other forms of government could respect human rights without adopting 
democratic values. However, there is a strong alignment between democratic principles – such 
as self-determination, freedom, autonomy, individualism, egalitarianism, tolerance, and 
pluralism – and the values embodied by IHRL.9 
Many human rights (such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, the right to privacy 
and to information) are integral to a properly functioning democracy.10 Moreover, human rights 
require the majority to respect the principle that everyone is due a basic level of respect – a 
democratic majority may not therefore simply overrule the rights of a minority. The majority 
in power is tempted to manipulate political rights to proliferate their supporters, especially to 
win elections.11 The Holocaust reminds us that the majority could pursue evil goals and became 
self-righteous and insensitive toward dissents. In this sense, human rights serve to constrain the 
worst excesses of bare majoritarianism.12 Most importantly, a functioning democracy needs to 
ensure that individuals have access to the means to protect their rights, especially from the 
state’s interference. IHRL offers both the grounds and mechanisms to challenge the legitimacy 
of state interferences (including specific policies and practices, or even particular rulers). On 
this point, Langlois has summarised that human rights and democracy share the same goal – 
namely, to force the authorities ‘to rule in the name of and for the interests of the people—
rather than merely serving their own interests.’13        
The following section argues that IHRL has produced a particular image of a democratic society 
whereby a state needs to uphold at least three values: pluralism, tolerance, and 
broadmindedness. IHRL is relevant to every democratic society because it promotes the 
democratic process. At the same time, some restrictions are needed to prevent democracy from 
destroying itself or being destroyed by non-democratic means – but even still, these restrictions 
must comply with IHRL to protect the fundamental fabric of a democratic society. Last, it will 
discuss the limitation of international judicial organs in adjudicating IHRL.  
 
2.1.1 Image of a democratic society under IHRL 
 
9 ibid 1004-1005. 
10 James Griffin, On human rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 243, 253. 
11 Wiktor Osiatyński, Human Rights and their Limits (Cambridge University Press 2009) 73. 
12 Langlois (n 8) 1012-1013. 
13 ibid 1017. 
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IHRL presents a particular image of a democratic society. This image becomes especially 
significant in explaining the lack of traction of human rights norms in ‘hybrid regimes’ (as later 
chapters demonstrate). Democracy values freedom of assembly on the basis that they provide 
a means to exercise civil rights outside the election period and enable individuals to directly 
participate in the politics. Citizens can signal their demands to the government through public 
assemblies and protests. In order to make this function work, a society must process a certain 
quality of tolerance towards peaceful assemblies. Hence, IHRL offers a universal minimum 
baseline to protect freedom of assembly.14  
2.1.1.1 A democratic society must uphold pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness 
A democratic society cannot exist without pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness.15 These 
qualities enable peoples with different backgrounds and beliefs to live together in peace. Both 
democracy and pluralism rely on citizens’ willingness to tolerate values, ideas, and actions with 
which they disagree.16  To promote pluralism, states must persuade their citizens to believe that 
they will gain something more significant by tolerating others’ views or behaviours.17 Bollinger 
has argued that the greatest strength of the First Amendment guarantee of free speech is that, 
in forcing us to confront the extremist views of others, it elicits and promotes the sort of 
tolerance necessary for healthily functioning democracy and collective, interactive social life.18 
Hence, IHRL demands that states must protect freedom of expression because it is one of the 
foundation stones in every democratic society.19 The UN Human Rights Council has reaffirmed 
that every free democratic society is constituted by freedom of opinion and freedom of 
 
14 Michael Hamilton, 'Freedom of Assembly, Consequenctial Harms and the Rule of Law: Liberty Limiting 
Principles in the Context of Transition' (2007) 27 OJLS 81.  
15 Aernout Nieuwenhuis, 'The Concept of Pluralism in the case law of the ECtHR' (2007) 3 European 
Constitutional Law Review 367, 369. 
16 David Feldman, 'Protest and Tolerance: Legal Values and the Control of Public-Order Policing' in Raphael 
Cohen-Almagor and Yitzhak Rabin (eds), Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance: Essay in 
Honor and Memory of Yitzhak Rabin (Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance: Essay in Honor 
and Memory of Yitzhak Rabin, University of Michigan Press 2000) 44. 
17 ibid; Jean-François Akandji-Kombe, Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, vol No.7 (Human Rights Handbooks, Council of Europe 2007) 51. 
18 Lee C Bollinger, The Tolerant Society : Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America (Oxford 
University Press 1988) 4. 
19 Reyes et al v Chile (27 November 2017) Communication no 267/2015 CCPR/C/121/D267/2015, para 7.3. 
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expression.20 This includes the expression and receipt of communications through freedom of 
assembly and association.21  
Democratic states must protect political speech because this type of speech enable individuals 
to express their ideas concerning public interests.22 Hence, states must persuade their members 
to believe that unorthodox views should not be suppressed but rather be challenged through 
counter-argument and tested against other possibilities. By doing so, peoples have the 
information they need when they participate in their political activities and when they hold their 
representative accountable.23   For example, the CCPR, in Svetik v Belarus, has ruled that the 
call to boycott a particular election was protected political speech.24 Similarly, the ECtHR 
regards political speech as the most protected kind of expression under the ECHR. The ECtHR 
emphasised that freedom of speech under ECHR Article 10 included speech that offends, 
shocks or disturbs. A pluralistic society must be able to tolerate severe criticism.25 In Wingrove 
v The United Kingdom , the ECtHR established that ‘there is little scope under Article 10 para 
2 of the Convention (art.10-2) for restrictions on political speech or on debate of questions of 
public interest…’26 The Court saw that the public has the rights to discuss public interests in 
order to engage in political activities effectively. Again, in Arslan v Turkey, the Court 
explained: ‘[i]n a democratic system the action or omission of the government must be subject 
to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but also of public 
opinion.’27 In short, the CCPR and the ECtHR have agreed that a democratic society must 
uphold pluralism tolerance and broadmindedness because they are necessary qualities enabling 
individuals to participate effectively in their politics. A plurality of views in the public sphere 
provides richer debate and a more informed polity. 
2.1.1.2 A democratic society is not required to tolerate violent or anti-democratic behaviour  
Tolerance in a democratic society comes with a limit. The harm principle directs that a person 
deserves to enjoy his liberty as long as he does not harm the interests of others. Indeed, on this 
 
20 UN Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 34 Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression 
(12 September 2011), para 2.  
21  ibid para 13. 
22 Barendt, Freedom of speech (n 6) 18-21. 
23 Katharine Gelber, 'Freedom of political speech, hate speech and the argument from democracy: The 
transformative contribution of capabilities theory' (2010) 9 Contemporary Political Theory  305. 
24 Svetik v Belarus (25 August 2004) Communication no 927/2000 CCPR/C/81/D/927/2000, para 7.3. 
25 Nieuwenhuis (n 15), 370. 
26 Wingrove v The United Kingdom  App no 17419/90 (ECtHR, 25 November 1996), para 58. 
27 Arslan v Turkey App no 23462/94 (ECtHR GC, 8 July 1999), para 46. 
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basis, the only legitimate purpose of legal coercion is to prevent harm to others. 28 This principle 
justifies an interference with someone’s action only when the action meets the threshold of 
harming others.29 To the freedom of assembly, this principle is reflected in Article 17 ECHR 
and Article 5 ICCPR – the prohibition on the abuse of rights. It is also reinforced by ICCPR 
Article 20(2)—prohibiting the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.30  Therefore, a democratic society is not 
required to tolerate violent or anti-democratic behaviour.  
In Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey, a political party was dissolved by the 
Constitutional Court of Turkey on the ground that it became ‘a centre of activities contrary to 
the principle of secularism’.31 The party also engaged in a holy war (jihad) and aimed to 
introduce Islamic law (sharia). The ECtHR held that a political party which incites violence or 
fails to respect democracy cannot demand protection from the Convention.32 The Court 
emphasised that, in a healthy democracy, a political party’s means to promote an idea and the 
idea itself must be compatible with fundamental democratic principles.33 As appeared in 
European history, totalitarian movements in the form of political parties can bring about the 
destruction of a democratic society.34 Hence, limiting some freedoms in order to protect 
pluralism and democracy is acceptable.35 The dissolution of Refah Patisi was regarded as 
‘necessary in a democratic society’.36 This case affirms the idea that a democracy must be able 
to prevent itself from self-destruction (though the judgment is also somewhat ironic since the 
purported threat presented by the Welfare Party was itself measured in terms of the party’s 
electoral success). 
The concept that democracy can defend itself is known as “militant democracy” or “defensive 
democracy.37 The principle suggests that states should be able to repress enemies of the 
 
28 The harm principle was first articulated in J S Mill, On liberty (1972) [1859] 123-124. 
29 Piers Norris Turner, '"Harm"and Mill's Harm Principle' (2014) 124 Ethics 299, 302. 
30 Hamilton (n 13) 81. 
31 Refah Patisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey App no 41340/98 and three others (ECtHR, 13 
February 2003), para 23. 
32 ibid para 98. 
33 ibid. 
34 Such as Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. 
35 Refah Patisi (the Welfare Party) and Others (n 29), para 99. 
36 ibid para 135. 
37 ECtHR merely acknowledged this principle. However, it is clear that ECHR Article 17 prohibit any 
interpretation that is aimed at the destruction of any rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Convention.     
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constitutional order before they have any chance to enter public office.38 The aim of militant 
democracy is to solve “the democratic dilemma” that a functioning democracy carries the 
possibility of destroying itself in the process.39 However, by adopting militant democracy, a 
state creates another paradox. On the one hand, it needs a politically insulated institution to 
guard democracy. On the other hand, giving the monopoly over banning and enforcing militant 
measures to an institution may turn the institution to become a threat to democracy.40 Hybrid 
regime incumbents may co-opt judges and use them to dissolve their rival political parties.41 
Therefore, peaceful assemblies should be recognised as a peaceful means to defend democratic 
values from anti-democratic behaviour.   
2.1.2 The constraints upon international judicial organs: the margin of appreciation and 
doctrine of subsidiarity 
It is important to note that international judicial organs adjudicating IHRL, such as the ECtHR 
and CCPR, are limited and themselves operate within certain constraints. The principle of 
subsidiarity constrains both the ECtHR and the CCPR from reviewing national laws in the 
abstract. This principle aims to guarantee a degree on independence to a state by preventing the 
supra-national organ from intervening in affairs that may be better dealt with domestically.42 
The principle is applied to IHRL on the basis that (1) the primary responsibility to secure human 
rights belongs to States, and (2) international human rights organs have only a supervisory 
function.43 IHRL was not designed to fill the gaps of domestic law but was rather formed upon 
existing domestic bills of rights or constitutions.44 Hence, the enforcement of IHRL relies 
primarily on domestic institutions. However, international human rights institutions 
complement domestic mechanisms by providing a monitoring system of external review. With 
 
38  Jan-Werner  Müller, 'Militant Democracy' in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The Oxford 
handbook of comparative constitutional law (The Oxford handbook of comparative constitutional law 
Oxford University Press 2012) 1254. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid 1267. 
41 For instance, (as mentioned in Chapter 1), on 2 December 2008, Thailand Constitutional Court dissolved 
Palang Prachachon Party and its political allies parties on the ground of electoral misconduct. It was clear 
that the dissolution provided a political opportunity to establish a military-backed government. Similarly, 
in Cambodia, on 16 November 2017, the Supreme Court dissolved the Cambodian National Rescue Party 
(the main opposition party) on the ground that its members, aided by the United States, attempted to 
overthrow the government by calling for ‘Colour Revolution’.   
42 Roberta Panizza, 'The principle of subsidiarity' (European Parliament, October 2018) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/7/the-principle-of-subsidiarity> accessed 30 
January 2019. 
43 Samantha Besson, 'Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Law--What is Subsidiary about Human 
Rights?' (2016) 61 American Journal of Jurisprudence 69, 72. 
44 ibid 76. 
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this power, they can point out where the minimal human rights standards are violated. This is 
the main reason why the right of individual petition under the First Protocol to the ICCPR is 
optional. Another requirement reflecting this principle of subsidiarity is the obligation to 
exhaust domestic remedies before bringing a case to the CCPR or the ECtHR.45  
The different approach between the CCPR and the ECtHR is that the ECtHR explicitly relied 
on the ‘margin of appreciation’ (MoA) doctrine while the CCPR explicitly rejects it.46 The 
CCPR perceives the MoA as a threat to the universality of human rights.47 While States may 
undermine universal values by seeking to justify human rights interferences on the basis of 
cultural and historical differences, the ECtHR developed the MoA as a form of judicial self-
restraint – first in the context of derogations and later expanded to other substantive obligations 
under the ECHR.48 This means that the State parties have some discretion to implement the 
Convention’s standards in accordance with their unique circumstances and conditions.49 The 
size of the margin of appreciation depends on the interactions between domestic courts, national 
parliaments, and the ECtHR (as well as on the nature of the particular right(s) engaged).50 The 
MoA offers states some flexibility in two ways: in assessing the nature of the threat that is said 
to justify a restriction or interference, and in assessing the solution or response. 
The ECtHR applies the MoA in the context of freedom of assembly. For example, in 
Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania51, the Grand Chamber of the Court allowed a relatively 
wide MoA in relation to the particular interference aimed at maintaining public order 
(prosecution for taking part in a ‘riot’). However, the authorities must exercise their power 
based on a fair balance between the legitimate aims to prevent disorder and the requirements of 
 
45 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR art 5.2(b); ECHR art 35 (1). 
46 Dominic McGoldrick, 'A defence of the margin of appreciation and an argument for its application by the 
Human Rights Committee' (2015) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 21, 58 –McGoldrick 
argued that the explanations as to why the CCPR rejected the margin of appreciation appear more 
political than legal. 
47 ibid 53. 
48 ibid 23. 
49 M Saul, 'The European Court of Human Rights' margin of appreciation and the processes of national 
parliaments' (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 745, 749. 
50 ibid. 
51 Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania, app no 37553/05 (ECtHR, 15 October 2015), para 129. –A group of 
farmers set up roadblocks on national highways to protest and to draw attention to their problems. Despite 
the protests were carried out peacefully, the organisers were convicted for rioting. The government 
argued that the interference pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder and the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of other. The domestic courts found that applicants’ roadblocks constituted a 
serious breach of public order and provoked general chaos in the country. 
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freedom of assembly on the other.52 In Zakharov v Russia (as in many earlier cases), the Court 
acknowledged that the national authorities enjoy the MoA in choosing the means for achieving 
the legitimate aim of protecting national security.53 However, this margin is subject to European 
supervision embracing both legislation and the decisions applying it. 54  
It is worth noting that the constraints on adjudication by international judicial organs in relation 
to the hybrid regimes in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand is even greater. The invocation of 
IHRL in these hybrid regimes depends solely on domestic mechanisms because there is no 
international judicial institution which has jurisdiction to adjudicate IHRL. None of the three 
Southeast Asian hybrid regimes is a party to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR which allows 
individuals to lodge a complaint with the CCPR. This is a significant defect since it means 
individuals are reliant on measures taken by, and within, states. Nevertheless, IHRL aspires to 
articulate universal values, and thus acts as a universal benchmark against which to assess the 
compatibility of domestic political processes with democratic values (at least, with the 
particular image of a democratic society that values pluralism, tolerance, and 
broadmindedness). 
 The scope of the right to freedom of assembly under IHRL 
The scope of freedom of assembly under IHRL is determined by many international human 
rights treaties. The United Nations human rights system is the main umbrella while there are 
several regional human rights systems to complement the protection of the freedom. Under the 
United Nations human rights system, the UDHR and the ICCPR are the main instruments. The 
Human Rights Committee (CCPR), a treaty-based body which is able to receive and consider 
complaints from individuals is the main driver to expand the Article 21 jurisprudence. It 
comprises of independent experts who are tasked with duties to monitor implementation of 
ICCPR. It can request a State party to submit a report on human rights and address its concerns 
and recommendations in the form of “Concluding Observations” to the State party. Complaints 
can be raised through the First Optional Protocol to the CCPR (where this has been ratified) 
which help in establishing an international standard on freedom of assembly, creating a corpus 
of adjudications.55 As noted above, none of the three Southeast Asian states is a signatory. 
 
52 ibid, para 182. 
53 Zakharov v Russia App no 47143/06 (ECtHR GC, 4 December 2015), para 232. 
54 Navalnyy v Russia App no 29580/12 and 4 others (ECtHR GC, 15 November 2018), para 139. 
55 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratification and accession 
by General Assembly res 2200A (XXI). 
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Moreover, the UN Human Rights Council also has independent human rights experts with 
mandates to report and advise on human rights from a thematic or country-specific perspective 
known as ‘the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council’.56  The UN Human Rights 
Council established the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the freedom of assembly in 
October 2010.57 The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to Freedom of Assembly and of 
Association (UNSRFAA) has duties to undertake fact-finding country visits and make annual 
reports to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly. In doing so, the UNSRFAA 
also helps define the scope of freedom of assembly under the United Nations human rights 
system. In addition, the UN Human Rights Council has the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
as a universal mechanism to monitor human rights situation in all UN Member States. It 
requires members to declare human rights situations in their jurisdictions and explain how they 
fulfil their obligations towards human rights commitments.58  
At the regional level, there are several regional human rights systems defining the scope of 
freedom of assembly. The African Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate freedom of assembly 
based on the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. In America, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights define the scope 
of freedom of assembly in the American Convention on Human rights. In Southeast Asia, there 
is the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) to advocate the 
freedom of assembly under the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Nonetheless, none of these 
regional human rights systems have so far generated a body of assembly jurisprudence on the 
same scale as the ECtHR in Europe.  
Hence, this study will focus mainly on scope of freedom of assembly defined by the United 
Nations human rights system and the European human rights system namely the CCPR, the 
UNSRFAA, and the ECtHR.   By examining interpretation of the scope of freedom of assembly 
from these institutions, we can see that the scope of freedom of assembly is defined by negative 
obligations (to avoid interfering with the right to peaceful assembly) and positive obligations 
 
56  OHCHR, 'Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council' (Special Procedures Division, 2019) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/sp/pages/welcomepage.aspx> accessed 17 July 2019. 
57 Human Rights Council, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council 15/21 The rights to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and of association (6 October 2010). 
58  Human Rights Council, 'Universal Periodic Review' (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2019) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx> accessed 29 August 2019. 
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(to protect and facilitate peaceful assembly). Hence, the following paragraphs discuss these 
negative and positive obligations in detail.  
2.2.1 Positive obligations to facilitate and protect peaceful assemblies 
The negative obligation to respect and ensure the rights of all individuals under international 
law means that States must refrain from restricting the exercise of the rights where it is not 
expressly allowed under international law.59 States are also under a positive duty to protect and 
promote human rights.60 In terms of freedom of assembly, the duty to facilitate and protect 
rights means that states are required to create, facilitate or provide the necessary conditions for 
the enjoyment of rights.61 This includes the responsibility to provide basic services such as 
traffic management, medical assistance, and clean-up services.62 States have the positive 
obligations to facilitate and protect peaceful assemblies to both participants in an assembly and 
to those who are affected from the exercise to the freedom of assembly.63 Thus, States may 
need to restrict freedom of assembly to facilitate an enabling environment. Still, any restriction 
imposed on peaceful assemblies must comply with international human rights standards. 
Restrictions should be used as an exception rather than a norm, and they must not impair the 
essence of the right.64    
The CCPR and the ECtHR have ruled that states have the positive obligations to facilitate and 
protect peaceful assemblies. In Kirsanov v Belarus and Turchenyak et al v Belarus, the CCPR 
held that ‘states should be guided by the objective of facilitating rather than seeking to limit the 
right to peaceful assembly disproportionately’. 65 Similarly, the ECtHR has applied the concept 
of positive obligations to public order policing.66 In Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v Austria, 
an association of pro-life doctors held two demonstrations to influence the Austrian legislation 
reform on the issue of abortion. Their demonstrations were confronted by counter-
 
59 UN Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions 
on the proper management of assemblies, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/66, para 14. 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid. 
62 ibid para 40. 
63 ibid para 13. 
64 ibid paras 29-36. 
65 Kirsanov v Belarus (5 June 2014) Communication No. 1864/2009 CCPR/C/110/D/1864/2009, para 9.7; 
Turchenyak et al. v Belarus (10 September 2013) Communication No.1948/2010 
CCPR/C/108/D/1948/2010, para 7.4. 
66 Jim Murdoch and Ralph Roche, The European Convention on Human Rights and Policing (The Council 
of Europe 2013) 9. 
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demonstrations. To prevent disorder, the police formed a cordon between the opposing groups. 
However, the organiser claimed that the cordon was insufficient because the counter-
demonstrators were able to interrupt them by using loudspeakers and throwing eggs/clumps of 
grass at them. The ECtHR found that the Austrian authorities did not fail to take reasonable and 
appropriate measures. The Austrian Government argued that ECHR Article 11 did not create 
any positive obligation to protect demonstrations because the Article was designed to protect 
the individual from direct interference by the state and that Article 11 did not apply to relations 
between individuals.67 The ECtHR, however, ruled that Article 11 required positive measures 
from the state because ‘in a democracy, the right to counter-demonstrate cannot extend to 
inhibit the exercise of the right to demonstrate.’68 On this point, the ECtHR established an 
important key principle – one that illustrates the Court’s vision of the public sphere in a 
‘democratic’ society: 
 A demonstration may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to 
the ideas or claims that it is seeking to promote. The participants must, 
however, be able to hold the demonstration without having to fear that they 
will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents; such a fear would 
be liable to deter associations or other groups supporting common ideas or 
interests from openly expressing their opinions on highly controversial issues 
affecting the community.69 
The ECtHR saw that the objective of Article 11 could not be achieved through only a negative 
obligation of non-interference. State parties to the Convention have ‘obligations to take a 
positive step to protect the rights of individuals’.70 Therefore, peaceful demonstrators must be 
protected from violent counter-demonstrations or any other violent party including those from 
their own side.71 In addition, in Plattform Ärzte für das Leben, the ECtHR sees positive 
obligations as measures to be taken rather than results to be achieved. 72 States do have wide 
discretion on the choice of tactics. This principle was restated in the United Macedonian 
 
67 Plattform Ärzte für das Leben v Austria App no 10126/82 (ECtHR, 21 June 1988), para 29.  
68 ibid para 32. 
69 ibid. 
70 Murdoch and Roche (n 66). 
71 Maina Kiai, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of 
association (United Nation General Assembly 21 May 2012) para 33. 
72 Plattform Ärzte für das Leben (n 67), para 34. 
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Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v Bulgaria.73 The Court held that the authorities were bound 
by positive obligations under the Article 11 to take adequate measures to prevent violent acts 
directed against the participants in a peaceful assembly, or at least the authorities must limit 
their extent.74 The Court reaffirmed: ‘genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot 
be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere; it is the duty of Contracting 
States to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed 
peacefully’.75   
In short, the CCPR and the ECtHR have the same opinion that limiting state interference alone 
is not enough to enable people to enjoy the freedom of peaceful assembly. Rather, the state 
must also take action to protect and facilitate peaceful assemblies. The next question is what 
public assemblies can be considered as peaceful assemblies. To more clearly ascertain what 
kind of assemblies give rise to these state obligations under IHRL, the following section 
discusses the international standards in relation to determining the peacefulness of an assembly.  
Since only peaceful assemblies are protected under international standards, peacefulness is a 
key ingredient in determining the extent of the state’s positive obligations.76 In determining 
whether an assembly qualifies as peaceful, a broad interpretation of the term ‘peaceful’ should 
be afforded,77 and the manner in which an assembly is held and the intention of its participants 
must be taken into consideration.78 Assemblies which cannot be defined as peaceful lose their 
protected status within the scope of the right to assembly. Non-peaceful assemblies can thus be 
limited without the state needing to demonstrate that the requirements in ICCPR article 21(2) 
and ECHR article 11(2), allowing proportionate restrictions, have been met.79  
IHRL has established a number of important standards in relation to this key criterion of 
‘peacefulness’ and these will be dealt with here in turn. They concern, respectively: an emphasis 
 
73 The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v Bulgaria App no 44079/98 (ECtHR, 20 
October 2005). 
74 ibid. 
75 ibid para 115. 
76 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly 
(Second edn, ODIHR 2010), guideline 1.3, 15; Human Rights Council, First Thematic Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, (21 
May 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/20/27, para 25; Human Rights Council, Resolution 25/38 The promotion 
and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests (11 April 2014) 2. 
77 Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights : CCPR commentary (2nd edn, N.P. Engel, 
2005) 487. 
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79Orsolya Salát, 'Comparative Freedom of Assembly and the Fragmentation of International Human Rights 
Law' (2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 140, 147. 
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on the intentions of assembly organisers and participants; ‘peacefulness’ in the context of a 
threat of violence arising from counter-demonstrators; ‘peaceful’ as distinct from ‘lawful’; and 
the ambiguous threshold of ‘reprehensible behaviour’. 
Both the CCPR and the ECtHR determine whether it is a peaceful assembly by assessing 
whether the organisers and participants have violent intentions. States have an obligation to 
presume that an assembly is peaceful until the contrary intention can be proven.80 Furthermore, 
the burden of proving violent intention belongs to the state rather than to the organisers or to 
the participants.81 In Christians against Racism and Fascism v United Kingdom, the European 
Commission on Human Rights established that ‘the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is 
secured to everyone who has the intention of organising a peaceful demonstration’.82 The 
Commission affirmed that ‘the notion of “peaceful assembly” does not include any 
demonstration where the organiser and participants have violent intentions that result in public 
disorder’.83  
In Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria, the ECtHR further 
noted that, when assessing the proclaimed intentions of an assembly organiser, one important 
factor to consider is whether there has been an express call for the use of violence, an uprising 
or any other form of rejection of democratic principles. 84 In this case, the court noted that the 
authorities might have had reason to interfere with the applicant’s Article 11 right if there had 
been such a ‘real foreseeable risk of violent action or of incitement to violence’ – but on the 
facts of the case, the court held that ‘there was no real foreseeable risk of violent action or of 
incitement to violence or any other form of rejection of democratic principles’.85 Similarly, in 
Mushegh Saghatelyan v Armenia, the ECtHR noted that the organisers’ purported intention to 
start an armed riot could have been proven by the authorities had they produced evidence 
 
80 UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/HRC20/27 (n 76) para 25; Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (n 76) guideline 2.1. 
81  Christian Democratic People’s Party v Moldova (No2) para 23; Frumkin v Russia, App no 74568/12 
(ECtHR, 6 October 2016), para 98; See also Taranenko v Russia, App no 19554/05 (ECtHR, 15 May 
2014), para 65. 
82 Christians against Racism and Fascism v The United Kingdom App no 8440/78 (ECHR, 16 July 1980), 
DR 21, 138, 148. 
83 ibid. Similarly, Cisse v France App no 51346/99 (ECtHR, 9 April 2002) para 37: ‘the only type of events 
that do not qualify as “peaceful assemblies” are those in which the organisers and participants intended 
to use violence.’ 
84 Stankov and The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria, App nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95 
(ECtHR, 2 October 2001), para 90. 
85 ibid para 111. 
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suggesting that firearms, explosives or bladed weapons were used by the participants.86 The 
applicant was found carrying a clasp knife but had never shown his intention to use the knife.87 
The assembly, in this case, went peacefully until the police dispersed it with force without prior 
warning.88 The Court saw that there was not sufficiently convincing evidence to conclude that 
the applicant had violent intentions.89  
In addition to the emphasis placed by the court on peaceful intentions, the right to organise or 
to join a demonstration under Article 11(1) cannot be taken away simply because there is a 
possibility of violent counter-demonstrations or a risk of disorder coming from outside the 
control of those organising it. In Christians against Racism and Fascism, the Commission ruled 
that the violent threat from counter-demonstrations alone did not justify interference with the 
peaceful assembly.90 The police continue to have an obligation to facilitate an assembly and 
protect it from counter-demonstrators, so long as it itself remains peaceful.91  
In Ziliberberg, a protest began peacefully but later turned violent. The ECtHR explained: ‘an 
individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a result of sporadic violence 
or other punishable acts committed by others in the course of the demonstration if the individual 
remains peaceful in his or her own intentions or behaviour’.92 The word “sporadic violence” 
here is open to interpretation. At the very least, the authorities may not quickly conclude that a 
demonstration should be dispersed because some violence has occurred.  
Peaceful assemblies, even in consolidated democracies, are often repressed because states too 
often regard the lawfulness of an assembly as being more important than its peacefulness.93 
Moreover, since the legal frameworks in non-democratic contexts (including in ‘hybrid 
regimes’) are often drafted and applied with the aim of protecting the incumbent rulers, what is 
‘lawful’ is itself often narrowly circumscribed. Crucially, however, under IHRL, peacefulness 
and lawfulness are different, and the protection of the right to freedom of assembly ought to 
depend primarily on its ‘peacefulness’ (rather than mere ‘lawfulness’). In Nurettin Aldemir and 
Others v Turkey, the ECtHR found that Turkish security forces violated Article 11 as they 
 
86 Mushegh Saghatelyan v Armenia, App no 23086/08 (ECtHR, 20 September 2018), para 230. 
87 ibid para 232. 
88 ibid. 
89 ibid para 233. 
90 Christians against Racism and Fascism (n 82) 151. 
91 ibid. 
92 Ziliberberg v Moldova App no 61821/00 (ECtHR, Admissibility decision of 4 May 2004).  
93 Tabatha Abu El-Haj, 'The Neglected Right of Assembly' (2009) 56 UCLA Law Review 543, 562. 
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dispersed peaceful demonstrations on the ground that the protest location was not permitted by 
law.94  The demonstrators did not engage in any violent action, and the Court ruled that the 
forceful intervention by the police was disproportionate and was not necessary for the 
prevention of disorder.95 Similarly, in Kovalenko v Belarus, a group of thirty people conducted 
a commemoration to those who were killed during the Stalinist repression. They were stopped 
and charged with an administrative offence by the authority because their commemoration was 
seen as an unauthorised mass event (a picket). The CCPR saw that ‘the peacefulness of the 
assembly was demonstrated by its aim of paying tribute to the victims of the Stalinist 
repression’.96 Breaking the requirement for prior authorisation alone (even if unlawful) does 
not determine whether an assembly is not a peaceful assembly. 
In Ezelin v France, the ECtHR established that a person had the freedom to take part in a 
peaceful assembly as long as he/she does not commit any ‘reprehensible act’.97 This principle 
has been reaffirmed in Galstyan v Armenia98 and Ziliberberg v Moldova.99 It is worth noting, 
however, that ‘reprehensible’ is a much more ambiguous term than either ‘non-peaceful’ or 
even ‘unlawful’/‘illegal’. In Kudrevicius v Lithuania, the ECtHR held that the almost complete 
obstruction of major highways against police instructions was a ‘reprehensible act’.100 In this 
case, the court considered that the protesting farmers had intended to cause serious disruption 
to ordinary life, more than the normal exercise of the right to peaceful assembly would 
permit.101 Such a finding was arguably foreshadowed by the Commission’s decision regarding 
the sit-in (blocking a road leading to US military barracks) in G. v Germany. Even though this 
protest was carried out peacefully, the Commission found that the blocking of a public road, 
which caused more obstruction than would normally arise from the exercise of the freedom of 
 
94 Nurettin Aldemir and Others v Turkey App no 32124/02, and 6 others (ECtHR, 18 December 2007), para 
46. 
95 ibid. In contrast, in Cisse, a group of several hundred illegal immigrants occupied a church for two months. 
They were forced to evacuate on the ground of unsatisfactory sanitary conditions by the police. Although 
the occupation of the church had been peaceful and did not disturb public order, the Court saw that the 
intervention by the authorities was justified as the sanitary conditions had become inadequate. See Cisse 
(n 83), para 51. 
96 Kovalenko v Belarus (26 September 2013) Communication No.1808/2008 CCPR/C/108/D/1808/2008, 
para 5.3. 
97 Ezelin v France App no 11800/85 (ECtHR, 26 April 1991), para 53. 
98 Galstyan v Armenia App no 26986/03 (ECtHR, 15 November 2007), para 115. 
99 Ziliberberg (n 92). 
100Kudrevičius and Others (n 51), para 174. 
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assembly, was an unlawful action that constituted a legal ground for its dispersal.102 The 
German Government argued that this assembly was not peaceful because the German law 
prohibited sit-in protests. 103 As such, one might speculate that the origins of ‘reprehensible’ 
behaviour are closer to the notion of ‘illegality’ than ‘non-peacefulness’.  
In this light, the notion of ‘reprehensible behaviour’ is problematic – offering an ill-defined and 
elastic concept which domestic authorities might interpret widely (or as akin to 
‘unlawful’/‘illegal’) to justify their interference with the freedom. Reliance on the threshold of 
‘reprehensible behaviour’ potentially makes the scope of the right to freedom of assembly 
contingent on the minimum level of tolerance afforded by domestic authorities rather than the 
ECtHR’s emphasis on peaceful intentions (which offers stronger protection for assemblies).  
As a fundamental right, States should have the presumption in favour of holding assemblies.104 
The notion of peaceful assembly is a key pillar in a democracy because freedom of assembly 
allows individuals to use peaceful means to exert some measure of control on political decision 
makers instead of using violent means to solve public affairs.105 Therefore, violent assemblies 
intended to create disorder or to disrupt the rule of law cannot be justified as being in the interest 
of a democratic society.106 
2.2.2 The meaning of ‘assembly’: organisers, participants and manner  
It is worth exploring the basic guarantees established by IHRL in relation to the composition of 
an assembly – its organisers/leaders, participants, and further obligations arising from human 
rights law relating to the location and manner of assemblies. 
2.2.2.1 Organisers and participants 
International standards establish that the right to enjoy freedom of peaceful assembly should be 
enjoyed by everyone without discrimination. Everyone can be an organiser of or a participant 
in a public assembly,107 – though states should not assume that someone has been an organiser 
 
102 ibid. 
103 G. v Germany [1989] ECHR 28. 
104 UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/HRC20/27 (n 76) para 27; Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (n 76) guideline 2.1, 15. 
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unless they can prove his or her intention.108 This includes non-nationals, children, people with 
disabilities, as well as law enforcement personnel. Although Article 21 ICCPR does not use the 
same wording as found in Article 19(2) – ‘everyone shall have the right …’ – or indeed, as 
Article 11 of the ECHR – ‘everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly ...’109 – but 
is instead phrased in more abstract terms – ‘the right of peaceful assembly shall be recognised’ 
– this provision has nonetheless been interpreted to ensure that its application extends beyond 
mere citizenship.110  
The UNSRFAA pointed out that, under the ICCPR, all individuals, without distinction of any 
kind, have the right.111 This includes minors, indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, 
minorities, non-nationals, refugees, and unregistered groups. “Everyone” has the rights to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.112 This includes stateless persons, refugees 
or migrants, and unregistered associations.113 The CCPR itself commented that the right to 
freedom of assembly is not limited only to citizens.114 For example, Kuwait Law No.65 (1979) 
on public gathering prohibiting non-Kuwaitis from participating in public gatherings was found 
to be an overly broad prohibition.115 The Committee further emphasized that the peaceful 
exercise of the rights to peaceful assembly cannot be used as a ground for revoking 
citizenship.116   
To answer the question of the minimum number of participants needed to constitute an 
assembly, the relationship between freedom of expression and freedom of assembly must be 
explored. Both the ECtHR and CCPR agree that freedom of assembly and freedom of 
expression complement each other.117 The difference is that, in the Strasbourg court’s 
 
108 UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/HRC20/27 (n 76), para 29. 
109 However, the right under Article 11 is subject to limitation under Article 16, which allows Contracting 
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115  HRC ‘Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Kuwait’ (11 August 2016) 
CCPR/C/KWT/CO/3, paras 42-43. 
116 ibid para 49. 
117UN Human Rights committee, General comment No.34 (n 20) paras 50-52; Ezelin (n 97), para 35; 
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jurisprudence, freedom of assembly is considered as lex specialis in relation to freedom of 
expression (as lex generalis) while the CCPR does not follow this approach. 
 The ECtHR has held that an assembly must have more than one participant.118 A single-
individual protest does not constitute an assembly but is instead protected under the scope of 
freedom of expression. In contrast, the CCPR have produced inconsistent case law, leading in 
three directions. First, the CCPR found that a single-person-protest was not an assembly in 
Coleman v Australia, Levinov v Belarus (2012), Surgan v Belarus, and Levinov v Belarus 
(2016).119  Second, the Committee found that a single-person-protest was admissible under 
Article 21 but examined it under Article 19 (in Katsora v Belarus, Pivonos v Belarus, and 
Protsko and Tolchin v Belarus).120 Last, the CCPR has considered cases affirming that single-
person-protests were protected under both freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.121   
Being an organiser of an assembly usually incurs legal obligations and responsibilities under 
domestic law. This is especially so in authorisation regimes, where penalties are imposed on 
the organisers if they fail to obtain official authorisation before commencing their events. In 
Zalesskaya v Belarus,122 the complainant argued that three persons walking on a sidewalk 
distributing leaflets could not be considered as an organised mass event. The authorities saw 
that it was a mass event because the Belarusian Law on Mass Events did not specify any 
quantitative threshold. The CCPR noticed that the Law on Mass Events was ambiguous and 
lacked clarity. The law left the question of qualification of a mass event to the competent state 
organs. The CCPR considered that the fine imposed on the complainant was unjustified because 
the authorities did not explain why the restriction was necessary within the meaning of article 
 
118 Kudrevičius and Others (n 51), para 91; Novikova and Others v Russia App nos. 25501/07 and 4 others 
(ECtHR, 26 April 2016), para 108. 
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Protest law & Public Order Policing in Hybrid Regimes - Pat Niyomsilp 
56 
 
21 of the ICCPR.123 It is worth noting that the CCPR did not decide the legal issue whether the 
complainant’s action could properly be held to constitute an unauthorised mass event under 
domestic law because the CCPR’s ability to undertake more intensive scrutiny is limited by the 
doctrine of subsidiarity.124 By failing to decide this matter, the CCPR accepted the State party’s 
claim that the question of qualification of a “mass” event shall be decided each time by the 
competent state organs. In other words, the national authority could continue to apply “the Law 
On Mass Events” on case by case basis. 
In Belyazeka v Belarus, the author claimed that he was only a participant to a commemoration, 
therefore he should not be held responsible for administrative liability under the Law on Mass 
Events which required a prior authorisation.125 Similar arguments were also found in Kovalenko 
and Velichkin v Belarus.126 This two cases involved the breaking up of the commemoration of 
the victims of the Stalinist repression on 30 October 2007 in Vitebsk. The Vitebsk Regional 
Court ruled that the Law on Mass Events required participants at the commemoration to seek 
an authorisation to hold a mass event. The Supreme Court agreed. The CCPR later found that 
Belarus violated the ICCPR Article 19 and Article 21. Although the restrictions were in 
accordance with the law, the CCPR found that such restriction did not conform to the strict tests 
of necessity and proportionality. The Belarus authorities has not explained why the 
commemoration would violate the interests of national security or public safety, public order 
(ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.127 These cases show that domestic law can impose restrictions on organisers 
and participants in a public assembly through the law governing public assembly but these 
restrictions must conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality. On this issue, this 
study will contrast below (chapter 4.2.3.1) how Southeast Asian hybrid regimes use the 
definition of organisers (including assumed organisers) and participants to shape the scope of 
freedom of assembly.  
2.2.2.2 Manner of an assembly 
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As we have seen, international standards establish that all types of assemblies are protected as 
long as their organisers and participants do not intend to use violence.128 The UNSRFAA has 
explained that freedom of assembly ‘includes the right to plan, organise, promote and advertise 
an assembly in any lawful manner’.129 Forms of assembly such as long-term demonstrations, 
sit-ins, occupy-protests, and online-protests should be protected.130 All simultaneous 
assemblies and counter-protests should be facilitated by States131 (unless these prevent other 
individuals and groups from exercising their freedom of peaceful assembly).132 According to 
the ECHR, the right to peaceful assembly includes many forms of meetings trying to convert 
others or to communicate or to show strength.133 Indeed, the Court has held the notion of 
‘assembly’ to be an autonomous concept within the Convention, and has explicitly ‘refrained 
from formulating the notion of an assembly … or exhaustively listing the criteria which would 
define it …’ precisely in order to ‘avert the risk of a restrictive interpretation.’134 Similarly, the 
CCPR has not provided any definitive list of the types of assembly that fall to be protected 
under Article 21. In addition, the OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines recommend that the definition of 
a peaceful assembly in domestic legislation should be inclusive and be defined as broadly as 
possible.135   
On this issue, in Chapter 4, this thesis will further discuss the definition of ‘a peaceful assembly’ 
in the three Southeast Asian hybrid regimes. It argues that the definition of a peaceful assembly 
in the law governing public assembly (PAA) in these regimes meets the international standards 
but the law gives the authorities vast discretion to ban or to restrict an assembly. For example, 
the PAA gives the authorities discretion to restrict some public assemblies which they 
considered as political gatherings or street protests. As a result, hybrid regime incumbents can 
discriminately filter out or restrict anti-regime protests. 
2.2.3 Right to choose time, place, and manner 
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International standards establish that organisers have rights to choose a location for their 
assembly. This principle is premised on an understanding of urban space as not only an area for 
traffic but also an area for participation.136 The free flow of traffic should not automatically 
prevail over the freedom of assembly.137 While domestic traffic law and street regulations often 
prioritize the maximisation of traffic flow, Nicholas Blomley has pointed out that the ‘traffic 
logic’ of traffic law may lead us too readily to accept that public space is  merely a ‘transport 
corridor’ rather than a site for citizenship.138 An effective right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
implies that it is the state’s duty to facilitate a space for exercising the freedom.  
As a general principle, organisers have the right to demonstrate within ‘sight and sound’ of 
their target audience or target object.139 Freedom of assembly would be rendered meaningless 
if people could only gather and communicate amongst themselves without being able to deliver 
their message to a wider public. The ability to choose a location, time and manner for spreading 
their messages is at the core of this freedom.140 In this regard, both the CCPR and the ECtHR 
have affirmed the ‘sight and sound’ principle. In Sáska v Hungary, the ECtHR held that ‘the 
right to freedom of assembly includes the right to choose the time, place and modalities of the 
assembly, within the limits established in paragraph 2 of Article 11.’141 In CCPR jurisprudence, 
the Committee held that organisers have the right to choose a location within hearing and seeing 
distance of their target audience.142 The Committee emphasised that this right is crucial in a 
democratic society.143   
The ‘sight and sound principle’ also applies in relation to counter-demonstrations which should 
be facilitated within ‘sight and sound’ of one another: there would be no counter-
demonstrations if the opposition were unable to see and hear the dissenting message. To rebut 
this argument, the authorities might argue that if the core purpose of an assembly is to send a 
message, organisers and participants could seek another way to express their opinion through 
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alternative channels (such as press releases or leafleting). However, one could argue that 
posting a comment or contribute a token display of support on a social network, especially 
when it is done in private, does not show as much commitment as going to a public gathering.144 
Sending a message is not the sole function of the right to peaceful assembly. It enables like-
minded people to generate a social movement which drives their society. The effectiveness of 
the right of freedom of assembly would be diminished if the authority were simply able to 
redirect participants to shout to themselves at some distance removed from their target 
audience.   
Another common method of undermining the ‘sight and sound’ principle is the designation by 
city or State authorities of a single approved location for holding assemblies. In Turchenyak et 
al v Belarus and Kozolve et al v Belarus, the Human Rights Committee noted that designating 
a sole location for public assembly to a stadium under the domestic legal framework cannot 
justify a ban on the use of other public locations.145 Similarly, in Sudalenko v Belarus, the 
Committee found that a restriction limiting public assemblies to a remote designated location 
was equal to a de facto prohibition.146 In Statkevich and Matskevich, the complainants requested 
to hold a ten-person-picketing in the city centre, in front of a shopping mall. The local authority 
refused on the ground that the complainants failed to ensure public safety and order, medical 
assistance and clean-up.147 The domestic court ruled that the complainants could picket only at 
the designated location according to the local by-law.148 The CCPR found the restriction was 
unjustified because the authorities failed to explain why the complainants’ picket in the 
proposed location would ‘jeopardize national security, public safety, public order, the 
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.149  
Under CCPR jurisprudence, the right under Article 21 covers both outdoor and indoor 
assemblies. 150 In Bakur v Belarus, the Committee held that an indoor public event was protected 
by ICCPR.151  Similarly, the ECtHR has affirmed that ‘the right to freedom of assembly covers 
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both private meetings and meetings in public thoroughfares as well as static meetings and public 
processions …’152 The OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines also recommends that the right to freedom of 
assembly cover assemblies on private property.153 Nevertheless, the owners of properties may 
lawfully restrict access to their land – a position that has been reinforced by IHRL: In Zündel v 
Canada, the CCPR established that neither Article 19 nor Article 21 of the ICCPR confers an 
absolute freedom of forum.154 In Taranenko v Russia, the ECtHR explained that freedom of 
expression does not automatically grant the rights of entry to private property or to government 
offices.155 In Appleby v The United Kingdom , the ECtHR has ruled that a private landowner 
can deny entry to anyone without having to consider the important of freedom of expression 
against the right of property.156  The Court has noted that under the circumstance that 
individuals have no space to exercise freedom of assembly, i.e. because the entire municipality 
is controlled by a private body, the state has a positive obligation to regulate property rights to 
protect the enjoyment of freedom of assembly under the ECHR. 
To sum up, states have both negative and positive obligations towards freedom of assembly. In 
general, all forms of assemblies are protected in a democratic society, unless there is a violent 
intention on the part of the organiser. The right to peaceful assembly should be extended to 
everyone without discrimination but the role of an organiser (and related liabilities) should not 
be assumed or imposed. International standards also provide that organisers and participants 
have the right to assemble within sight and sound of their target audience. In later chapters, this 
thesis will demonstrate that the three Southeast Asian hybrid regimes do not follow the principle 
of sight and sound that we have discussed in this section. The authorities in these regimes use 
blanket bans to restrict freedom of assembly and shield the incumbents from challenges on the 
street. Although, they could argue that international standards allow states to interfere freedom 
of assembly upon certain conditions, it is important to remark that the international standards 
also require that such interference is permissible only if it conforms with the law and the strict 
test of necessity and proportionality.157 Therefore, the following section explores the 
international standards involving states’ ability to interfere with and limit freedom of assembly.    
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 Grounds for any interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly 
Generally, it is a negative obligation for the states not to unduly interfere with the freedom of 
assembly. States can only interfere on the grounds provided by the treaties. The legitimate 
grounds for imposing restrictions of freedom assembly appear in Article 21 ICCPR and Article 
11(2) The CCPR and the ECtHR use the three-prong test to justify any restriction on the 
freedom of assembly: They assess whether a restriction: (1) is prescribed in conformity with 
the law, (2) pursues a legitimate aim, and (3) is necessary in a democratic society (comply with 
a strict test of necessity and proportionality).158 The principle of proportionality requires that 
‘any restriction must be appropriate to achieve its protective function’.159 At the same time, it 
must be the least intrusive instrument that can deliver the desired outcome.160   
In my view, the central purpose of these limitations is to enable a democratic society to function 
properly. If we were to remove the democratic quality from this provision, any restriction in 
any regime type would perfectly fit the three-prong test because a state could exercise its 
sovereignty to make any law, especially to define what is in the interest of national security and 
what is the desired quality of its public order.161 Hence, “necessary in a democratic society” 
becomes a fundamental determinant of whether restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly 
are legitimate. The test provides a measure of independent objectivity by which to evaluate the 
quality and effect of whatever restrictions have been imposed. 
The CCPR has held that the law regulating the freedom of assembly must be in strict 
compliance with the grounds for restriction indicated in Article 21 of the Covenant.’162 In 
Belyazeka v Belarus, the complainant was convicted on the ground of organising an 
unauthorised mass event.163 The domestic court found that the commemoration service met the 
definition of a “picket” under the Law on Mass Events. The Committee points that by imposing 
a procedure for holding mass events, it is the state’s obligation to explain how its restrictions 
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meet the criteria set out in Article 21 of the Covenant.164 The CCPR saw that there was a 
violation because the state did not explain why such restriction was necessary. In both 
Belyazeka and Kovalenko, the State party’s restrictions on public assembly were in accordance 
with the domestic law but the State failed to explain how, in practice, these restrictions meet 
criteria set out in Article 21 of the ICCPR.165 These two cases reaffirm that the state has the 
burden to show a rational connection between the legitimate aim and specific restrictions on 
the exercise of freedom of assembly. In the same way, the ECtHR reviews the grounds for 
restriction indicated under ECHR Article 11(2). In Hyde Park and Others v Moldova (No.4), 
the Court explains: 
When carrying out its scrutiny under Article 11 the Court’s task is not 
to substitute its own view for that of the relevant national authorities but rather 
to review under Article 11 the decisions they have delivered in the exercise of 
their discretion. This does not mean that it has to confine itself to ascertaining 
whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and 
in good faith; it must look at the interference complained of in the light of the 
case as a whole and determine whether it was “proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to 
justify it are “relevant and sufficient”. In so doing, the Court has to satisfy 
itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity 
with the principles embodied in Article 11 and, moreover, that they based their 
decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see, mutatis 
mutandis, Jersild v Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 31, Series A no. 298).166  
Regarding the quality of domestic law, in Nepomnyashchiy v Russian Federation, the CCPR 
explained that legislation must be sufficiently precise to allow an individual to regulate their 
behaviour accordingly.167 Similarly, the ECtHR has held that the standard “prescribed by law” 
includes the clarity of the law (not merely whether a legal provision exists).168  In Hashman and 
Harrup v The United Kingdom , the Court established that the law (in this case, a binding over 
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order to keep the peace and be of good behaviour) must state what ‘the subject of the order 
might or might not lawfully do’.169 Laws governing public assemblies must at least provide 
sufficient precision letting the people know how to act lawfully. The Court noted that one of 
the reasons that restrictions must be prescribed by law is that this creates certainty and 
foreseeability.170 This condition offers a safeguard against arbitrariness from the authorities. 
Having laws that are either too subjectively or too vaguely worded can greatly limit the ability 
to enjoy freedom of assembly. In Gillan and Quinton v The United Kingdom, the ECtHR held 
that the law, under ECHR, must be ‘adequately accessible and foreseeable, that is, formulated 
with sufficient precision to enable the individual – if need be with appropriate advice – to 
regulate his conduct.’171 Although the Court did not assess whether Article 11 had been violated 
in Gillan and Quinton, it is clear that its ratio extends to cover the laws governing public 
assemblies.172  
2.3.1 Impermissibility of content-based restrictions 
International standards provide that content-based restrictions must be carefully scrutinised as 
they can greatly affect the democratic character of a society. The CCPR and the ECtHR have 
allowed content-based restrictions in several areas: ‘the expressive freedoms relating to obscene 
material, defamation of private individuals and judges, national security, reckless incitement of 
imminent violence, inciting the abolition of institutions of democracy and racial or religious 
invective.’173 However, the CCPR has consistently expressed the view that content-based 
restriction is one of the most serious forms of interference. Often, such concerns arise in the 
context of public assemblies that seek to challenge entrenched societal norms concerning 
gender and sexuality. In Alekseev v The Russian Federation, for example, the complainant 
requested that he be allowed to hold a picket in front of the Iranian Embassy in Moscow to raise 
public awareness and call for a ban on the execution of homosexuals in Iran. It was refused on 
the ground that the picket would trigger a negative reaction in society. The CCPR found that 
the restriction was based solely on the content of the picket.174 Although the State party could 
argue that such restriction was for public safety, the Committee pointed out that the State had 
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a positive duty to protect picketers from violent parties. The State did not explain why the police 
would not be able to prevent the violence. Hence, the restriction was not necessary in a 
democratic society.175   
In Youbko v Belarus, the complainant requested to hold a picket of around 50 participants with 
an aim to draw public attention to the work of the judiciary. They proposed to display posters 
saying: “For Justice”, “The President-Guarantor of Constitutional Rights”, “We Are Against 
Bureaucracy in Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office”, and “Why Are Innocent People Convicted 
and Real Murderers Remain Free?”. The request was denied because the picket was considered 
to be an attempt to influence court rulings.176 Because the burden of showing the necessity of a 
restriction is always on the state, the CCPR found that the restrictions did not pass strict tests 
of necessity and proportionality because the local authorities failed to explain why criticism of 
a general nature regarding the administration of justice would jeopardize the court rulings.177 
In Evrezov v Belarus, the domestic authorities rejected the complainant’s request to protest the 
imprisonment of a political figure on the ground that its purpose would contradict a court’s 
verdict on the prisoner.178 The CCPR found that this rejection was unduly restrictive to freedom 
of assembly. The national authorities failed to demonstrate how the complainant’s picket would 
jeopardise national security, public safety, public order, the protection of public health or 
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.179  The ECtHR expressed, in 
Primov and Others v Russia, that ‘the government should not have the power to ban a 
demonstration because they consider that the demonstrators' “message” is wrong’.180 In this 
case, the authority that had the power to authorise or deny the public assembly was the main 
target of criticism. Hence, the Court emphasised that content-based restrictions on freedom of 
assembly in the case should be subject to the most serious scrutiny.181  
2.3.2 Presumptive disproportionality of blanket-bans 
One way in which states can fulfil their negative obligation not to unduly interfere with 
assemblies is to avoid imposing blanket-bans on time and location.182 Their prohibitive, 
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indiscriminate and far-reaching nature make such bans presumptively disproportionate. 
Blanket-bans often cover iconic locations such as historical sites, parliaments, presidential 
palaces, and memorials. They should be considered as public spaces where people can organise 
a peaceful assembly. In Pavel Levinov v Belarus, the CCPR held that the restrictions that limited 
pickets to certain designated locations, requiring a one-person picket to contract additional 
services in order to hold a picket, do not conform with the standards of necessity and 
proportionality under the Covenant.183 There are many cases in which the ECtHR ruled against 
blanket bans prohibiting assemblies in a specific location. For example, blanket bans near 
parliaments in Nurittin Aldemir and Others v Turkey and Sáska v Hungary, bans near 
government buildings in Christian Democratic People’s Party v Moldova, Özbent and Other v 
Turkey, bans near courts in Kuznetsov v Russia, Maloffeyeva v Russia,and Kakabadze and 
Others v Georgia,  and bans near the residence of a prime minister in Patyi and Others v 
Hungary. 184  In Lashmankin and Others v Russia, the Court noted that Russian law imposed a 
statutory blanket ban on holding public events at certain locations such as in the immediate 
vicinity of court buildings, detention facilities, the residences of the President of the Russian 
Federation, dangerous production facilities, railway lines and oil, gas or petroleum pipelines.185 
The Court explains a general ban on demonstrations can be considered as being necessary under 
the scope of the Article 11 Convention if it has two components: (a) the assembly pose a real 
danger to public order, and (b) it is clear that the security concern outweighs the unavoidable 
negative effects from the assembly even after applying narrow bans on location and duration.186   
The authorities in many countries have used blanket bans to curtail the exercise of the right to 
freedom of assembly – often, to gain some degree of political advantage. For the purposes of 
this thesis (and as later chapters demonstrate), this is certainly true of hybrid regimes, where 
IHRL has limited traction. This creates a double problem – not only do blanket bans greatly 
limit the exercise of freedom of assembly, but because they are generally enacted in primary 
legislation (not merely imposed by way of police discretion), there is little possibility to mount 
a legal challenge against them: international mechanisms generally avoid reviewing in abstract 
the human rights compatibility of domestic legislation because of the principle of subsidiarity. 
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2.3.3 Notification and authorisation  
The permissible rationales for requiring prior notification of assemblies is that States have a 
positive obligation to facilitate and to protect peaceful assemblies. In order to be able to 
facilitate an assembly effectively, the authorities need to know some information regarding the 
assembly such as time, place and the possibility of counter-demonstrators. This should be the 
main objective of a notification procedure (and notification procedures are thus preferable to 
authorisation procedures).187 Holding a peaceful assembly should not be subjected to 
authorisation by the authorities because states should recognise the presumption in favour of 
holding peaceful assemblies.188 Moreover, states should always protect and facilitate peaceful 
spontaneous assemblies189 – those where the organisers are unable to fulfil the notification 
requirements or where there are no identifiable organisers. Domestic laws should provide an 
exemption for such assemblies from any standard prior notification requirement.190  
The CCPR and the ECtHR take different approaches towards notification and authorisation. 
Generally, both agree that notification is preferred over authorisation191 – though neither has 
yet explicitly outlawed authorisation requirements.192 The CCPR has further held that 
authorisation procedures must not be used to prevent people from organising a peaceful 
assembly, and in Youbko v Belarus and Bazarov v Belarus, the CCPR held that authorisation 
or notification procedures must comply with the Covenant.193 Similarly, under the ECHR, prior 
notification is permissible as a lawful restriction if it is not contrary to the spirit of Article 11.194 
In Kuznetsov v Russia, the ECtHR expressed its view that ‘the subjection of public assemblies 
to an authorisation or notification procedure does not normally encroach upon the essence of 
the right as long as the purpose of the procedure is to allow the authorities to take reasonable 
and appropriate measures in order to guarantee the smooth conduct of any assembly.’195  
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Importantly, however, the CCPR has held that a notification requirement is a de facto 
interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under the ICCPR.196 This implies 
that states must be able to explain why the notification procedure is justifiable under the strict 
tests of necessity and proportionality.197 This view is shared with the Special Rapporteur and 
the OSCE/ODIHR Panel of Experts on Freedom of Assembly.198 In contrast, the ECtHR does 
not automatically consider authorisation or notification procedures to be an interference with 
the right to freedom of assembly. Here Mead comments that if authorisation or notification 
procedures are not even regarded as an interference, then there will not be any scrutiny by the 
ECtHR on the proportionality of the authorisation/notification process because there must be 
an interference before the Court can assess the proportionality of such process.199 
According to international standards, it can be argued that there are three characteristics that 
prior-notification procedures in a democratic society should have: (1) it is not necessary for all 
assemblies to be subjected to a notification procedure, (2) spontaneous assemblies should be 
exempted from a notification procedure, and (3) a failure to comply with a notification 
requirement does not justify dispersal as long as it remain peaceful. Each of these will be dealt 
with here in turn. 
2.3.3.1 Not all assemblies need notification – and the challenge of ‘horizontalism’ 
Notification should not be required automatically for all assemblies. An assembly that does not 
cause much disturbance or that consists of only a small number of participants or which takes 
place in an indoor/private space should be exempted from the procedure. 200 In Aleksandrov v 
Belarus, the CCPR held that a prior-authorisation for a street march in which only three persons 
intended to participate was not necessary in a democratic society.201  In Lozenko v Belarus, a 
prior-authorisation requirement for holding meetings in a private space was held to be 
unnecessary.202  
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Furthermore, it is difficult (if not impossible) to require a notification or a permit for an 
assembly which has neither an organiser nor leader. Identifying who should be responsible for 
fulfilling the notification requirement can be problematic in relation to public assemblies that 
are based on horizontalism, a social movement concept that rests on the logic of flattened 
hierarchies, differentiated equality and non-representation.203 Horizontalism was claimed to be 
a motivational influence in the American Occupy Wall Street protests204, the Spanish 
Indignados, the Greek Aganakitismenoi, and the Turkish Gezi protests.205 Critical Mass bicycle 
rides are another type of leaderless protests. It has been accepted as an event with no fixed 
route, no end-time and no pre-determined destination.206 These are all decided by the 
participants on the day. The random nature of Critical Mass makes an advance notification 
impossible.207 
Such amorphous forms of organisation, lacking formal leadership hierarchies or structures – in 
combination with the technical capacity to multiply and expand participation far beyond what 
was previously possible – are creating both opportunities and challenges for assembly 
participants and state authorities alike. Indeed, in both established democracies and 
authoritarian regimes, messaging apps and online digital media platforms, initially embraced 
as a tool for mobilisation, have quickly themselves become a target for governmental regulation 
and a means of tracking and imposing liability on protesters.208 This is an area in which 
international human rights standards are lagging behind practice ‘on the ground’ – though 
perhaps inevitably so.209  On this issue, later chapters further argue that the definition of 
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‘organisers’ in hybrid regimes are too broad. Such definitions allow the authorities in hybrid 
regimes to impose the notification/authorisation duty upon assumed organisers. There have 
been several instances where a post on online media, inviting the public to a public event, has 
made the owner of the account liable for failing to notify the authorities.     
2.3.3.2 Spontaneous assemblies should be exempted from a notification procedure 
There should be an exemption for spontaneous assemblies because they are logistically 
impossible to meet notification requirements.210 To deny this form of public assemblies means 
to deny the essence of the freedom of assembly. The CCPR, in Popova v The Russian 
Federation, has held that spontaneous demonstrations cannot be subjected to a lengthy 
procedure of notification.211 In this case, an organiser was prosecuted for holding an 
unauthorised public event. She argued that her gathering was a direct and immediate response 
to the announcement of the parliamentary electoral result. It was impossible to meet the prior 
notice requirement.212 The Committee found her gathering was a spontaneous peaceful protest, 
which was protected under the ICCPR.213 In Bazarov v Belarus, the CCPR found that the prior 
authorisation for holding a peaceful street march in which only three persons intended to 
participate was not necessary in a democratic society.214 The CCPR emphasised that a state may 
introduce a system of prior notification but it must not operate against the object and purpose 
of ICCPR Article 19 and 21.215 
In Navalnyy v Russia, the ECtHR found that the notification system in Russian law is 
formulated in rigid terms providing no room for any spontaneous assembly.216 The system has 
an unusually long statutory time-limit which makes it more difficult to follow the law. The 
Court has held that, in special circumstances such as an immediate response to a current event, 
the right to hold a spontaneous may override the notification requirements.217 In Lashmankin 
 
210  According to the OSCE/ODIHR guidelines, ‘a spontaneous assembly is generally regarded as one 
organized in response to some occurrence, incident, other assembly or speech, where the organizer (if 
there is one) is unable to meet the legal deadline for prior notification, or where there is no organizer at 
all. Such assemblies often occur around the time of the triggering event, and the ability to hold them is 
important because delay would weaken the message to be expressed’; Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (n 76) 67. 
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and Others v Russia, the Court considered that ‘the automatic and inflexible application of the 
notification time-limits without any regard to the specific circumstances of each case could by 
itself amount to interference without justification under Article 11§ 2 of the Convention.’218 In 
Vyerentsov, the Court referred to the OSCE Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly that 
the notification timeframe should not be ‘unnecessarily lengthy (normally no more than a few 
days)’.219 The Court has identified that the violation of Article 11 arose from the 
implementation of a former Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, 
which had a repressive nature.220 Vyerentsov demonstrates that a legal frameworks which has a 
repressive nature and does not comply with the obligation under IHRL can effectively create 
chilling effects and deter people from exercising freedom of assembly.   
In addition, although the peaceful nature of an assembly may override the need to notify or to 
seek permission from the authorities, a spontaneous demonstration must be warranted by a 
special circumstance.221 ECtHR uses ‘the special circumstance test’ to evaluate whether a 
spontaneous should be allowed. In Éva Molnár, the Court established: 
the right to hold spontaneous demonstrations may override the 
obligation to give prior notification to public assemblies only in special 
circumstances, namely if an immediate response to a current event is 
warranted in the form of a demonstration. In particular, such derogation from 
the general rule may be justified if a delay would have rendered that 
response obsolete.222 
This issue raises the important of judicial review in identifying special circumstances allowing 
spontaneous assemblies. In later chapters, this study argues that the lack of adequate judicial 
review in hybrid regimes renders spontaneous assemblies which have not made an application 
very susceptible to state interference. Notification requirements in hybrid regimes can be 
enforced strictly upon certain groups, and very flexibly on others, leading to claims of 
differential, and thus, arbitrary policing of particular groups. Without adequate judicial review 
to establish the scope of special circumstance, spontaneous assemblies practically depend on 
the authorities’ discretion.     
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2.3.3.3 A failure to comply with a notification requirement does not justify dispersal as long 
as the assembly remains peaceful. 
If the permissible rationale for requiring the submission of prior notification is to enable the 
state to facilitate and protect peaceful assemblies, then failing to notify the authorities should 
not entitle law enforcement officials to disperse an assembly automatically. 223 Neither criminal 
law nor administrative law should not impose punishments on organisers for failing to notify 
the authorities.224  In Bukta and Others v Hungary, the ECtHR emphasised the peaceful nature 
of an assembly that had failed to satisfy the lawful notification requirements. The Court has 
established that states cannot disperse a peaceful public assembly solely because the organisers 
have failed to notify the authorities.225 In Kudrevičius and others, the ECtHR stated that: ‘the 
absence of prior authorisation and the ensuing “unlawfulness” of the action do not give carte 
blanche to the authorities; they are still restricted by the proportionality requirement of Article 
11’.226 In other words, a system of prior notification cannot become an end in itself. 
In addition, the authorities should provide an effective opportunity to the participants to an 
assembly to convey their message before interfering. In Oya Ataman v Turkey, the ECtHR 
found that the police operation to disperse an assembly was disproportionate because there was 
no evidence showing that the participants posed a danger to public order.227 In Éva Molnár, the 
ECtHR found that the police had displayed the necessary tolerance towards protesters by 
allowing them to show solidarity for several hours before dispersing their assembly. This 
interference was not unreasonable because protesters had a sufficiently long time to show 
solidarity.228 The main difference in these two cases is that the dispersal in Oya Ataman was 
quite prompt while the police in Éva Molnár waited for several hours to allow the protesters to 
convey their message before dispersal.229  
To sum up, states are allowed to impose restrictions on freedom of assembly but these must 
satisfy the three-prong test: prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary in a 
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democratic society. International standards also emphasize that content-based restriction230 and 
blanket-bans should be avoided.231 Finally, a prior-notification procedure must have the main 
objective to facilitate public assemblies rather than to prevent them. Most importantly, it must 
be justifiable under strict tests of necessity and proportionality. In later chapters, the relevance 
of these particular international standards will become clear. This thesis will demonstrate that 
hybrid regimes curtail the scope of freedom of assembly to gain political advantages through 
content-based restrictions, blanket-bans, and prior notification requirement. 
 Public order policing  
Public order policing (revisited in chapter 5) is a key determinant of how freedom of assembly 
is exercised in a jurisdiction. The police are responsible for protecting and facilitating peaceful 
assemblies – and thus for upholding the state’s positive obligations in this regard. Indeed, local 
authorities and officials exercising law enforcement duties are at the frontline of fulfilling these 
obligations. Public order policing involves not only protecting political freedoms (such as 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly) but also entails upholding other absolute 
rights such as freedom from torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment. Having a good 
legal framework governing public assemblies does not guarantee that people can enjoy their 
right to peaceful assembly. Public order policing must also comply with international standards.  
This part aims to explore international standards on public order policing. It argues that police 
duties towards freedom of assembly are created by the positive obligation under IHRL. Hence, 
all police policies and operations should aim to facilitate and protect public assemblies rather 
than unnecessarily restricting the freedom. This part explores international standards on the 
core police operations namely surveillance, arrest and detention, dispersal and use of force. It 
then explores international standards aiming to hold the police accountable such as derogation 
(a procedural element of which entitlement is that state provide an explanatory justification), 
judicial review and remedies. 
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2.4.1 General duties of the police: facilitation and protection 
The general duties of the police towards assemblies in a democratic society arise primarily from 
the State’s positive obligations to facilitate and protect the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly. 232 It is helpful to consider these two obligations separately.  
2.4.1.1 Facilitation 
According to the CCPR, states can facilitate a peaceful assembly by providing protesters with 
access to public space and protecting them, without discrimination.233 Some participants such 
as women, children, and disabled persons may need special protection from intimidation or 
gender-based violence. Local authorities and law enforcement agents should establish and 
maintain effective communication with protesters. In addition, basic services, including traffic 
management, medical assistance, and clean-up cost should be the state’s responsibility.234 On 
this issue, in Pavel Levinov v Belarus, the CCPR has noted that ‘[o]rganisers should not be held 
responsible for the provision of such [basic] services, nor should they be required to contribute 
to the cost of their provision.’235 The CCPR has expressed that when imposing any restriction 
to the freedom of assembly, ‘the State party should be guided by the objective of facilitating 
the right rather than seeking unnecessary or disproportionate limitations to it’.236 Similarly, the 
ECtHR has stated that ‘the essential object of Article 11 is to protect individuals against 
arbitrary interference by public authorities with the exercise of the rights protected, there may 
in addition be positive obligations to secure the effective enjoyment of this rights.’237 Hence, it 
is the state’s responsibility to provide appropriate security measures. This includes the presence 
of on-site first-aid services and the management of traffic in the surrounding area.238  Organisers 
of a public assembly should not be held responsible for the cost of basic public services such 
as policing and first-aid services. By charging fee for these services, there will be no rights to 
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peaceful assembly for those who cannot afford to pay.239 The fee will create an exclusive zone 
for protesters with wealthy sponsors and state sponsored social movements.     
The obligation to facilitate includes a duty to train police to uphold IHRL. Police training is 
one of the major factors contributing to the success of enabling public assemblies. The 
UNSRFAA has urged that states adequately train their law enforcement officials to facilitate 
public assemblies.240 Police must have proper knowledge of the laws governing public 
assemblies, crowd facilitation techniques and human rights, including some soft skills such as 
effective communication, negotiation and mediation to avoid escalation of violence and 
conflict.241 Effective communication between organisers of a protest and police, both before 
and during the events, enables the authorities to perform more effectively in public assemblies 
policing.242 In addition, the ECtHR has considered, in İzci v Turkey, that State parties must 
provide adequate training to their law enforcement personnel and their supervisors on the 
necessity, proportionality and reasonableness of any use of force.243 Therefore, having a police 
force that does not understand its obligations under IHRL can pose severe threats to the right 
to peaceful assembly.  
2.4.1.2 Protection 
States have duties to take measures preventing those exercising their rights from interference 
by others.244 In Alekseev, the CCPR ruled that states have a duty to protect participants against 
violent parties even if the content of their event is offensive. 245 The reason is that if states do 
not offer protection to less popular or offensive ideas, the democratic process would be impaired 
because views belonging to the minorities or dissenting opinions could not be heard. The 
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240 UN Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur (n 59), para 42. 
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ECtHR has ruled a similar principle in Ziliberberg, as long as they remain peaceful, participants 
to a public assembly do not cease to enjoy their right because someone else causes violence.246 
The ECtHR has held that force used must be directed only at violent individuals. In Solomou 
and Others v Turkey, Mr. Solomou was killed by state agents during the dispersal of a violent 
demonstration. Solomou had been unarmed until he was shot. The ECtHR found that the 
violence caused by others cannot justify the shooting and killing of one who is not posing a 
threat.247  
In Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden, the Court insisted that police 
should have made an extra effort to accommodate two opposing commemorative events in the 
same place and at the same time, particularly if the location had a crucial factor to the 
organisers, i.e. having a link to a particular event in their history.248 Öllinger v Austria reflects 
similar reasoning. Two groups wanted to hold commemorative events at the same cemetery at 
the same time. One was to commemorate Jews killed by the SS during the WWII. The other 
was to commemorate the SS who were killed during the War. The Jewish assembly was planned 
as a counter-demonstration. The local authorities banned the Jewish commemoration on the 
ground that it would endanger public order and offend the religious feelings of uninvolved 
visitors.249 The ECtHR found that the ban was disproportionate because the authorities were 
still able to provide protective measures such as deploying police officers to a degree that would 
sufficiently keep both of the commemorative events safe from each other.250 In Plattform “Ärzte 
für das Leben”, the Court has expressed that the obligation under Article 11 is ‘an obligation 
as to measure to be taken and not as to results to be achieved’.251  The Court concerned that the 
international standards do not impose unrealistic burdens on the authorities. They are regarded 
as a minimum baseline protecting freedom of assembly. Nonetheless, the authorities still have 
a duty to provide adequate public order policing resources to protect participants and other 
individuals in a peaceful assembly.252  
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2.4.2 Surveillance and identity checks  
The UN Human Rights Council has confirmed that the collection of personal information in 
relation to an assembly must not interfere impermissibly with privacy or other rights.253 
Surveillance operations should be conducted only for investigatory purposes rather than for 
identifying participants. In the Concluding Observations of the Republic of Korea, the Human 
Rights Committee expressed its concern that South Korean authorities identify participants in 
assemblies by using “base station investigations” which can identify the user of every mobile 
telephone near the site of demonstrations.254 The Committee was further concerned that the 
Telecommunications Business Act, which allows operators to release their subscribers’ 
information on request without a warrant, should be used for investigatory purposes only. The 
Committee saw that the authorities’ practices of using photographic and video surveillance and 
identity checks during demonstrations could interfere the right to peaceful assembly.255 The 
ECtHR is broadly of the same view on this issue. In Catt v The United Kingdom, the ECtHR 
accepted that the police had a role to monitor protests which were known to be violent and 
potentially criminal.256 However, the Court noted that participating in a peaceful protest and 
acting within the democratic process deserve specific protection under Article 11.257 The 
collection and retention of the participants’ data revealing a political opinion can cause a 
chilling effect.258 Therefore, the retention of such data must be either absolutely necessary or 
for the purpose of a particular inquiry.259 
In contrast, the public has the right to observe and to record public assemblies.260 Since one 
objective of the right to freedom of assembly is to allow individuals to participate directly and 
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effectively in political life, freedom of expression and free media must be protected.261 A 
democratic society needs free media that are able to inform the public without unreasonable 
restraint.262 The CCPR, in Zhagiparov v Kazakhstan, has affirmed that arresting a journalist for 
performing his duty in a public assembly and penalising him for being critical of his government 
or of the political social system is unjustified under Articles 19 and 21.263 By contrast, the 
ECtHR, in Pentikäinen v Finland, while recognising that the media could play a role as a 
watchdog by providing information on how the authorities handle public assemblies and hold 
them accountable264, and insisting that ‘any attempt to remove journalists from the scene of 
demonstrations must, therefore, be subject to strict scrutiny’265 nonetheless found no violation. 
The Court viewed that the police can order a press photographer to leave the scene of a 
demonstration that had become a riot was necessary in a democratic society.266 The Court has 
more recently expounded a more welcome and more favourable view, from the point of view 
of protesters. In Butkevich v Russia, Russian police arrested a Ukrainian journalist while 
covering a street protest in St Petersburg on the ground that he disobeyed an order from a police 
officer.267 He was ordered to stop taking pictures and stop participating in an unlawful public 
event. The applicant argued that his arrest and detention infringed the public’s right to be 
informed and created a chilling effect.268  The third parties’ submissions, the Media Legal 
Defence Initiative et al, argued that the principle in Pentikäinen should not be interpreted in a 
manner that would create an unintended chilling effect on journalists covering protests or place 
media personnel in serious danger.269 They raised the issue that any requirement to wear 
clothing to distinguish media from protesters would undermine the concept of journalism and 
the realities of reporting on protests. They pointed out that mandatory licensing or registration 
of journalist and a requirement to wear distinctive clothing were incompatible with the freedom 
of expression under the ECHR.270 The ECtHR found that the domestic courts did not apply 
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standards which conformed with the ECHR Article 10.271 His arrest was unlawful. The Court 
saw that taking photographs and collecting information of a public assembly with an intention 
to “impart” that information was an essential preparatory step in journalism, protected under 
Article 10.272  
In later chapters, this thesis argues that the authorities in hybrid regimes use surveillance and 
identity checks to harass participants to a public assembly. Such surveillance is especially 
problematic in hybrid regimes because there are also prohibitions on who can be an organiser 
or participant (including restrictions based on minimum, citizenship, and unregistered or 
banned organisations).  
2.4.3 Arrest and detention 
Punishing protesters by arrest or detention for participating in an event interferes with freedom 
of assembly as much as banning in advance.273 International standards establish that arrest, 
including stop-and-search power, must be authorised by law and subjected to necessary and 
proportionate principles.274 The CCPR has interpreted the term “arrest” as ‘any deprivation of 
liberty, and is not limited to formal arrest under domestic law’.275 Article 9 of ICCPR stipulates 
that ‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.’ In the context of assemblies, 
criminalising of assemblies can lead to unreasonable arresting, especially when the laws 
governing assemblies are illegitimate.276  For example in Sviridov v Kazakhstan, the 
complainant was arrested for holding an unauthorised demonstration in front of a commercial 
centre.277 Despite it being a single-person protest, the domestic courts convicted him for failing 
to comply with the authorisation procedure.278 In addition, the ECtHR, in Gillan and Quinton, 
has emphasised that the law authorising stop-and-search power should provide a limitation to 
the discretion of the authorities. Officers should not be allowed to exercise this power based 
exclusively on their “hunch” or “professional intuition”.279 The Court further explained that 
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when the legislation grants broad discretion to the police officer, it comes with a greater risk of 
it being used discriminately ‘against demonstrators and protester in breach of Article 10 and/or 
11 of the Convention.’280 
In addition, states should avoid employing mass arrest because it is an indiscriminate and 
arbitrary arrest. 281 When an arrest was made, the authorities have the duty to treat detainees in 
a humane manner and with respect of their dignity.282 In Austin and Other v The United 
Kingdom, the ECtHR has established that crowd-control strategies relying on containment such 
as kettling or corralling are permissible where there is a real risk of serious injury or damage 
and where less intrusive means are ineffective.283 In other words, these tactics must be 
employed exceptionally under two conditions: (1) it is necessary to prevent serious damage or 
injury and (2) there is no less restrictive police tactic available. 
As discussed earlier (at 2.2.2.2), the ECtHR has established that individuals who remain 
peaceful do not lose their right to peaceful assemblies.284 Therefore, it is a police duty to 
separate violent parties from the peaceful assemblies. Police must be trained to handle agents 
provocateurs and remove them rather than banning or dispersing an assembly on the ground 
that it has become violent.285      
States should avoid using intrusive pre-emptive measures unless there is a clear imminent 
danger. For example, arresting public assembly goers on their way to join a demonstration is 
interference with freedom of assembly. In Evrezov, Nepomnyaschikh, Polyakov and Rybchenko 
v Belarus, the CCPR found that arresting and detaining a group of people marching with 
placards to join a demonstration violated their right to peaceful assembly.286 In Kudrevičius and 
Others, the ECtHR has held that a refusal to allow an individual to travel for the purpose of 
attending a meeting amounts to interference to freedom of assembly.287  In Kasparov v Russia, 
the applicant was travelling to join a march in another city. He was arrested and detained 
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unlawfully at an airport on the ground of using forged tickets. As his passport and tickets were 
seized, he was prevented from joining the rally. As the Court found that his arrest was not 
prescribed by law, his right to freedom of assembly was interfered.288  
Notwithstanding that the authorities may make lawful arrests under other laws unrelated to 
public assembly, such interventions may still be considered as an interference with the right to 
freedom of assembly. In Huseynli and Others v Azerbaijan, the applicants were arrested a few 
days before a planned demonstration against the government. While the charges against them 
were unrelated to the assembly they were attending, they claimed that their arrests were to 
prevent them from attending an opposition demonstration.289 The Court noted that pre-emptive 
and/or retaliatory arrests and convictions were used on a massive scale in order to repress the 
opposition.290 Several legal grounds were initiated to detain the opposition activists namely 
possession of drugs, possession of arms, evading military service, resistance to arrest and 
hooliganism, failing to obey police’s orders, traffic offences, and disturbing public order.291 
Under such circumstances, the Court believed that the administrative proceedings against the 
applicants were aimed at preventing them from participating in the planned demonstration.292 
Moreover, they were part of the authorities’ measures to create a chilling effect deterring other 
opposition supporters from participating in anti-government demonstrations.293 This case 
confirmed that even in the case that arrests and convictions are not expressly related to freedom 
of assembly, the authorities can still be held responsible for breaching the freedom of assembly. 
It is worth noting that the ECtHR has not ruled out pre-emptive arrests to prevent a breach of 
the peace. In Eiseman-Renyard and others v The United Kingdom , eight peoples were arrested 
prior to the wedding of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge.294 The police explained that these 
people were arrested to prevent imminent breaches of the peace and were released after the 
wedding was over. The ECtHR decided that these cases were inadmissible on the ground that 
they were manifestly ill-founded. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, the Court saw that the 
domestic courts had sufficiently conducted a judicial review on the preventive detentions and 
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struct a fair balance between the right to liberty and the prevention of public disorder.295 In this 
regard, later chapters argue that hybrid regime incumbents, relying on carefully crafted legal 
frameworks, use arbitrary arrests and detentions to intimidate organisers and assembly 
participants. Also, Courts in hybrid regimes refrain from conduct proper judicial review on the 
arbitrary arrests and detentions of protesters.  
2.4.4 Dispersal and use of force  
Under international standards, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of 
assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, pointed out that there are three factors determining 
whether a dispersal may be justified:  
(1) whether there is a risk to public order or another legitimate aim 
that cannot be managed; (2) whether the participants in the assembly are given 
an effective opportunity to manifest their views; (3) whether the authorities 
refrain from the use of unnecessary force or the imposition of disproportionate 
sanctions.296  
When using force, states have an obligation to prevent arbitrary killing in their territories, 
especially by their own security forces.297 International standards direct that the use of force 
must comply with the principles of legality, precaution, necessity, proportionality and 
accountability.298 Under the principle of legality, it is important that domestic legal frameworks 
governing the use of force must comply with international standards. The laws must stipulate 
how the authorities may have recourse to the use of weapons and tactics during public 
assemblies.299 The principle of precaution demands that states must take precautionary 
measures to avoid the use of force against public assemblies.300 Officers must be well-trained 
to facilitate and accommodate participants to a public assembly.301 Any use of force must 
adhere to the principle of necessity and proportionality. 302 Officials assigned to perform crowd 
control should be equipped with appropriate gears such as protective equipment and less-lethal 
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weapon rather than lethal firearms. Under these principles, ‘firearms may be used only against 
imminent threat either to protect life or to prevent life-threatening injuries.303 Therefore, using 
lethal firearms to disperse an assembly indiscriminately is always unlawful.304  
In Güleç v Turkey, the ECtHR found that the force used to disperse an unauthorised 
demonstration was not “absolutely necessary”. 305  The applicant’s son was shot while he was 
returning home from his school. The Government claimed that there were masked terrorists 
firing randomly while using women and children as a human shield. The ECtHR noted that the 
Government failed to produced evidence supporting this claim. The force used was unjustified 
because the gendarmes employed very powerful weapons against civilians. Disorder could be 
foreseen as the area was in a state of emergency. However, the state cannot use the lack of 
proper crowd control equipment as an excuse to resort to lethal-weapons.306 Last, the principle 
of accountability requires that effective reporting and review procedures must work effectively 
to hold state officers into account when force is used. This includes having transparent record 
keeping of decisions made by command officers and equipment deployed (especially firearms 
and ammunition).307  
In the case that dispersal is unavoidable, the authorities must warn participants of their intention 
to use force. Participants should be allowed sufficient time to voluntarily leave the area.308  In 
Olmedo v Paraguay, police and military personnel use lethal force to disperse a 
demonstration.309 The CCPR ruled that ‘States parties should take measures not only to prevent 
and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts but also to prevent arbitrary killing by their own 
security forces.310 When the use of force results in a violation of human rights, a criminal 
investigation and effective (and enforceable) remedies should be available for those who 
affected by it. States have a responsibility to investigate all allegations arising from the use of 
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force in good faith.311 Without effective investigation, prosecution, and system of remedies; the 
CCPR concerned that states created a culture of impunity.312  
In Giuliani and Gaggio v Italy, the ECtHR has explained that any use of force to disperse a 
demonstration must be “absolutely necessary” under Article 2 and “necessary in a democratic 
society” under Article 11 of the Convention.313 Therefore, dispersal methods and the amount 
of force used must correspond to the level of the threat. In Primov and Others, police officers 
surrounded the demonstrators and fired automatic rifles above the demonstrators’ heads. As a 
result, a person was shot dead and five demonstrators were severely injured. Several dozen 
people were injured either by tear-gas explosions or by being beaten by the police.314 The 
ECtHR concluded that the authorities’ overall response was not disproportionate because many 
demonstrators were violent. 315 Although some police officers use firearms, they did not 
deliberately shoot to kill or to wound the protesters. Nevertheless, the Court did not examine 
the proportionality of the use of gas grenades as there was no complaint from the injured 
persons nor from their relatives. If it was the case, throwing tear gas grenades directly into the 
crowd causing injuries from the explosion could be considered as deliberately used to wound 
demonstrators. In Abdullah Yaşa and Others v Turkey, the ECtHR has considered firing a tear 
gas grenade directly at demonstrators, flat-trajectory shot as an impropriate police action 
because it could cause serious injuries.316 Later in this thesis, it is argued that hybrid regime 
incumbents have retained the legal means to employ excessive force to crush anti-regime 
protesters. 
2.4.5 Derogation 
ICCPR Article 4 allows states to take measures derogating from the obligations under the 
Convention in time of public emergency, which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence. However, they have an obligation to explain the exigencies of the situation when 
they invoke the right to derogate from the Covenant. Therefore, when a state suspends the right 
to peaceful assemblies, it must be able to justify all their measures derogating from the 
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Covenant.317  Siracusa principles to the ICCPR explain that ‘internal conflict and unrest that do 
not constitute a grave and imminent threat to the life of the nation cannot justify derogation 
under Article 4.’318 A threat to life of the nation needs to meet two criteria: (1) affect the whole 
of the population in a part of the territory, and (2) threatens the physical integrity of the 
population, the political independence or the basic functioning of institutions safeguarding the 
rights under the ICCPR.319 Any derogation must be terminated as soon as the emergency 
ends.320 The principle of strict necessity and proportionality must be applied to all derogation 
measures.321 Similar to the ICCPR, ECHR Article 15 directs that the right to derogate can be 
invoked only in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. In 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands, v Greece, the European Commission of 
Human Rights found that the military junta’s derogation violated Article 15 because the public 
emergency (the military junta had taken power in April 1967) did not exist.322 In relation to this 
issue, later chapters demonstrate that hybrid regime incumbents initiate emergency laws to 
switch from public order policing to more military style policing. However, when doing so they 
do not generally invoke the formal derogations requirements as set out in the ICCPR. As such, 
the overreliance on emergency powers, in the absence of a formally declared and time-limited 
emergency, represents a significant departure from IHRL standards. 
2.4.6 Effective judicial review  
According to international standards, police operations must be subject to a competent, 
independent judicial review.323 The right to peaceful assembly can become substantially limited 
when effective appeal mechanisms are not available. Mechanisms, such as judicial and 
administrative procedures to address potential violations, should be established by domestic 
legislation.324 The UN Human Rights Committee demands that states parties ensure that 
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everyone has access to effective judicial review. 325 Also, states must bring those responsible 
for the violation are brought to justice, either under domestic or international law.326 In 
Sudalenko v Belarus, the complainant’s request to hold a picket was rejected by the 
authorities.327 He claimed that the impossibility of challenging the lawfulness of the Law on 
Mass Events in the Court of Justice deprived him of an effective remedy under ICCPR. 
However, due to the principle of subsidiarity, the CCPR decided that this claim was 
inadmissible because the Constitutional Court could review the legality of the law.328 
Nevertheless, the CCPR was able to review the rejection of the complainant’s request. 
Regarding the violation in this case, the CCPR noted that the legislation should be revised to 
comply with the ICCPR, to provide an effective and enforceable remedy.329  
In Evrezov v Belarus, the complainant claimed that his right to freedom of assembly was 
violated because neither the executive authorities nor the courts attempted to explain why his 
request to hold a picket was rejected. The CCPR found that Belarus failed to give any 
explanation and accepted the author’s claim that it was based on his political motive. Although 
the domestic courts had ruled that the restriction conformed with the Law on Mass Events, the 
CCPR saw that they did not provide any justification for the restriction.330 It is the state’s 
obligation to justify the limitation of the right protected by the ICCPR.  
Likewise, the ECtHR, in Lashmankin and Others, directed that domestic courts had an 
obligation to examine the question of whether the refusal to approve time, place and manner of 
a public assembly had been well reasoned.331 The Court has emphasised that domestic courts 
must apply the necessity and proportionality test to balance freedom of assembly and other 
legitimate interests. In this case, the ECtHR found a violation because the scope of judicial 
review under Russian legal frameworks did not include any test of the necessity and 
proportionality. To this point, the later chapters argue that domestic courts in hybrid regimes 
do not sufficiently consider the test of necessity and proportionality. Judicial review processes 
in hybrid regimes are ineffective and fail to deliver substantive rulings in a timely fashion. 
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To sum up, international standards direct that police have duties to facilitate and to protect 
peaceful public assembly. Therefore, when the authorities impose any restriction on the 
freedom of assembly, they should be guided by the objective to facilitate rather than to seek 
unnecessary or disproportionate restrictions. They must be able to justify their restrictions or 
interventions according to their obligation under IHRL. All public order policing operations, 
such as surveillance, arrest, detention, dispersal, use of force, and derogation are subjected to 
the strict test of necessity and proportionality. International standards demand that there must 
be effective judicial review mechanisms to balance the freedom of assembly against other 
legitimate interests.  If there is any violation, affected parties should have access to a review 
system to seek timely and enforceable remedies.  
 
 Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates that international judicial institutions like the CCPR and the ECtHR 
have expanded the right of peaceful assembly. Without this significant body of jurisprudence, 
the scope of this ‘fundamental’ right would likely be regarded as relatively insignificant. From 
the case law, we can conclude that IHRL reflects a certain image of democracy. At the 
minimum, a democratic society must uphold three democratic values namely pluralism, 
tolerance, and open-mindedness. A mechanism to defend its core values is needed in order to 
survive the democratic dilemma – people cannot participate in politics effectively when the 
political system is too restricted. Thus, a democratic society can be sustained by upholding 
IHRL. It is worth nothing that IHRL is effective when there are international judicial institutions 
to adjudicate the rights standards. Nonetheless, the power of the CCPR and the ECtHR is 
limited under the principle of subsidiarity/margin of appreciation, and this ultimately leaves the 
implementation of IHRL mainly to domestic institutions.  
This chapter has identified basic principles and standards on governing public assemblies laid 
down by the CCPR and the ECtHR. As a general principle, they agree that states are required 
to fulfil not only a negative obligation to abstain from unnecessarily interfering with freedom 
of assembly but also a positive obligation to facilitate and protect public assemblies. This 
chapter categorises the international standards into three groups: the protected composition of 
a public assembly, the power to impose restrictions, and public order policing. Overall, we can 
conclude that these standards aim to sustain the core values of a democratic society. They 
prevent states from arbitrarily depriving individuals and groups of their right to freedom of 
assembly. Indeed, any restriction on freedom of assembly must satisfy the well-known three-
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prong test: conforming with the law, pursuing a legitimate aim, and being necessary in a 
democratic society. In a similar vein, public order policing must have the primary objective to 
facilitate and protect public assemblies.    
Nevertheless, IHRL is not only limited because of the principle of subsidiarity. Regime type is 
also one of the determinants of the effectiveness of human rights protection. In hybrid regimes, 
where IHRL does not have much traction, arbitrariness is a serious problem. Here, domestic 
courts review only the lawfulness of law enforcement decisions and fail altogether to give 
appropriate weight to the peacefulness of the assembly in question. They also often fail to 
review the necessity and proportionality of any restrictions imposed.332 Cases in the CCPR and 
the ECtHR, especially those having Russia or Belarus as a party, present a pattern 
demonstrating that laws governing public assemblies operate in a way that significantly limits 
the ability to assemble publicly. For example, the notification/authorisation systems in these 
countries operates in a way that activists are allowed to assemble only in designated locations. 
Their proposals are routinely rejected and relocated to the outskirts of their cities, while those 
of pro-government groups are allowed in the city centres.333 These restrictions were found to 
be legitimate under domestic courts but the CCPR and the ECtHR found them to be 
incompatible with international standards. Arbitrariness in the legal frameworks of hybrid 
regimes allows the authorities to impose time, place and manner restrictions or even blanket 
bans on any particular undesired public assembly in order to gain and secure political 
advantage. Furthermore, where domestic legislation does not provide any special appeal 
procedure for disputes regarding public assemblies, organisers have to face lengthy legal 
procedures or find themselves unable to obtain an enforceable ruling before their proposed date 
of their event.334 If they decide to proceed with their plans peacefully but without authorisation, 
the police may treat unlawful assemblies in the same way as criminal activities.335 Worse, their 
events could be hijacked or interfered with by agents provocateurs or be suppressed under anti-
terrorism law.336 
The next chapter explores the politics of protest in hybrid regimes with an attempt to understand 
how regime types affect the way people exercise freedom of assembly and how states regulate 
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the freedom. It discusses the politics of protest in hybrid regimes from both a legal perspective 
and a social science perspective and argues that these regimes benefit from the loose traction 
of IHRL as they significantly curtail freedom of assembly through legal frameworks and public 
order policing.
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 Chapter 3 Protest in Hybrid Regimes 
This chapter aims to explore the role of public assemblies in hybrid regimes through the lens 
of sociology and political science. It argues that these disciplines have largely overlooked the 
role of law and its institutions. This chapter starts by discussing the role of public assemblies 
in the political process – public assemblies are tools for marginalised individuals to collectively 
express their demands. Then, this chapter unpacks the concept of ‘contentious politics’ which 
dominates the field of social movement studies. Drawing on the notion of ‘repertoires of 
contention’, it discusses how collective action can open political opportunities, and protest 
cycles can potentially lead to democratisation. However, some forms of collective actions can 
disrupt democracy. Therefore, this chapter argues that consolidated democracies have sought 
to ensure that protest cycles remain within the democratic sphere. These efforts have been 
bolstered by international human rights standards on public assemblies which (as chapter 2 
explained) similarly emphasize the connection between assemblies and democracy. 
Democratising countries have, in turn, incorporated (or reflected) these standards in domestic 
laws.  
Nevertheless, some states have been able to withstand waves of democratisation.1 Some such 
states fit the description of ‘hybrid regimes’– enjoying some of the benefits that flow from 
allowing the exercise of freedom of assembly while simultaneously minimising the political 
effect of street protests. This study uses, but develops, Graeme Robertson’s theory of the 
politics of protest in hybrid regimes to identify the incentives that drive incumbents in hybrid 
regimes to restrict freedom of assembly. It argues that Robertson himself has not taken 
sufficient account of legal variables in his theory, and that a more granular focus on the 
particularities of domestic legal provisions – and the corresponding methods of public order 
policing – is required. In other words, these legal provisions (and their operation in practice) 
must also be regarded as key determinants when seeking to fully understand the form and extent 
of protest in hybrid regimes. Fleshing out Robertson’s theory with legal perspectives reveals 
that contentious politics in hybrid regimes can be controlled through legal frameworks and 
public order policing. This chapter later demonstrates that Putin’s Russia has curtailed the scope 
of freedom of assembly through legal mechanisms, something which Robertson does not really 
address in his study. It attempts to show that the Putin administration has controlled 
organisational ecology through the laws governing public assemblies, and controlled state 
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mobilisation strategies through the legal framework governing public assemblies and public 
order policing.    
 Freedom of assembly is a political tool for marginalized individuals 
Freedom of assembly plays an important part in the political process because it offers a political 
tool for marginalized individuals to come together and make a collective demand to their rulers. 
For centuries, village and town halls have served as venues for informing, discussing public 
issues and making requests to the authorities. Freedom of assembly serves at least four 
functions within the political process: offering cheap and effective means to express political 
views, offering alternative channels of influence outside institutional politics, providing early 
warning of public dissatisfaction, and providing an opportunity for networking which can lead 
to a forming of new organisations.  
Firstly, freedom of assembly offers cheap and effective means to express political views. In a 
situation where the majority of the population do not have much means to communicate 
political messages, freedom of assembly enables them to make their voice heard.2 Although 
some jurisdictions require that broadcast media must balance their programmes, some public 
issues may be overlooked just because they have no commercial value. Issues outside the 
mainstream politics can be left out from the public debate.  However, a demonstration with 
enough participants can attract journalists’ attention to cover the event and demonstrators’ 
political messages.3 Freedom of assembly is particularly important for those who cannot 
influence their government through press and broadcast media.4 It allows them to communicate 
to the public and government at low cost. Moreover, an outdoor assembly is a unique form of 
political participation because face-to-face experiences generate strong motivation and political 
commitment.5 Unlike radio broadcasting, parades and meetings provide opportunities to convey 
messages directly to a target audience with pressure and strength from supporters.  
Secondly, freedom of assembly offers alternative channels of influence outside institutionalised 
politics.6 Goldstone argues that social movement activities are not alternative to the system but 
 
2 Richard Stone, Textbook on civil liberties and human rights (10 edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 386. 
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rather serve as a complementary mode of political action.7 He points out that the number of 
protest activities increases in linear proportion to the increase of democratic institutions.8 
Emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, South America and Southeast Asia were the results 
of collective actions seeking democratisation and greater civil rights.9 In a representative 
democracy, freedom of assembly offers a means to keep elected-representatives in check and 
to publicly express a particular opinion or demand to their representatives.10 On this point, 
Barendt emphasises that minorities, whose interests are not presented properly by political 
parties, can effectively voice their demands through public assemblies.11 Public assemblies 
allow individuals to exercise their autonomy to resist against majoritarian standards and thus 
preserve social diversity.12 They are tools for outsiders and opponents of the political 
representation system to seek political changes or social reforms.13 Alternatively, public 
assemblies can accompany other actions such as filing lawsuits, submitting petitions and 
influencing individuals to pursue their goals.14  Hardt and Negri see ‘representation’ as a 
mechanism that separates the population from power especially in an environment in which 
corruption and transparency detach the representatives’ responsibility from the people.15 Public 
assemblies can be very useful when representatives do not respond to the common interests of 
the marginalised groups.16  
Thirdly, freedom of assembly acts as a safety-valve detecting and providing a vent for people’s 
dissatisfaction. Barendt argues that any liberal society should be able to accommodate some 
small-scale disorder in order to prevent serious inevitable violence.17 Public assemblies act as 
a social safety-valve providing early warning of public dissatisfaction before it turns to 
 
7 Jack A Goldstone, States, parties, and social movements (Cambridge studies in contentious politics, 
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 2003) 6. 
8  ibid. 
9 Jack A Goldstone, More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political Opportunity Structures to 
Relational Fields (Kluwer 2004), 337. 
10 Helen Fenwick, Fenwick on civil liberties and human rights (Routledge 2017). 
11 Barendt, Freedom of Assembly (n 4) 165-6. 
12 John D Inazu, Liberty's refuge : the forgotten freedom of assembly (Yale University Press 2012) 151. 
13 Goldstone, More Social Movements or Fewer?...  (n 9) 336. 
14 ibid. 
15 M. Hardt and A. Negri, Declaration (Argos Navis 2012) cited in Alexandros Kioupkiolis and Giorgos 
Katsambekis (eds), Radical democracy and collective movements today : the biopolitics of the multitude 
versus the hegemony of the people (Farnham, Surrey, England : Ashgate 2014),  219. 
16 See, for example, Marina Prentoulis and Lasse Thomassen, ‘Autonomy and Hegemony in the Square: The 
2011 Protests in Greece and Spain’ in Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis (eds) (n 15) 217. 
17 Barendt, Freedom of speech (n 6) 169-170. 
 
Protest law & Public Order Policing in Hybrid Regimes - Pat Niyomsilp 
92 
 
violence.18 The US Supreme Court has expressed in Whitney v California that it is dangerous 
to discourage thought, hope and imagination because fear breeds repression. 19 Then, repression 
breeds anger and frustration, which eventually affects the stability of the government. Public 
assemblies provide opportunities to respond to any grievance and propose a remedy. Hence, 
public assemblies are warning signs to which the authorities need to respond. 
Last but not least, freedom of assembly provides an opportunity for networking which leads to 
the forming of new organisations sustaining the movement. According to Della Porta and Diani, 
there are three steps in generating a social movement: conflictual collective action, dense 
informal networks, and collective identity.20 First, conflictual collective action refers to actors 
whose claims damage the interests of the other actors.  This leads to the identification of 
common targets for collective actions. Second, dense informal networks happen as a result of 
collective actions. Individuals and organisations participating in a collective action negotiate 
the means to their common goal.21 Last, they create a collective identity on the shared 
commitment and common purpose. Forming a new collective identity pushes organisations and 
individuals to pursue their common goal rather than stick to their specific interests.22 Thus, 
public assemblies are the first milestone of sustained social movements.  
It can be concluded that public assemblies are a political means for individuals, especially to 
those who do not possess much political influence in their society. It offers a chance to voice 
their demands to the public and to the actors in institutionalised politics. The minority may 
come out demanding better treatment while the majority may protest to demand that political 
institutions fulfil their promises. Here, Tilly notes that both democratisation and social 
movements stand on the same principle; ‘ordinary people are politically worthy of 
consultation’. 23 Protests put pressure on political representatives according to the level of their 
popularity.24 Ultimately, public assemblies and protests can affect the outcomes of elections. 
The following part examines further into the relationship between public assemblies and regime 
types from the perspective of social movement studies and drawing upon the concept of 
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contentious politics. It attempts to unpack the concept and argues that social movement theorists 
do not take legal factors sufficiently into consideration.   
 Contentious politics and legal factors  
Regime types are a key determinant of the nature of public assemblies. Public assemblies, as a 
type of collective action, are usually peaceful in democracies because the political system 
regards them as a part of political process. Peaceful public assemblies are standardised to keep 
them support the democratic process. In contrast, non-democracies limit the scope of freedom 
of assembly in order to consolidate their political power. Different regime types perceive the 
value and the role of public assemblies differently. Thus, to understand the relationship between 
a regime type and its nature of public assemblies, the following parts explore the concept of 
contentious politics (CP) and argue that consolidated democracies set up minimum standards 
on public assemblies in order to keep public assemblies supporting the democratic process.    
CP was proposed by Tilly in the 1970s. It focuses on the relational mechanisms surrounding 
contention allowing social scientists to study social movements and institutional politics more 
interactively. CP focuses on investigating (1) the dynamics between actors such as claim-
makers, their allies, their opponents, the government, the media, and the mass public; (2) the 
transformations from one form of contention to another; and (3) the forms of collective action, 
which arise from the struggles.25 Tarrow states that ‘routine interactions between government 
and political actors produce political opportunities…’26 Such interactions also form ‘repertoires 
of contention’ where all parties to contention persuade, negotiate, collaborate, block, and punish 
each other. He further explains that a ‘collective action becomes contentious when it is used by 
people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, 
and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities’.27 Contention leads 
organisers to exploit political opportunities, create collective identities, gather like-minded 
people together, form organisations and mobilise them against the authorities.28 In some 
regimes, collective action is the only means for ordinary people to fight stronger opponents or 
more powerful state actors.  
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Contention and opportunities for collective action are closely linked.29 Tarrow explains that 
there are two major conditions contributing to the increase in contention. First, contention 
increases when options to escape compliance are available and there are opportunities to use 
them. Second, contention increases when people’s sense of injustice exceeds its limit.30 Public 
demonstrations create political opportunities for elites in both a negative sense and a positive 
sense.31 In a negative sense, violent protests and direct actions provide solid grounds for 
repression. In a positive sense, politicians may seize the opportunities created by challengers 
and establish themselves as popular leaders or champions of people’s rights.  
Tarrow has observed that there are three basic types of collective actions in the repertoire of 
contention: violence, disruption, and convention. First, violence will make the authorities 
employ superior force in return. Violence can lead to polarisation in which people are forced to 
choose sides.32 The repertoire is generally nonviolent in democracy because organisers know 
that if they invoke violence, they will lose legitimacy and support from the public. Organisers 
and participants who engage in armed conflict are likely to be branded as ‘terrorists’ which 
damage their movements both domestically and internationally. Second, disruption is an option 
to attract others’ attention by obstructing routine activities. This form of contention aims to 
derail the authorities. They are not effective in the situation that elites are united, and police are 
determined. Disruption is difficult to maintain over a long period without formal organisations. 
Third, conventional collective actions such as strikes and demonstrations are more 
institutionalised. Organisers of strikes and demonstrations must follow the procedures and 
regulations set out in law. Most constitutional states see the advantages provided by 
demonstrations and strikes as they provide a means to express political views notwithstanding 
that they are regulated and shaped by the state.33    
CP arises when groups make claims to political actors in the form of collective actions such as 
meetings, strikes, processions, picketing, and fighting in armed conflicts. To Tilly, democracy 
is based on the notion of relatively equal citizenship, strong consultation of citizens and 
significant protection of citizens from arbitrary action by governmental agents.34 Therefore, 
there is legislation governing public assemblies to facilitate political participation. Tilly argues 
 
29  ibid 71. 
30  ibid. 
31  ibid 88-89. 
32  ibid 95. 
33  ibid 100. 
34 Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires (University of Chicago Press 2006) 25. 
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that CP in democracies are generally peaceful because the political system provides 
opportunities for individuals to participate and voice their demands. He lists eight principles 
allowing the people to challenge the government peacefully.35 These principles are freedom to 
form and join organisations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public 
office, competition by political leaders for support, alternative sources of information, free and 
fair elections, and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and citizens’ 
preference. Tilly points out that government capacity depends on its ability to coordinate all 
political actors. However, in most cases, expanding governmental capacity without reinforcing 
citizenship often promotes top-down tyranny.  
In consolidated democracies, representative assemblies, elections, referendums, petitions, 
courts, mass media, and public assemblies hold the government to its commitments. Social 
movement activists utilise some mixture of public assemblies, press releases, and petitions 
rather than employing violent means such as terrorist attacks or hostage-taking. This is because 
their repertoires allow them to make collective claims peacefully within limited space, time, 
and methods provided by law.36 Therefore, I argue that the legal mechanisms that lay down 
rules governing collective actions should be fully taken into consideration when assessing CP 
in a regime. The next heading explores the concept of repertoires of contention from the legal 
perspective.    
3.2.1 The concept of ‘repertoires of contention’ overlooks legal factors 
The argument being made in this chapter is that Robertson’s study of contentious politics in 
hybrid regimes is enriched if we pay greater attention to the constraints, and possibilities, posed 
by law. Here, we can see that this blind spot stems from some of the original theorising on 
social movements. Tilly’s repertoires of contention in different types of regimes can be 
distinguished by examining legal frameworks in the jurisdiction where contention occurs. Tilly 
does not expressly emphasise the role of law and its institutions in shaping the “repertoires of 
contention”. He argues that the repertoires of contention vary upon the environment set by 
political opportunity structures (POS); changes in environment produce changes in 
contention.37 Legal factors were not included in Tilly’s identified six factors that can cause 
changes in POS:  
 
35  ibid 13-14. 
36  ibid 35. 
37  ibid 43-44. 
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‘(a) the multiplicity of independent centers of power within the 
regime, (b) the openness of the regime to new actors, (c) the instability of 
current political alignments, (d) the availability of influential allies or 
supporters, (e) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective 
claim-making, and (f) decisive changes in (a) to (e).’38   
In addition, Tilly’s POS has been criticised by many scholars due to its vagueness from 
encompassing too many different elements.39 For instance, Meyer has commented that the POS 
are ‘frequently conceptualized broadly but operationalized narrowly, the body of research 
contains contradictions and confusions.’40 Gamson and Meyer have pointed out that the POS is 
‘in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement 
environment’41 Anisin has also noted that the POS does not explain how structure affects 
agency or how agency affect structure.42   
Besides, Tilly has accepted that legislation can shape repertoires of contention. In describing a 
protest movements in Uganda, Tilly noted that laws such as the Anti-Terrorism Law and Public 
Organisations Law allowed the State to shape civil society activities.43 He claimed that ‘both 
democratic and nondemocratic governments typically control demonstrations through 
legislation governing freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and public order, with police as 
the main enforcers.’44 Yet, Tilly did not explain precisely how these legal factors shape 
repertoires of contention. In my opinion, they are the major factors determining the nature and 
extent of public protest in a given context. 
For instance, a crucial distinction can be noted between consolidated democracies and 
authoritarianism –the very concept of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (WUNC) 
is premised on a broad commitment to popular sovereignty. Consolidated democracies have 
legal frameworks that enable people to exercise their autonomy to influence decision makers 
 
38  ibid 44. 
39 Alexei Anisin, 'State repression, nonviolence, and protest mobilization' (DPhil Thesis, University of Essex 
2016) 59. 
40 David S. Meyer, 'Protest and Political Opportunities' (2004) 30 Annual Review of Sociology 125, 141. 
41 William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, 'Framing political opportunity' in Doug McAdam, John D. 
McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political 
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge 
University Press 1996), 275. 
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and members of parliament. In contrast, if the governing legal frameworks do not accept the 
principle of popular sovereignty, some forms of contention are eliminated from the public 
sphere altogether.45 As such, the nature of contention in authoritarian regimes is very different 
from that in democracies because their POS is much smaller. There are fewer (a) independent 
centres of power within the regime and (b) to (f) are heavily restricted to prevent any challenger 
from posing threats against the regime. Authoritarian regimes commonly forbid a wide range 
of political claim-making performances.46 Only a few political performances are available for 
activists to drive their movements. Tilly notices that high-capacity non-democratic regimes 
‘typically exclude contentious issues and actors from prescribed and tolerated forms of claim-
making’.47 Here, I argue that many of these constraints are imposed systematically through 
legal mechanisms.  
Given this blind spot in the social movement literature, this thesis posits that social movement 
activities are confronted with restrictions imposed by law and through public order policing. In 
other words, it is often the law that either limits the choices available or incentivizes particular 
responses. Although it could be implied that legal factors are acknowledged within the element 
of (e) in Tilly’s factors that change the POS, I see that there is not any explanation of how the 
role of law and its institutions cause changes in the POS. The marginalisation of the importance 
of law as an affective factor, this thesis argues, is a significant gap in the political science 
literature on social movements.48 Therefore, a study focusing specifically on legal mechanisms 
and their enforcement mechanisms can help further reveal the structural determinants of 
contention.  
3.2.2 Democratisation, protest cycles, and standardisation of collective actions  
The standardisation of collective actions is a result of democratisation. It comes with an aim to 
keep protest cycles within democratic parameters. This part attempts to explore the 
relationships between democratisation processes, protest cycles, and the standardisation of 
 
45 For example, Malaysia Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 (up to 2019) banned “street protest” and Thailand 
NCPO Order 3/2558 2015 banned “political gathering of five or more persons”. 
46 Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires (n 34) 76. 
47  ibid. 
48 In addition, the insufficiency of attention towards legal factors such as legal frameworks and public order 
policing is common among social movement scholars. For instance, famous textbooks in this field rarely 
take legal factors into consideration. i.e. Snow et al (eds), the Whiley-Blackwell Companion to Social 
Movements (2nd ed Whiley-Blackwell, 2019), and Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements: An 
Introduction (2nd ed Blackwell, 2006) contain no index entry for any legislation relating to laws 
governing public assemblies. 
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collective actions. First, it points out that democratisation is a process that comes with reverse 
effects. Then, it unpacks the notion of protest cycles proposed by social movement scholars 
before arguing that consolidated democracies develop their legal frameworks and adopt 
international standards governing public assemblies precisely to keep the protest cycle 
travelling within the democratic sphere. 
3.2.2.1 Protest cycles as parts of a political process 
Democratisation is a global phenomenon. Huntington explains that there have been waves of 
democratisation.49 The first wave began after the American and French revolutions. The second 
wave came during the WWII and early 1960s. The third wave started in 1974 and moved 
through southern Europe, Latin America, former Soviet bloc, and Asia in less than two 
decades.50 Waves of democratisation come with reverse waves, which make some of the 
transformed countries revert back to non-democratic rule.51  The first reverse wave happened 
around the WWI where countries returned to their traditional forms of authoritarian rule or the 
new forms of totalitarianism. The second reverse wave started in the early 1960s. Huntington 
estimated that around one-third of working democracies were reversed by military coup 
d’états.52 He argues that the characteristics of the society are the reason why countries swing 
between authoritarian and democracy.53 For example, in Western Europe during the nineteenth 
century, the pressure towards democratisation came from economic development, 
industrialisation, urbanisation, the emergence of the middle class, the working class 
organisation development, and the decrease in economic inequality.54 On the other hand, 
countries which have populist democratic governments and conservative military regimes, such 
as Thailand, swing between democratic and authoritarian systems.55 Such dynamics might, for 
example, follow the following pattern: under an elected government, the opposition and 
dissenters launch anti-government protests accusing the prime minister of corruption. Protests 
escalate to disorder, usually by the intervention of agent provocateurs. Then, the military seizes 
this opportunity to overthrow the elected government and establish a military regime. A new 
constitution will be introduced along with a new election system. Afterwards, the military 
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government fails to manage the country’s economy effectively. Eventually, the politicians 
reclaim their office through either winning the general election or through public mass protests. 
Then, the cycle continues.  
Democracy is a form of government which is ruled by the people who have citizenship to elect 
their representatives and their rulers. Democracy is also defined as ‘a process, which has to be 
continually reproduced, for maximizing the opportunities for all individuals to shape their own 
lives and to participate in and influence debates about public decisions that affect them’.56 In 
other words, democracy is a process in which protest cycles can cause social and political 
changes.57 As a cycle of protest develops, social movement activists may decide to change their 
tactics according to the POS and the strategic choices of other social movement activists. 58 
However, to maintain democracy, it is necessary to make sure that the protest cycles are not 
damaging to democratic values.  
Social movements can be used to degrade democracy. According to Tilly, ‘democratisation 
promotes the formation of social movements, but by no means do all social movements 
advocate or promote democracy’.59 For example, the Nazi Party was a political party that started 
from a radical nationalist/racist movement.60 Hitler adopted this social movement’s ideology 
and transformed it to become the foundation ideology for the Nazi Party. 61  Hitler gained 
popularity and rose to power through the use of propaganda techniques, political violence, and 
most importantly the ability to mobilise a mass electoral base.62 The strong Nazi army started 
from organised groups which were responsible for protecting its meetings.63 Hitler Youth was 
so popular that by 1935 more than half of the German young males were members of the 
 
56 M Kaldor, ‘Democracy and globalisation in M Albrow and others (eds), Democracy and globalization 
(Global civil society 2007/8: Communicative power and democracy, Sage 2008) 35. 
57  Sidney Tarrow, 'Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of 
Contention' (1993) 17 Social Science History 281, 284. Tarrow points out that there are five steps of 
protest cycles: heightening conflict across the social system, diffusing sectoral and geographic 
boundaries, introducing new social movement organisations and empowering the old ones, creating a 
meaning for mobilisation, and expanding repertoires of contention. 
58 Donatella Della Porta, Mobilizing for democracy. comparing 1989 and 2011 (Oxford scholarship online, 
Oxford : Oxford University Press 2014) 16. 
59 Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires (n 34) 182. 
60 Tim Kirk, Nazi Germany (Routledge Abingdon 2013) 16. 
61  Encyclopaedia Britannica, 'National Socialism' (2016) <https://www.britannica.com/event/National-
Socialism> accessed 13 September 2016. 
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movement.64  Hitler’s National Socialism movement gained vast support which eventually 
brought him a majority in the parliament and ended the democratic republic. This shows that 
mobilisation can be used as a tool to achieve elites’ political goals rather than pursuing 
democratisation. Therefore, from the perspective of democratic rulers, there is a continual need 
to keep social movements travelling within the democratic boundaries. 
3.2.2.2 Standardisation of collective actions to sustain the democratic process through legal 
frameworks 
Democracies standardise collective actions through the legal frameworks governing public 
assemblies and law enforcement practices to keep protest cycles traveling within the boundaries 
of peaceful protest and democratic values. They need to ensure that all collective actions 
support the democratic process and uphold democratic values. Therefore, collective actions are 
legalised with an aim to enable the democratic process. For example, strikes were legalised in 
many European countries as a means of industrial action for labourers. It was a by-product of 
bitter labour struggles.65 Strikes were illegal until politicians realised that they could not resist 
the tide and that making concessions better served their interests. Tilly pointed out that the rules 
and the repertoires of collective action change when the balance of power changes.66 As such, 
I see that the rules and their implementation are the tangible evidence showing how political 
actors fought for power. In contrast, the legal frameworks governing public assemblies in non-
democracies restrict freedom of assembly and limit the role of civil society actors stopping 
them from participating in the democratisation process. Because large-scale protests can lead 
to democratic struggles and a revolution, mobilisation in non-democracies is generated by the 
state exclusively.  
Opportunity for democratisation in authoritarian regimes comes when the state is unable to 
contain social protests or cannot repress the population effectively. In this situation, an 
authoritarian state may break the cycle of contention by reorganising and applying new 
techniques of repression or finding new sources of legitimation.67 Thus, legal frameworks in 
non-democracies aim to restrict any form of social movements that can cause a regime change. 
Nevertheless, there are states that manage to appear to follow some democratic values (like 
 
64 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 'Hitler Youth' (6 September 2015) <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hitler-
Youth> accessed 13 September 2016. 
65 Charles Tilly, From mobilization to revolution ( Addison-Wesley 1978), 161. 
66 ibid. 
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democracies) while still having recourse to repressive measures (like authoritarian regimes). 
This thesis labels them as “hybrid regimes”.    
 Robertson’s theory on the politics of protest in hybrid regimes 
In the previous section, we noted that social movements scholars pay little attention to legal 
factors in their analysis. Even when law is discussed, much scholarship makes claims about law 
without clearly thinking through the complex, multiple dimensions of what law is and how it 
operates.68 It points out that consolidated democracies have standardised collective actions 
through legal frameworks and international standards to keep collective actions broadly within 
the democratic process. However, hybrid regimes appear to adopt democratic principles of 
legitimation but do not always comply with them in practice. Unlike in authoritarian regimes 
where the leaders do not compete in elections, hybrid regime incumbents partly concede to the 
principle of popular sovereignty by holding periodic elections and allowing the opposition to 
display itself publicly. Therefore, the continuity of hybrid regimes depends on the leaders’ 
ability to control the outcomes of elections as well as their ability to manage public protests.69 
Under this premise, this part aims to unpack the politics of protest hybrid regimes proposed by 
Robertson. Then, it explores the incumbents’ incentive to curtail freedom of assembly to 
maintain the status quo. 
3.3.1 The politics of protest in hybrid regimes 
Robertson argues that hybrid regimes tend to feature protests which are different from protest 
patterns in a democracy. 70  He points out that literature from political scientists such as Meyer 
and Tarrow, Goldstone, and Tilly all agree that ‘protest in democracies is both a normal and 
frequent element of political life’.71 In contrast, authoritarian regimes ban or severely repress 
most forms of public protest and impose heavy penalties to control their citizens because 
allowing the opposition to protest may signal the regimes’ weakness. Therefore, protest patterns 
in authoritarian regimes will likely either use everyday forms of resistance to avoid directly 
challenging the authorities or take direct action, including using violence and armed 
insurrection.72 However, Robertson found that these protest patterns are inaccurate to explain 
the patterns in hybrid regimes. The following part unpacks Robertson’s argument and his three 
 
68 For examples, see footnote 48. 
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variables effecting protest patterns in hybrid regimes. Then it discusses the dilemma for 
allowing freedom of assembly in hybrid regimes.    
3.3.1.1 A new perspective in social movement theories 
Robertson argues that hybrid regimes have taken some steps towards democratisation, but they 
do not intend to achieve the goal of becoming a consolidated democracy. His research, ‘the 
Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes’, illustrates how politicians and elites in Russia have 
monopolised the public arena and curtail the freedom of assembly to sustain their regime.73 
Robertson argues that Tilly’s POS and Goldstone’s argument that “more democracy brings 
more protests” do not fully explain the pattern of protest in hybrid regimes. On the one hand, 
Tilly’s POS explains that the openness of political institutions to external influence has a 
curvilinear relationship with protest (see figure 1).74 Protest levels are low when the openness 
is very limited. This is because there is little chance of success in encouraging the public to 
protest. Protest levels are also low when the openness is very high because there is little need 
to protest when political institutions work effectively. Therefore, protest levels are high only in 
the middle because people have sufficient incentive to use protests to influence political 
actors.75 On the contrary, Goldstone claims that an increase in the level of democracy leads to 
a corresponding increase in protest.76 He argues that the degree of access to political institutions 
is directly proportional to the number of protests. Higher democratic levels bring more protests 
because the access to political institutions is wider. Robertson argues that neither side is correct. 
Both explanations are ambiguous and contradictory. He suggests that protests in a hybrid 
regime do not depend on regimes’ openness or its level of democracy.77 They are rather driven 
by three variables: organisational ecology, state mobilisation strategies, and elite competition.78  
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3.3.1.2 Robertson’s three variables affecting protest patterns 
Robertson suggests that organisational ecology, state mobilisation strategies, and elite 
competition affect protest patterns in hybrid regimes. First, the organisational ecology refers to 
the nature of social movement organisations. 79 This includes the level of their development and 
their working environment. Democracies allow independent organisations to dominate civil 
society while closed authoritarian regimes allow only state-sponsored organisations. Therefore, 
independent organisations in a democracy are the driving force while independent organisations 
in authoritarian regimes are either powerless or non-existent.80 Civil society in hybrid regimes 
is a blended formula between state-sponsored organisations and independent organisations.  
They are allowed to operate with little civil rights under narrow constitutional guarantees of 
freedom of association, organisation, and assembly. At the same time, states impose restrictions 
that allow the authorities to arbitrarily terminate independent organisations while giving special 
treatment to state-sponsored organisations.81 As a result, mobilisations are sometimes carried 
out without social movements.82   
Second, the state mobilising strategies refer to the degree of states’ involvement in mobilisation. 
As the incumbents in hybrid regimes face some degree of open political competition, they need 
to be able to mobilise a large number of supporters to vote and to discourage potential 
challengers.83 Unlike closed authoritarian regimes or totalitarian regimes, in which political 
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organisations are monopolised by the states, hybrid regimes do not have total control over 
political organisations. The options available for hybrid regimes are not only to repress or to 
allow oppositions to mobilise. Similar to ‘astroturfing’ in many democracies84, hybrid regimes 
go further by creating ersatz social movements that campaign and mobilise like genuine social 
movements but act as political vehicles –they are often tasked with duties to dominate the streets 
and to seize the political opportunity from opposition groups.85 These ersatz social movements 
can be mobilised to create the impression of dominance and invincibility. 
Third, there is sometimes a significant degree of competition among elites.86 When elites are 
competing to hold state’s power, they may have an incentive to mobilise their supporters to win 
over the opponent. The higher degree of elite competition, the more mobilisation there is.87 The 
level of public elite competition is high when central leadership is weak, or the leader’s 
popularity is low. In contrast, the level of elite competition is low when there are signs that the 
leadership is strong and is likely to remain in office for a long time. However, the level of public 
elite competition cannot be translated in a linear fashion into protests on the streets. High levels 
of public elite competition do not always produce more street protests because elites’ strategic 
choices depend on whether mobilisation offers better political opportunities. By choosing to 
mobilise, elites risk creating political opportunities for other competitors and risk giving people 
real experiences from protests on the street. These may backfire later because the protesters 
will have opportunities to expand their networks and later organise new movements that the 
elites cannot control. According to Robertson, when organisational ecology is dominated by 
the state and state has a demobilising strategy, states will make sure that bottom-up mobilisation 
remains weak and difficult to be expanded. Under this condition, elites are likely to remain 
demobilised.88 Thus, a high level of public elite competition does not always produce frequent 
protests. 
Robertson points out that these three variables (organisational ecology, state mobilisation 
strategies, and elite competition) allow us to examine contention in hybrid regimes better. The 
following section discusses how these variables work together giving a particular characteristic 
of contention (see table 2). Protests in a consolidated democracy and in an authoritarian regime 
 
84 Astroturfing is an attempt to create a fake impression of widespread grassroots support where there is 
none. It is secretly funded by the government or private companies to form a particular opinion on 
someone or something.  
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usually appear at the extreme ends of the spectrum. For a consolidated democracy, the 
organisational ecology is dominated by independent organisations. The state has little incentive 
to mobilise while the public elite competition is always high. This type of contention produces 
protests that display WUNC. In contrast, an authoritarian regime has a state-dominated 
organisational ecology, a monopoly of state mobilisation, and a low level of public elite 
competition. Protests as a form of political contention in authoritarian regimes under this 
contention are rare and violent.89 In hybrid regimes, contention can vary depending on the 
combination of the three factors. Robertson remarks that the contention in a hybrid regime is 
not only about the contest between pro-regime and anti-regime forces. He argues that we should 
see a hybrid regime as ‘a set of rules designed for the management of competition among elites 
and for managing pressure from below that might otherwise fracture elite coalitions.’90 The 
open and closed nature of the regime is modified through this set of rules in order to deal with 
political pressure and challenges.91 In my opinion, Robertson’s theory illuminates protest 
patterns not only in Russia, the focus of his study, but also in the three states that are the focus 
of this thesis. However, similar to social movement scholars we discussed earlier, Robertson’s 
work only partially acknowledges the role and relevance of law.       
3.3.1.3 How do regime types affect the pattern of contention? 
Robertson suggests that regime type can affect the pattern of contention. Protests in democratic 
regimes are usually driven by strong independent organisations. The state is not interested in 
mobilising and the level of elite competition is relatively high. In such conditions, he explains 
that the level of contention is high, and protest will likely be peaceful consisting primarily of 
demonstrations of WUNC.92 At the other end of the spectrum, closed authoritarian regimes 
fully control the field of organisational ecology and state mobilisation strategies. As a 
consequence, public protests are rare and often involve violence or direct action. The 
organisations in hybrid regimes are mixed between state-sponsored organisations and 
independent organisations. Hybrid regimes may decide to mobilise or demobilise their 
supporters corresponding to the level of elite competition. Consequently, protests and 
demonstrations in hybrid regimes can be peaceful or violent depending on the dynamic of elite 
politics.93 A unique feature of protests in a hybrid regime is that protesters can be very active 
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in one situation and be extremely passive in another one with similar time and place. For 
example, the authorities can arbitrarily restrict anti-regime protests while facilitate (or turn a 
blind eye to) pro-regime gatherings. This is because both pressures from below and elites’ 
politics drive the level of mobilisation.94  
While Robertson’s three variables allow us to make predictions about the nature of contention 
and protest activity, it is not a fully-fledged account. The argument in this thesis is that the 
incumbents in hybrid regimes are themselves able to manipulate Robertson’s variables through 
domestic legal frameworks and public order policing so as to control the nature of public 
protest. These two overarching legal factors provide means to create a condition that produce 
fewer public protests. According to Robertson’s theory (see table 2, rolls 3 & 4), the two 
conditions that produce fewer public protests are either: (1) state dominated organisational 
ecology, applying a demobilising strategy, and low level of public elite competition or (2) 
balanced organisational ecology, applying a demobilising strategy, and low level of public elite 
competition. When public elite competition is high, hybrid regimes seek to dominate the 
organisational ecology and applying a demobilising strategy. When the elite competition is low, 
the regime may decide to apply a mobilising strategy to show that there is freedom of assembly, 
but such strategies only produce large state-controlled rallies. Therefore, I argue that 
incumbents in hybrid regimes can manipulate the three variables through legal frameworks and 
public order policing.   
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Table 2. Varieties of Contention in Hybrid Regimes 
  
Source: Graeme Robertson, The politics of protest in hybrid regimes: managing dissent in post-
communist Russia (Cambridge University Press 2011) 204. 
3.3.1.4 Protest presents a dilemma in hybrid regimes 
Allowing freedom of assembly presents a dilemma in hybrid regimes. Hybrid regimes are 
characterised by their uneasy combination of open political competition and authoritarian 
control.95 If they allow too much freedom of assembly, the regimes will be vulnerable and open 
opportunities for elites to break away and mount public protests to challenge the status quo. If 
they allow too little freedom, their economic and international reputation will suffer.  Robertson 
argues that democracies can resist instability caused by street protests better than authoritarian 
regimes because they are better equipped with institutional legitimacy and legal procedures.96 
Autocracies are more sensitive to street protests because they do not have any legitimate 
mechanisms to deal with protests and political leaders often make a decision on less reliable 
political information than leaders in democracies.97 Likewise, hybrid regimes are also 
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vulnerable to street protest. Hybrid regimes are more vulnerable to small-scale protests than 
democracies and authoritarian regimes.98  
Unlike democracies where small protests are part of everyday life, street protests in hybrid 
regimes and authoritarian regimes can illustrate a regime’s weakness and open political 
opportunities for opposition groups. While opposition forces decide to mobilise a large number 
of people to destabilise the government in an election, a protest with little participants can cause 
great embarrassment.99 Street protests can generate political momentum, which could 
eventually lead to a breakdown of elite consensus. While authoritarian regimes can 
straightforwardly use excessive force without hesitation, hybrid regimes have a tendency not 
to totally censor or use excessive public violence.100 Hybrid regimes have some open political 
competition and civil society to pick up the momentum from small-scale protests. This 
condition creates a dilemma for hybrid regimes that is ‘to allow significant political freedoms 
without signalling weakness to potentially disaffected segments of the elite’.101  Robertson saw 
that this was the reason why Russia developed techniques of repression that increase the state’s 
capacity to suppress demonstrators and mobilise pro-regime activists.102 
3.3.2 How do hybrid regimes manage street protests? 
The argument being made in this chapter is that Robertson has given insufficient weight to the 
capacity of law as an agent of control or as a factor that animates his three variables. To make 
the case, we need to further investigate how protests are managed in his one typical hybrid 
regime, Russia. Robertson identifies that coercion and channelling are the main techniques 
creating street-proof mechanisms. The first method, coercion, refers to the use of force such as 
intimidation and direct violence.103 Apart from security forces such as police and military, 
Russian authorities also assign special units and regime supporters to carry out attacks and 
harassment.104 The aim is to publicly intimidate public protest participants and to discourage 
potential participants.105 The second method, channelling, refers to indirect repression aiming 
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to affect the forms of protest available such as restrict time allowed to protest, limit the flows 
of resource, impose tax restrictions on organisers, etc.106 Putin’s regime has developed 
techniques for channelling energy away from the opposition by manipulating the media, 
licensing civil society, and developing ersatz social movements to support the regime.107  
Putin’s regime restrained from using severe violence against street protesters. The authorities 
prefer to silence opposition groups by using proactive intervention such as detaining or 
harassing organisers prior to a demonstration, intimidating potential participants, employing 
undercover agents, and closing down gathering venues.108 The key was to prevent targeted 
troublemakers from taking part in any demonstration. For example, during the G8 summit in 
St. Petersburg in 2006, hundreds of people were detained to ensure that they could not disturb 
the event.109  Another technique was to harass activists for “disrespecting the President”.110 
When these arrests or charges are employed, activists are detained and released rather quickly 
due to insufficient evidence. The Putin administration uses excessive force against public 
demonstrations only when it is necessary. Overall, coercion is considered a short-term 
strategy.111 It is likely to be employed when channelling (see further the following paragraph) 
fails to give desirable results. For example, in an environmental protest to stop a highway 
construction in Khimki forest, environmental activists were beaten by both police and armed 
thugs.112 Some journalists who wrote articles criticising the project were also attacked 
severely.113 Pre-emptive harassment of activists is often carried out by the authorities while 
more explicit forms of violence are executed by networks of pro-regime actors with whom the 
government easily deny responsibility.114      
Channelling under Putin’s regime focuses on three techniques namely, manipulating the media, 
imposing a licensed civil society, and mobilising pro-regime supporters.  The government 
manipulates the media through both state ownership and through private oligarchy owners who 
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response to Putin’s political interests.115 In 2001, the regime bought Vladimir Gusinsky’s NTY 
and Boris Berezovsky’s ORT. Three years later, all major TV stations and publishing houses 
were controlled by the regime. Consequently, the media reported favourably pro-Kremlin news 
and heavily criticised the opposition.116 After taking control of the media, the government 
moved on to curtail civil society. In 2006, the Kremlin channelled potential supporters away 
from the opposition by amending legislation on NGOs - the Federal Law No.18-FZ. Foreign 
NGOs were required to register within six months after the promulgation of the law. The 
government demanded higher qualifications – purportedly, as an attempt to eliminate fake 
organisations disguised as NGOs such as commercial-oriented groups and criminal gangs.117 
As a result, the law gave the authorities vast discretionary power (to not grant approval to some 
targeted NGOs). This legislation clearly serves as a tool for discouraging NGOs from 
challenging the authorities.118 
After Putin’s re-election in March 2012, the government enacted the Federal Law Introducing 
Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the Regulation 
of Activities of Non-commercial Organisations Performing the Function of Foreign Agent. The 
law requires all non-commercial organisations (NCOs) to register with the Ministry of Justice 
before receiving funding from any foreign source. As a result, USAID was halted on the ground 
that it provided grants for election monitoring.119  On 23 May 2014, Putin signed the Federal 
Law No.129-FN on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, known 
as ‘the Law on Undesirable Organisations’ which gives power to the Prosecutor General to 
outlaw any NGO that s/he considered a threat to national security. Any person participating or 
associating with it will face administrative and criminal penalties. On 6 July 2016, Russia 
enacted two federal laws, known as the “Yarovaya Package”, which were designed to enhance 
counter-terrorism and protect public safety. These laws provide vast discretion for the security 
forces to apply criminal and administrative measure against any suspect. Telephone and internet 
providers are ordered to store all communications and activities of all users and make it 
available for inspection up to six months. This measure caused a significant chilling effect 
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among NGOs operating in Russia because they are worried that the regime would arbitrarily 
use these laws against them.120 
While existing civil society organisations are kept on a tight rein, Putin’s regime filled the 
missing organisational space with ersatz social movements.121 The government created pro-
regime organisations to supply mass mobilisation upon request. This strategy provides the 
government with an option to counter street protests. For example, in 2000, brothers Vasilii and 
Boris Iakemenko founded Moving Together (Idushchie vmeste), which later became known as 
the “Putin Youth movement”.122 The organisation became popular and transformed to the 
“Nashi” movement aiming to turn young citizens to pro-regime supporters. Such organisation 
boosts its popularity through networks of regional commissars and annual summer training 
camps. Nashi has been mobilised to show pro-regime supports and to harass anti-regime 
demonstrators. By 2007, Nashi became Putin’s personal mobilising unit.123 
3.3.3 Implications of Robertson’s theory in Thailand, Malaysia, and Cambodia 
In a previous part, this thesis noted that Robertson’s three variables are the main factors 
affecting protest patterns in hybrid regimes. It also argued that Robertson overlooks the role of 
law and law enforcement in shaping the nature of contention. Hence, this part attempts to 
establish that Robertson’s theory can be applied to understand contention in Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Cambodia. This chapter further illustrates that these hybrid regimes have used 
similar techniques to curtail freedom of assembly through legal frameworks and public order 
policing.   
3.3.3.1 Thailand 
Considered in light of Robertson’s theory, Thailand during 2007- 2014 arguably had a balanced 
organisational ecology. The state did not attempt to dominate civil society organisations. 
Hence, both Yellow-shirts and Red-shirts established their own organisations to generate ersatz 
social movements. This increased their ability to sustain long-term rallies. Both also possessed 
their own satellite channels which were less regulated than normal TV stations, and became the 
main tools for communicating with their supporters and attracting potential followers; ASTV 
for the Yellow-shirts and UDD TV for the Red-shirts. Social media, online newspapers and 
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community radio stations also been used to generate ersatz social movements. Supporters 
tended to follow only their camp’s media rather than receiving information extensively from 
many sources.124 Therefore, they were easily flamed by biased news and propaganda. In terms 
of state mobilisation strategy, Thailand has a mix of state and independent mobilisation 
strategies. The ruling parties often mobilised their supporters against the opposition protests. 
Counter protests, by opposition camps, usually came after mass mobilisation against the 
government. According to Robertson, in the circumstances that state balancing of 
organisational ecology, mobilisation, and the degree of public elite competition is high, the 
pattern of protest tends to be frequent, large scale and highly polarised. The contention between 
the Red and Yellow Shirt movements supports Robertson’s theory. Both camps were managed 
by Thai elites, and both were being mobilised precisely when these elites were in conflict.   
3.3.3.2 Malaysia 
Viewed through the lens of Robertson’s theory, prior to 2008, Malaysia fell into the category 
in which the state dominated organisational ecology (but independent organisations continued 
to exist), engaged in demobilisation, and had a high degree of elite competition. These 
conditions produced little public protest because elites refrained from using the potential of 
street mobilisation. After 2008, however, the state engaged in a mobilisation strategy and the 
level of elite contention rose. In these conditions, the resulting protests involved large scale 
elite-led mobilisations. The two Bersih movements are good examples. The first Bersih protests 
(2007) and Bersih 2.0 (2011) involved large rallies being met with significant State repression. 
Later, when the movements developed to Bersih 4.0 (2015), the degree of public elite 
competition became higher still. The protest pattern changed from one of demobilisation pre-
2008 (with State control exercised primarily through the domination of organisational ecology) 
to large scale elite-led mobilisation. The movement was openly supported by the opposition 
leaders. The state employed coercion techniques (further discussed in chapter 4 and 5) such as 
preventing public expression of opposition, threatening and harassing organisers in advance of 
the protest dates and discouraging potential participants. A series of laws have been used to 
channel civil society away from the public sphere while the state mobilised ersatz social 
movements to support the regime. Mass media has been tightly controlled by the state. Internal 
security law has been used to suppress political dissenters.  
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3.3.3.3 Cambodia 
Again, considering Robertson’s theory, Cambodia might be argued to provide an example of 
balanced organisational ecology because it allows some (minimal) space for NGOs and 
opposition groups to exercise civil rights and freedoms, despite the government’s effort to limit 
and strictly control organisations which pose a threat to the regime. Cambodia has a mobilising 
strategy as the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) had shown that they can mobilise their 
supporters through networks of officials and youth groups as well as using nationalist groups 
to boost popularity for the CPP. The degree of public elite competition has been high as the 
CPP significantly lost seats to the opposition in the 2013 general election. This condition 
produces a protest pattern that involves ‘frequent large scale, highly polarised protest, with 
significant state and independent involvement’.125 Nevertheless, the difference between 
Cambodian and Thai politics is that Hun Sen is the Cambodian strongman who has the military 
completely under his control, while the Thai civilian leaders rarely had full control over the 
military. When protests escalated, the Thai military seized the opportunity to launch a coup 
d’état.  In contrast, Hun Sen’s regime has a higher capability to restrain the military.  
Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia are geographically linked. Social movements and street 
protests in one country can inspire citizens in neighbouring countries to behave in a similar 
fashion.  For example, the anti-government protests, both of the Red-shirts and of the Yellow-
shirts in Thailand inspired Bersih movements in Malaysia. Bersih movements wore yellow-
shirts as their identity while the pro-government (UMNO) groups dressed in red. Similar 
accusations relating to corruption and unfair election procedures were raised. Afterwards, 
activists in the opposition in Cambodia demanded free and fair elections and called for a “colour 
revolution”. Political conflicts in these three countries have become deeply polarised between 
the pro-government groups and the opposition. Similarly to Russia, governments of these three 
countries recently introduced legislation on public assembly as an attempt to shape the scope 
of freedom of assembly: the Public Assembly Act 2015 (Thailand), Peaceful Assembly Act 
2012 (Malaysia), and Law on Peaceful Assembly 2009 (Cambodia).  Moreover, the three states 
have been employing similar techniques of coercion and channelling in order to reduce or 
eliminate the effects of public assemblies. They dominate or heavily influence civil society. 
Ersatz social movements are used to protect the regimes and gain popularity from their people. 
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Furthermore, as can be seen from table 3, the level of public elite competition in all three 
countries was relatively high during the past decade.   
Table 3. Varieties of Hybridity is Thailand, Malaysia, and Cambodia 
 
Organisational 
Ecology 
State Mobilisation 
Strategy 
Public Elite 
Competition 
Nature of Contention 
Thailand 
 
Balanced 
 
Mobilising  
(2007-2014) 
 
High 
frequent large scale, 
highly polarised 
protests 
(2007 – 2014) 
Balanced 
Demobilising*:  
(2014 - 2018) 
*Under Military Junta 
High 
Large scale anti-
government 
mobilisation 
(2017 – 2018) 
Malaysia 
Dominated but 
independent 
organisations 
exist 
Demobilising  
(prior to 2008) 
High 
Elites refraining from 
using mobilisation 
(prior to 2008) 
Dominated but 
independent 
organisations 
exist 
Mobilising  
(2008 - 2018) 
High 
Large scale, elite-led 
mobilisation 
(2008-2018) 
Cambodia 
Balanced Mobilising Low (prior to 2013) 
Large scale controlled 
rallies, heavy state 
repression 
(prior to 2013) 
Balanced Mobilising High (2013 -  2018) 
Frequent large scale 
protest, highly 
polarised protest 
(2013-2018) 
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In this section, we can conclude that Robertson’s three variables offer a new perspective to 
understand protest patterns and the nature of contentious in hybrid regimes. Moreover, this 
section demonstrated that Robertson’s theory can be applied to three hybrid regimes in 
Southeast Asia. Just as the Putin administration managed street protests through coercion and 
channelling, we can expect to see similar techniques to manage street protests in these regimes. 
We noted, however, that Robertson has largely overlooked the role of law and legal institutions. 
Hence the following heading explores Robertson’s theory from a legal perspective.   
  
 Looking at Robertson’s theory from a legal perspective 
Robertson has overlooked legal mechanisms governing public assembly which, in my opinion, 
give direct effect to his three variables. He has also missed considering the role of legal 
institutions in framing the repertoires of protest. This part attempts to explore Robertson’s 
theory from a legal perspective. It argues that Robertson’s observations help us to better 
understand the logic that underlies the imposition of restrictions on public assemblies in hybrid 
regimes and can reveal the characteristics of legal mechanisms governing public assemblies in 
hybrid regimes.    
3.4.1 Unexplored areas in Robertson’s politics of protest in hybrid regimes 
Robertson does not fully incorporate a legal perspective to explain the politics of protest in 
hybrid regimes. I suggest that an appreciation of the (often) structuring role played by legal 
mechanisms is needed, especially an understanding of how the rules in hybrid regimes curtail 
the scope of freedom of assembly through law and law enforcement. There are at least two legal 
issues that tacitly underpin Robertson’s theory that are worth exploring. The first is the potential 
that law has to shape the capacity for social movement actors to take to the streets in order to 
seek change. The second is the role of legal institutions. 
Robertson has not fully explored the interaction between on the one hand legislation, rules and 
regulations that govern public assemblies and on the other, those actors involved in public 
protests which thus then frame the exercise of freedom of assembly. That is, he pays scant 
regard to the legal management of contention in hybrid regimes. For instance, when he 
explained the theory of declining in protest frequency, he followed Meyer’s and Minkoff’s 
approach which explains variation in protest through the effect of formal rules and of political 
Protest law & Public Order Policing in Hybrid Regimes - Pat Niyomsilp 
116 
 
signals that players received.126 Instead of evaluating law and regulations governing public 
assemblies, Robertson examines the result of implementing a mixed electoral system which 
decreases the elites’ incentives to mobilise their protesters.127 Here, I suggest that legal 
frameworks and public order policing are major factors shaping the incentives of both genuine 
civil society organisers and of elites in terms of whether to use the streets to challenge the 
incumbent government. Hybrid regimes may impose punitive sanctions and disproportion 
responsibilities to discourage organisers and participants from mobilising.   
Looking at Robertson’s theory from a legal perspective can reveal how hybrid regimes 
systematically create street-proof mechanisms through law. For instance, when Robertson 
examined coercion tactics under the Putin administration, he did not make many references to 
the laws that were used to harass participants in public demonstrations.128  That said, when he 
explained the organisational ecology in Russia, he did examine the Federal Law No. 18-FZ (the 
NGO reform law) which drew the parameters within which civil society and other NGOs in 
Russia could operate.129 However, he overlooked the Federal Law No.54-FZ on Gatherings, 
Meetings, Demonstrations, Processions and Picket when he assessed the state mobilisation 
strategies and the level of public elite competition. He simply accepted that hybrid regimes had 
legal frameworks guaranteeing a significant degree of civil rights, but that they also had 
restrictions, both de jure and de facto, limiting NGOs’ ability to conduct some activities.130 As 
such, he did not explain much about how these laws affect protesters’ ability to assemble on 
the street. It is argued here, though, that legal frameworks on public assembly and public order 
policing are the key factors affecting protest organisers incentive and ability to hold a 
demonstration. A further study on the interaction between these legal restrictions and 
Robertson’s politics of protest theory will fill the theoretical gap.  
Secondly, Robertson leaves unexplored the role of legal institutions. He noticed the relationship 
between the judiciary and the police, but did not closely investigate court judgments or the 
dynamics of public order policing. How law enforcement and the judiciary see their roles in 
fulfilling a State’s obligations under IHRL can greatly affect the repertoires of protest. When 
Robertson investigated the politics of protest in Russia, the practice of judicial review (both its 
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quality and the role of judges in safeguarding freedom of assembly) are missing from his 
analysis. Furthermore, despite Russia having had many freedom of assembly and association 
cases against it heard before the ECtHR, Robertson did not investigate the role of the ECtHR 
and its effects on the domestic protection of protest in Russia. It is argued here that legal 
research on this matter can support Robertson’s theory in further explaining elite decisions - as 
Robertson already pointed out, the degree of competition among elites depends on the different 
strategic choices that elites are able to choose from.131 Unquestionably, legal frameworks 
governing public assembly and public order policing are factors influencing these elite choices. 
 It is worth noting that Robertson was looking to correct the previous sociological skew in social 
movement scholarship, by providing the perspective of a political scientist looking to a 
characterise the nature of protest and explain the dynamics that underlie protest patterns, not to 
provide a comprehensive theory, one which would encompass law (and other disciplines and 
approaches too). He admits that most of the literature on contentious politics has been written 
by sociologists rather than political scientists.132 Sociologists are likely to pay attention to the 
effect of political institutions on protest in a general sense rather than comparing the effects of 
particular institutional arrangements under the constitution and its legal frameworks. 
Robertson’s theory is thus an example of political science research discussing the nature of 
protest based on political incentives and the interaction between political players. In a similar 
way, this thesis comes primarily from a legal perspective and argues that legal research on 
public assembly provides an evidential basis for better understanding the politics of protest in 
hybrid regimes – specifically, how contention is shaped through legal frameworks and public 
order policing. It is suggested that this legal perspective (and its more granular focus on the 
operation of specific legal provisions) is necessarily part of the full picture. 
3.4.2 What can we learn from Robertson’s theory on the politics of protest in hybrid regimes? 
By examining Robertson’s politics of protest through a legal perspective, we can better 
understand how the legal framework governing public assemblies and public order policing 
effects political contention in hybrid regimes. Robertson’s theory identifies key factors that 
explain political contention and protest patterns in hybrid regimes.133 His theory explains that 
protests in hybrid regimes are driven not only by civil society but also by the state and the elites. 
Robertson’s theory offers a framework to understand how contention in hybrid regimes is 
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managed by explaining the incumbents’ incentive to manage street protests. If Robertson’s 
observation is correct, there is a tension inherent at the heart of the management of contention 
in hybrid regimes; elites will impose restrictions limiting the ability of political dissenters to 
mount public protests but, at the same time, will allow pro-regime movements to mobilise and 
dominate civil society.134 If so, and as has been argued here and in chapter 2, the legal 
restrictions in hybrid regimes serve a different purpose than laid down by IHRL (and the 
particular conception of ‘democracy’ upon which it is premised). 
3.4.2.1 The logic of imposing restrictions on public assemblies in democracies  
Democracies restrict freedom of assembly to ensure that public assemblies support their 
democratic process and uphold democratic principles.135 The rules regarding protests are 
substantively neutral, neutral as to the outcome and result, seeing protest and public assemblies 
as essential elements of not in opposition to, democracy. Restrictions in democracies are 
designed to protect and facilitate peaceful protests which are seen as legitimate means to make 
demands.136 Political institutions encourage citizens to participate in decision making both 
through electoral-methods and non-electoral methods. One of the important characteristics of 
public assemblies is that they are performed to influence decision-makers who fear losing their 
electoral popularity. Hence, protesting in a form of public gathering can influence elected 
representatives.137 If a protest successfully sets an agenda in motion with sufficient social 
support, politicians cannot easily ignore it. Upon this logic, Tilly claims that politicians in a 
representative democracy are more likely to respond to protests when protesters display a 
significant degree of WUNC.138 Similarly, Della Porta and Diani agreed that the fear of losing 
electoral support can make elected representatives change their position, either to avoid losing 
popularity or to attract new supporters.139   
3.4.2.2 The logic of imposing restrictions on public assemblies in authoritarian regimes 
In closed authoritarian regimes, public assemblies are not an essential part of their political 
process. Although there are state-sponsored public assemblies to boost the regime’s popularity, 
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genuine public assemblies are usually banned or significantly restricted by the authorities. 
Harsh restrictions enable the regimes to retain a monopoly on public participation. Strict social 
control and law enforcement in authoritarian regimes make public assemblies rare and 
dangerous.140 Independent organisations or social movements outside ruling-party control are 
usually forbidden or insignificant.141 Authoritarian regimes fear that a public assembly may 
spark uprisings or ignite a revolution. Mass protests also signal that a regime is facing a crisis 
of legitimacy.142 Such a decline in legitimacy, if left continue, could eventually lead to regime 
transition.143 Therefore, authoritarian regimes have the incentive to make contention localised 
and make it harder to sustain a long-term protest, which in return reduces the degree of threat 
to the regimes. For instance, Lorentzen points out that China, as an authoritarian regime, has 
the incentive to tolerate regular small-scale protests because they serve as useful indicators in 
monitoring corruption at local government and identifying discontent and citizen 
preferences.144 He argues that the information on corruption makes the regime stronger and 
more efficient.145 Lorentzen coined the term ‘loyalist protest’ to describe a pattern of protest, 
which is healthy for authoritarian regimes. The loyalist protests are collective actions of small 
well-defined groups whose claims are narrow in scope. They do not seek to escalate but instead 
focus only on their groups’ grievance and local interest. Above all, they do not challenge the 
legitimacy of the rulers or challenge to topple their general policy.146 
3.4.2.3 The logic of imposing restrictions on public assemblies in hybrid regimes 
Hybrid regimes, in contrast, need somehow to contain challenges from both elites and the 
partly-freed civil society.147 They have an incentive to retain the capacity to repress anti-regime 
protesters and to mobilise pro-regime activists to shield the regime from opposition (and 
thereby enhance the likelihood of continued electoral success). As an attempt to curb the 
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capacity of people to protest, they use public assembly restrictions together with other relevant 
legislative provisions to shape the public sphere and to reduce the threat from political 
challengers. 
Hybrid regimes benefit from having laws and public order policing that are not fair to other 
political competitors. Political competition takes place in an unfair environment but freedom of 
assembly is not simply prohibited outright. These regimes restrict the freedom unfairly to 
protect their political dominance. Under these conditions, Tilly’s WUNC framework does not 
fully explain protesters’ incentive to pressure their representatives via protests because the 
incumbents usually have an election-proof mechanism allowing the incumbents to maintain 
their majority in Parliament. Protests displaying WUNC have less impact on institutionalised 
political actors in hybrid regimes.  
If Lorentzen’s observation of protest in authoritarian regimes is correct148, hybrid regimes 
should have a similar incentive to tolerate regular small-scale protests because they operate 
without accurate information on public opinion. According to Robertson, small-scale protests 
are harmful to hybrid regimes because they can embarrass the authorities and generate a real 
political problem.149 This is because civil society in a hybrid regime is partly open and there is 
at least the appearance of real political competition. By contrast, in an authoritarian regime 
there is semblance of open political competition and no civil society exists to sustain opposition 
momentum. Therefore, I see that hybrid regimes need a mechanism filtering out real threats 
while keeping the political competition partly open. The underlying logics for imposing 
restrictions on freedom of assembly in a hybrid regime are (1) to limit dissenters’ capability to 
protest while having a mix of real social movement organisations and ersatz social movement 
organisations in its civil society, and (2) to allow the incumbent ruler to mobilise pro-regime 
supporters to display their dominance.150 
In short, we can conclude that the logic of imposing restrictions on public assemblies in hybrid 
regimes is to limit dissenters’ capability to protest lawfully while allowing pro-regime 
supporters to mobilise. This logic contradicts that in a consolidated democracy where 
restrictions are (or at least, ought) only to be imposed to keep public assemblies within 
democratic boundaries. Robertson’s theory provides a rationale explaining what patterns of 
political contention are desired in hybrid regimes. I see that Robertson’s theory can be used to 
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explain the characteristics of legal mechanisms governing public assemblies in hybrid regimes 
because they are the tools for curtailing freedom of assembly limiting the capacity of the 
opposition groups and discouraging other elites to challenge the incumbents’ status quo.  
3.4.3 Characteristics of the legal mechanisms governing public assemblies in hybrid regimes 
The logic of imposing restrictions on public assembly dictates the characteristics of the legal 
mechanism. I argue that legal frameworks and public order policing are relied upon to produce 
an ecology in which hybrid regime incumbents have the advantage. According to Robertson’s 
theory of organisational ecology in hybrid regimes, the state can mobilise ersatz social 
movements to display dominance. From a legal perspective, we can expect that the law 
governing civil society (such as the NGO law) excessively restricts the ability to form and 
operate a civic organisation against the interests of a dominant state. The state must have a legal 
mechanism to control ‘organisational ecology’ in order to screen out NGOs that might 
destabilise the regime.  
When considering the legal frameworks governing public assemblies, we can expect to find 
legal frameworks that allow them to arbitrarily restrict dissenters’ ability to protest, while at the 
same time enabling pro-regime supporters to mobilise (See table 4). The legal frameworks in 
hybrid regimes should provide the authorities with broadly framed legal grounds to restrict 
freedom of assembly allowing them to exercise their discretion arbitrarily. On the matter of law 
enforcement, we should expect to find that public order policing in hybrid regimes lacks 
insulation from political power and has a bipolar characteristic: Authorities can switch their 
public order policing style between a democratic approach and an authoritarian approach. The 
police must adhere to the incumbents’ orders rather than to human rights standards. Also, 
judicial review in hybrid regimes serves as a mechanism for consolidating rather than 
challenging power, bolstering the legitimacy of the incumbent.151    
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Table 4. Characteristics of legal mechanisms governing public assemblies in hybrid regimes 
 Democracy Hybrid regimes 
Legal frameworks governing 
NGOs 
NGOs work relatively free 
from state intervention. 
Licensing of civil society 
Civil society dominated by 
ersatz social movements. 
NGOs work in a restricted 
environment. 
Legal frameworks governing 
public assemblies 
Grounds for restriction aim to 
support the democratic process 
The strict test of necessity and 
proportionality is a mandatory 
Uphold international human 
rights standards 
Provide overly broad legal 
ground to restrict freedom of 
assembly 
Do not provide the strict test of 
necessity and proportionality 
Lack of adequate judicial 
review 
Public order policing Insulated from political 
influence 
Consider state positive 
obligations 
Lack insulation from political 
influence 
Diverge between the cultural 
norms of the police and 
international human rights 
norms 
  
Overall, Robertson’s theory reveals the incentives operating upon hybrid regime incumbents in 
shaping the sphere of freedom of assembly. His work provides a foundation to examine why 
such regimes introduce certain types of legal mechanism to produce the desired pattern of 
political contention. The following part examines how hybrid regimes curtail freedom of 
assembly through the modification of law and legal institutions. In order to show how such an 
argument fits with Robertson’s work, it takes Russia as a case study – arguing that Putin’s 
regime modified the legal mechanism governing public assembly precisely in order to shape 
the nature of political contention in Russia. 
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 Curtailing freedom of assembly in hybrid regimes 
Earlier in this chapter it was argued that Robertson has overlooked the importance of legal 
mechanisms shaping the repertoires of protest. The next section attempts to demonstrate that 
laws governing NGOs and freedom of assembly, together with legal institutions (including 
public order policing) are the tools through which States manipulate organisational ecology and 
state mobilisation strategy. For this reason, this part explores the legal framework and public 
order policing in Russia (with brief introductions also to the equivalent frameworks in Thailand, 
Cambodia and Malaysia) to lay a foundation for the extensive discussion in the subsequent 
chapters. 
3.5.1 Controlling organisational ecology through legal frameworks governing NGOs 
Hybrid regimes can limit the right to organise and to participate in a public assembly through 
laws governing NGOs. Robertson has observed that the Putin administration controlled the 
organisational ecology by licensing civil society and by inserting ersatz social movements into 
the civic space. The licensing measure enables the regime to screen out unwanted NGOs. After 
Putin became the president in 2000, the parliament, regional governments, political parties, and 
television networks were bought under executive dominance.152 Civil society was also brought 
under his control and was mobilised to support his regime.153 The organisations funded by the 
regime became known in the academic literature as ‘government-organised nongovernmental 
organisations (GONGOs)’.154  In January 2006, the government enacted the Federal Law No. 
18-FZ On Introducing Changes to Several Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation to tailor 
NGOs and curb civil society in Russia.155 The law has imposed a system of licensing civil 
society which provides vast discretionary power enabling the authorities to discriminately limit 
potential threats from NGOs.156 All NGOs were required to re-register with the authorities and 
the law provided several grounds to refuse any application.157 Moreover, the government can 
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demand unlimited information documenting day-to-day management and can send agents to 
any NGO’s event or any internal meeting without the NGO’s invitation.158  
After Robertson published The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes in 2011, the government’s 
attempt to limit the civil society continued. As a response to the large-scale election protests in 
December 2011, the Putin administration enacted the Federal Law No. 121-FZ ‘On 
Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the Regulation of the 
Activities of Non-profit Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent’ (the 
Foreign Agents law).159 It aimed to either eliminate or marginalise dissenters’ ability to organise 
themselves against the regime.160 This law was a part of a series of amendments designed to 
gain control over the civil society: the amendment to the criminal code and the laws ‘On Public 
Associations’, ‘On Non-commercial Organisation’, and ‘On Combating Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism’.161 Large numbers of NGOs were listed as ‘foreign agents’ in 
a discriminatory manner; for example, the law restricted organisations which advocated 
‘discrimination, the protection of women’s and LGBT rights, the preservation of historical 
memory, academic research, criminal justice and prison system reform, consumers’ rights, and 
environmental issues’.162 All materials distributed by a foreign agent must be labelled as 
‘products of foreign agents’. As a foreign agent NGO, permission is required before 
participating in any political activity. Without it, foreign agents could face a heavy fine or face 
two years imprisonment.163 Plausibly, the heavy fines under this law were designed to bankrupt 
targeted NGOs.164   
A legal technique allowing the authorities to act arbitrarily upon the regime’s signal is to make 
the law ambiguous. For example, the definition of ‘political activity’ in the Foreign Agents law 
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is too loose and too broad. It allows the authorities to wield vast discretionary power.165 The 
definition includes any activity seeking to influence government policy or public opinion with 
regard to government policy.166 Such a definition allows the Russian authorities wide discretion 
to arbitrary restrict and harass NGOs that criticise the authorities and advocate the values of a 
democratic society If a body in receipt of international funding refuses to register, it will be 
banned from participating in any public demonstration. Its bank account will be frozen. Its 
personnel can be fined or imprisoned.  
The Venice Commission has pointed out that the Foreign Agents law did not comply with 
international standards because it did not provide necessary legal certainty.167  This law also 
went against the protected political speech—any restriction on political speech must comply 
with the scope under ECHR Article 10 (2).168 Furthermore, on 23 May 2014, President Putin 
enacted the Federal Law No. 129-FZ (known as ‘The Law on Undesirable Organisations’). This 
law provides the Prosecutor General or the Prosecutor General’s Deputies power to declare any 
foreign or international NGO ‘undesirable’ as a threat to national security. All activities under 
such undesirable organisations are banned, any persons participating in their activities is then 
subjected to administrative and criminal penalties.169 
While civil society organisations were heavily restricted, Putin’s regime filled the civil society 
with ersatz social movement organisations in the form of GONGOs. In 2004, he proposed the 
establishment of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation in order to bridge the 
relationship between the state and civil society.170 The Chamber consisted of presidentially 
appointed members who were regarded as the representatives of organisations in Russian civil 
society. These members were less likely to raise any issue that would threaten the regime’s 
stability.171 For example, Brechalov, who was elected as the head of the Chamber in 2013, was 
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the co-chair of the All-Russian Popular Front which was in charge of mobilising regime 
supporters to vote for the ruling party.172   
In 2013, the number of demonstrators in Moscow reduced by around five times partly because 
participants were in fear of public persecution.173  Another contributing factor was that activists 
did not believe that their efforts on the streets would make any substantial change.174  The loss 
in the public participation matches the explanation under the POS which requires activists to 
believe that they have both power and opportunity to bring about a change.175 By closing down 
the opportunity to achieve a goal, the degree of participation went down as a result. It was clear 
that the Putin administration was sending a strong message to protesters to choose between 
abstaining from politics or facing legal prosecutions.176 According to Robertson’s theory, the 
reduction in public participation was caused by restrictions that changed the organisational 
ecology. The civil society in Russia became dominated by ersatz social movements.  
Russian anti-NGO law and law suppressing freedom of assembly and expression inspired other 
authoritarian regimes to follow.177 Similar legal techniques using NGO laws to silence protests 
from pro-democracy activists and human rights groups can be found in the three Southeast 
Asian regimes. In Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen introduced the Law on Associations and 
Non-Governmental Organisations (LANGO) in 2015. Similar to the Russian style of NGO law, 
it requires all NGOs, both domestic and international organisations to register to the authorities. 
The law imposes burdensome registration requirements such as requiring that international 
NGOs must have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government before 
initiating any activity.178 For foreign NGO applicants, it requires that they must obtain a letter 
issued by the public authority to support their proposing projects.179 Moreover, the law excludes 
NGOs from politics by requiring that all NGOs shall maintain ‘political neutrality’ and refrain 
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from supporting political parties.180 Rhona Smith, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights in Cambodia, has commented: ‘it is difficult to understand why civil society 
organisations and trade unions must be politically neutral. Civil servants, the police and the 
military, on the other hand, should be politically neutral.’181     
The Minister of the Interior has vast discretion to refuse any application on the grounds of 
‘endangering the security, stability and public order or jeopardise the national security, national 
unity, cultures, tradition, and custom of the Cambodian national society’. 182  The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation has similar power to terminate the validity of 
any MOU given by foreign NGOs.183 If the MOU is terminated by the Minister, foreigners in 
the NGO will face expulsion measure under the Law on immigration.184  With several vaguely 
worded provisions, the message to NGOs is nonetheless crystal clear – they should keep their 
activities away from politics if they want to continue to enjoy legal status in the country. 
LANGO creates a significant chilling effect on domestic NGOs. It forces them to operate under 
the fear of arbitrary shutdown because there have been no guidelines on how LANGO would 
be implemented.185 The law was seen as a tool to contain independent organisations, especially 
before and during the election period. For instance, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), a 
US-affiliated NGO, was ordered to shut down in August 2017 due to its failure to register under 
LANGO. The institute had been promoting democratisation in Cambodia since 1992. The NGO 
filed an application to register 15 months before it was ordered to shut down.186 The government 
also threatened to shut down several domestic and international NGOs, including independent 
media to create chilling effects before the next general election in July 2018.187 Between April 
2016 to March 2017, the authorities initiated LANGO to prevent NGOs from holding meetings 
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and gathering.188 On 2 October 2017, the Ministry of Interior issued a directive requiring every 
association and NGO wishing to organise activities in a specific city or province to inform the 
Ministry about the nature of the activities three days in advance.189 This initiative fits the pattern 
that the government was curtailing its civil society before the general election in 2018.190 
In Malaysia, the state imposes an extensive set of restrictions to limit social movements to 
ensure that the regime will survive any threat from civil society.191  Historically, the legal 
framework governing NGOs originated from the British campaign against Chinese secret 
societies during its colonial rule.192  It was an attempted to channel dissenters who would 
challenge the government to organise as a political party rather than forming an NGO.193 The 
Societies Act of 1966 requires that only registered organisations are allowed to function as 
societies.194 The definition of a society under this law is very broad.195 This definition in turn 
confers a powerful discretion on the authorities. The law states that the Minister has absolute 
discretion to declare any societies unlawful if he/she sees that it is ‘being used for purposes 
prejudicial to or incompatible with the interest of the security of Malaysia…’196  The Registrar 
has the power to order any registered society to remove all persons who are not Malaysian 
citizens and to prohibit any affiliation, connection, communication, or other dealing with any 
other body outside Malaysia.197 The law also grants unfettered discretion to the police to 
exercise powers of entry and search. Any police officer of or above the rank of Inspector may 
use force to enter any house or building which he has a reason to believe that there is a meeting 
of an unlawful society or there is a member, publication, insignia, arms, or articles of an 
unlawful society.198 Under this framework, many NGOs in Malaysia choose to register as 
companies or businesses instead.199  
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In addition, human rights NGOs in Malaysia have long been perceived by the government as 
threats to national interests.200 For example, in 1981, the Mahathir administration amended the 
Society Act 1966 to classified NGOs into two categories, “political” and “friendly”.201 The 
amendment has prevented a large number of NGOs from seeking to influence government 
policy. To further discourage NGOs and their supporters, the Societies Act, the Police Act and 
other laws upholding freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of assembly were also 
amended.202      
Turning to Thailand, Thai NGOs first flourished between 1973 and 1976 when a parliamentary 
democracy shortly replaced a military rule.203  When the military came into power, NGOs which 
were seen as leftist or anti-military government were routinely suppressed. Nevertheless, Thai 
NGOs played an important role in facilitating the democratisation process such as campaigning 
against corruption, participating in election monitoring, calling for constitutional revision, and 
demanding political and electoral reform.204 The Thai legal framework on NGOs provides vast 
discretionary power to pursue involuntary termination or liquidation as a means to shut down 
organisations that advocate disagreement with or threaten the state’s stability.205  The Civil and 
Commercial Code of Thailand (CCC) requires that all associations must be registered.206 
However, it is not enforced consistently.207 The CCC provides the authority with discretion to 
deny an association’s application on the ground that the object of the association is contrary to 
the law or good morals or likely to endanger public order or national security.208 The registrar 
also has the power to order involuntary termination and liquidation of any association when the 
object of the association or its activity is contrary to the law or public moral or is likely to 
endanger public peace or national security. 209 These involuntary termination and liquidation 
proceedings present two (related) problems for NGOs.210 The first is that officials can exercise 
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discretion in deciding whether the detailed requirements and procedures have been complied 
with. The second is that politics can easily affect the authority’s decision to terminate anti-
government NGOs.  
Foreign organisations operating in Thailand must obtain permission from the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare. The committee granting this permission is composed of several 
members from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and several representatives from the 
national security and intelligence agency. In granting a permission for a private organisation to 
operate/establish a regional office, the committee must consider the policy of economic and 
social development, national security, the good relationship between Thailand and other 
countries.211 The permission to operate is granted for one year for the first application. Then it 
must be renewed every two years.212 Foreign organisations are prohibited from having an 
objective to generate profit or political purpose.213 Their objectives must be in conformity with 
the development policy and security of Thailand and have operational plans that are not 
contrary to the policy of the Thai Government.214 Their activities shall not be contrary to morals, 
Thai custom and culture.215 Only permitted activities shall be carried out.216 Under the 
conditions listed above, foreign organisations’ freedom to initiate their activities is very limited 
and they risk facing political sanctions from the authorities.  
From the evidence presented above, it can be concluded that it is through the legal framework 
governing NGOs that, what Robertson terms, ‘organisational ecology’ is shaped. We can see 
that legal frameworks in four hybrid regimes excessively restrict the ability to form and operate 
a civic organisation that seeks to challenge the State or hold its officials to account. There are 
legal mechanisms to screen out ‘undesirable’ NGOs. The common grounds for restrictions are 
nationality and threats to national security. NGO law and Foreign Agent law which requires 
periodical registration allow the authorities to keep political activists under surveillance. Also, 
they allow the authorities to selectively ban or prosecute activists perceived to destabilise 
political arrangements. When the civil society can only manoeuvre in limited space, the hybrid 
regime rulers preserve the option to mobilise their ersatz social movements to enrich their 
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popularity. Lacking in a strong and active civil society, the government has the advantage in 
stirring public opinion.  
3.5.2 Controlling state mobilisation strategies through legal frameworks governing public 
assemblies and public order policing 
Robertson’s state mobilisation strategies are fundamentally controlled and shapted by legal 
frameworks governing public assemblies and public order policing. In Russia, many pieces of 
legislation were introduced systematically to restrict freedom of assembly (after Robertson’s 
study in 2012). In his later work, Robertson noticed this missing part and accepted that 
legislatures were used to reduce social protests.217 Hamilton highlights three factors limiting 
the freedom of assembly in post-Soviet hybrid regimes: the excessive discretion power of 
regulatory authorities, procedural problems, and the punitive sanction.218 The Russia legal 
framework governing public assemblies is a good example of his claim. The legal framework 
gives broad discretionary power to the executive authorities to restrict public assemblies. The 
authorities then translate such power into restrictions on time, place, and manner that undermine 
the value of peaceful assemblies.  
The government curtailed the scope of freedom of assembly through the Federal Law on 
Gatherings, Meetings, Demonstrations, Processions and Picket, No. 54-FZ of 19 June 2004 
(Russian PAA). Spontaneous assemblies are prohibited. The law gives that an organiser of a 
public event, except a single-participant picketing, must notify the authority no earlier than 
fifteen days and no later than ten days before the date of the event.219 An absence of a prior 
notification makes a public event unlawful, regardless of whether it is a peaceful spontaneous 
gathering. The ECtHR found, in Navalnyy v Russia, that this legal provision becomes the main 
justification for the authorities to routinely place administrative charges and arrest 
participants.220 The notification system also presents another problem. Although the law uses 
the term “notice of intent”, the authority considers it as “authorisation” in practice. Section 5 of 
the law provides that the authorities may suggest an alternative choice or modify the proposal. 
Then, the organiser needs to negotiate with the authorities to reach an agreement. If there is no 
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agreement, the event cannot take place.221 As a result, the organisers are forced to accept the 
conditions for an assembly – they must “take it or leave it”.222 These requirements substantially 
dictate how a street protest is planned and executed. On this issue, the Venice Commission 
points out that such requirement goes far beyond the legitimate aims under the ECHR which is 
to facilitate public assemblies.223 Therefore, the Commission takes the view that the Russian 
PAA imposes a de facto authorisation procedure.224 
Valery Teterin’s case is a good example.  He sent a notification to hold a public demonstration 
to the Irkutsk administration on 7 October 2018. His notification was returned without 
consideration because he did not define the forms and methods of ensuring public order. He 
argued that he indicated his intention to inform the participants at his event about the telephone 
numbers of the police and ambulance. However, the local courts ruled that his measure did not 
constitute specific measures according to the PAA. Later, Teterin challenged the 
constitutionality of the Russian PAA (s5 and s7) which allowed the authorities to determine 
arbitrarily whether the notification of a public event meets the requirements for specifying the 
forms and methods of ensuring public order and medical aid. On 8 June 2019, the Constitutional 
Court ruled that the provisions were constitutional.225 However, the Court banned the 
authorities from refusing to permit public assemblies on grounds either of uncertainty regarding 
the notification form or failure to put in place specific methods to ensure public order. 226 The 
Court has noted that measures taken by the authorities to ensure freedom of peaceful assembly 
should not lead to excessive state control over organisers or unreasonable restrictions.  In this 
case, the authority has the obligation to consider the submitted notice and is obliged to send 
reasoned proposals for change to the organiser if the authority sees that the notification does 
not meet the requirements in the PAA. Afterwards, if there is no agreement between the 
organiser and the authority, the organiser can apply for a judicial review. Nonetheless, the 
effectiveness of the Russian judicial review procedure remains problematic. The Venice 
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Commission has noted earlier that the appeal procedure under the Russian law was unlikely to 
produce an injunction before the notified date.227 The lengthy appeal procedure under Russian 
law can render judicial review useless. 
The Russian PAA imposes blanket-bans and absolute prohibitions to limit the scope of freedom 
of assembly. The ECtHR has ruled that blanket-bans are disproportionate by their nature 
because they do not allow for exceptions or consideration of particular circumstances. For 
example in Lashmankin and Others v Russia, the ECtHR found that the Russian PAA imposed 
blanket bans on locations such as in the immediate vicinity of court buildings, detention 
facilities, the residences of the President of the Russian Federation, dangerous production 
facilities, railway lines and oil, gas or petroleum pipelines.228  The Venice Commission and the 
Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation have expressed concern that the 
term “immediate vicinity” is overly broad and could be interpreted widely.229 Such a term offers 
opportunities for the authorities to implement the law in a discriminatory manner.  The Venice 
Commission suggests that the law should provide some criteria on circumstances and 
limitations to prevent danger to sensitive locations rather than simply listing prohibited 
locations.230 Section 9 of the law provides a blanket ban on time – any assembly between 11 
p.m. and 7 a.m. is prohibited. Some persons are deprived of freedom of assembly due to their 
age, disability or nationality. Section 5.2 of the law requires that an organiser of a public event 
must not be a legally incapable person, a non-citizen of Russian Federation, a person age less 
than 18 years old (for meeting) and 16 years old for rallies. Furthermore, the law bans any form 
of assembly that does not meet notification requirements, i.e. spontaneous assemblies, 
simultaneous assemblies, urgent assemblies, and counter-demonstrations.231 
Apart from the Russian PAA, the government introduced legislation which contains highly 
ambiguous prohibitions. For example, Federal Law No.135-FZ (the Anti-LGBT Propaganda 
Law) was adopted in 2013.232 It contains highly ambiguous wording, such as “non-traditional 
sexual relationships” and “a non-traditional sexual orientation”, which allow the authorities to 
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ban gay pride parades.233  This provision was a countermeasure to the ECtHR ruling in 
Alekseyev v Russia. 234 In this case, the City of Moscow and other major cities repeatedly denied 
requests to organise gay parades. The government claimed a wide margin of appreciation on 
the issue relating to the treatment of sexual minorities. The ECtHR denied the claim and stated 
the ban on the events did not meet a pressing social need and were not necessary in a democratic 
society.235 Three years later, the government enacted the Anti-LGBT law. It does not use the 
term “homosexuality” but rather uses “the promotion of non-traditional sexual relationships”. 
The law imposed a fine of up to a million rubles for a violation. The law was challenged in the 
Russian Constitutional Court. The Court found that it was justified on the ground of protection 
of morals. ECtHR, in Bayev and Others v Russia, ruled that the Anti-LGBT law violated ECHR 
Article 10 because it does not serve the legitimate aim of the protection of morals.236 The 
ECtHR found that the vagueness of the terminology enables the unlimited scope of their 
application which allows the authorities to encourage homophobia and to damage the principle 
of equality, pluralism and tolerance in a democratic society.237  
In addition, Varol argues that the Putin administration deployed judicial review as a mechanism 
to consolidate his power and bolster his regime’s democratic credentials.238 He authorised 
federal courts to strike down any regional law considered to be inconsistent with the federal 
constitution. This may look normal for a democratic country. However, Putin’s agenda was to 
reduce the vertical checks on his power by regional governments through the federal courts.239 
Moreover, Varol claims that Putin enlisted support from the Constitutional Court, especially 
 
233 Article 6.21 of the Federal Law No.135-FZ states: 
 1. The promoting of non-traditional sexual relationships among minors, expressed in the 
dissemination of information aimed at creating in minors a non-traditional sexual 
orientation, promoting the attractiveness of non-traditional sexual relationships, 
creating a distorted image of the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional 
sexual relationships, or imposing information about non-traditional sexual 
relationships, arousing interest in such relationships, if these activities do not contain 
acts punishable under criminal law… 
234 Alekseyev v Russia App nos 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09 (ECtHR,21 October 2010). 
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through its chairman Valery Zorkin.240 As a result, the Constitutional Court upheld pro-
government legislation and safeguarded the interests of the authoritarian elites.241 Although 
human rights violation cases in Russia can be reviewed by the ECtHR, the Court has been 
unable to prevent a large number of systematic human rights violations because the regime 
makes little effort to improve the situation.242  
Turning to the role of public order policing, Robertson has not yet explored sufficiently how 
public order policing affects state mobilisation strategy. For example, after the presidential 
election of 2011-2012, there were widespread protests in both the capital and other major cities. 
Putin ordered a significant crackdown on political activists who could organise mass protests 
challenging his regime.243 It was a lesson learned from the coloured revolutions in the 
neighbouring countries. The 2011-2012 movements attacked Putin and his United Russia Party. 
Their common goal was to bring down the regime. Although many protests received permits, 
the key opposition figures were harassed and arrested.244 To reduce threats from potential 
protesters, Russian police exercised a combination of aggressive tactics, provided by the legal 
frameworks, such as selective prosecution, vigorous crackdowns on attempted protests and 
arbitrary enforcement of laws and regulations.245 For instance, when arresting participants in a 
public assembly, Russian police have discretion whether to press charges under Article 20.20 
of the Russian PAA which contains a fine or to press administrative charges under Article 19.3 
of the Code of Administrative Offences which may result in up to 15 days of detention.246  These 
two charges require a different standard of proof; administrative cases demand a lower degree 
of proof than in criminal cases. The police need to prove that the arrested participants had 
resisted his/her legitimate order. This leads the police to use administrative charges as their pre-
emptive measure against political dissenters. Amnesty International reported that the Russian 
police treated unauthorised public assemblies as unlawful, however peaceful or undisruptive 
they may be.247 If a participant in the assembly failed to obey the police order to ‘leave 
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immediately and unquestioningly’, the police regarded such action as ‘resistance to a legitimate 
order’. Then, they started to arrest the participants discriminately.  The arrests of protesters who 
support the Bolotnaya prisoners, in February 2014, clearly support the accusation.248 
Politicising the police has been a method to secure political power in Russia. According to 
Robertson, taking control of the security forces by restructuring the Interior Ministry (MVD) 
and Federal Security Services (FSB) can secure political power.249 He points out that ‘coercion 
in Russia is overwhelmingly carrying out by special units of the state apparatus’.250 The general 
public regards the police, secret police, and prosecutors as common tools for repression.251  The 
Russian police organisation has been highly politicised. When law enforcement reformers 
called for the transfer of public order policing tasks from the federal to regional police, the 
proposals were usually rejected by both the MVD and the presidency.252 Decentralising the 
public order policing power would mean that the president would lose the opportunity to 
politicise public assemblies as well as losing the power to contain challenges posed by political 
dissenters.    
Russian police are not subjected to democratic control and their operation thus lacks 
transparency. The Putin administration politicised its law enforcement by appointing former 
KGB personnel throughout the bureaucracy. The current law enforcement structure is inherited 
from the Soviet Union’s structure. Therefore, it has the repressive tendency to violate human 
rights and repress societal forces even when these are not directly encouraged by politicians.253 
The KGB (Committee of State Security), the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), and the 
General Procuracy (responsible for criminal investigation and prosecution, and for monitoring 
state agencies) were the key institutions responsible for enforcing the Communist Party’s 
orders. These three institutions have military structures with hierarchical and top-down 
command traditions.254 The KGB was a combat division of the Communist Party until the party 
collapsed in 1991. Then the FSB (Committee for State Security to Federal Security Service) 
took over its duties and has become the main mechanism of Russian’s security services. The 
FSB is personally overseen by the President but there is no real political control over it. In other 
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words, the FSB is ‘a self-contained and closed system’ which there is no independent organ to 
check and no court to balance its power.255  
Having a personal army can prevent threats from the political circle. Putin established the 
National Guard on top of the regular army to fight the threat of another colour revolution.256 It 
is a lesson learned from the failed coup of August 1990, in which the regular army failed to use 
force against protesters. Moreover, there are political police serving as ‘a reliable instrument 
for holding on to power.’257 They are equipped with special powers and permanent legal cover 
so that they can employ methods outside legal limits such as provocations, arraignment on 
fabricated charges, use of secret and illegal sources of information, and infiltration of agents.258 
The political police can remove the problem swiftly and effectively without the need to initiate 
emergency law.  
In summary, this part has examined the role of laws and legal institutions affecting Robertson’s 
variables. It illustrates that legal frameworks governing NGOs, legal frameworks governing 
public assemblies, and public order policing can shape both the organisational ecology and state 
mobilisation strategy. It highlights that, in Russia, Putin enacted a series of laws (namely, 
Federal Laws No.18-FZ, No.121 FZ, No.129-FZ, No.135-FZ and No.54-FZ) with the objective 
of restricting freedom of assembly and association. Thus, I see that legal frameworks governing 
public assemblies and public order policing can be used to control these key variables that 
underpin and determine the nature of political contention.  
 
 Conclusion 
Public assemblies are a part of the political process. They are important for marginalized 
individuals to raise issues or make demands to the authorities. Consolidated democracies have 
standardised public assemblies to ensure that their conduct remains broadly within the 
parameters of the democratic process. IHRL and the international standards that we have seen 
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in chapter 2 provide further evidence for this claim. In contrast, authoritarianism restricts public 
assemblies because they could lead to democratic and revolutionary struggles.  
Historically, social movement scholars have not precisely explained protest patterns in hybrid 
regimes because these regimes are neither consolidated democracies nor fully authoritarianism. 
Therefore, Robertson suggests that the incumbents in hybrid regimes have a different incentive 
– they want to appear as a democracy, but yet also significantly restrict anti-regime protesters’ 
capacity to protest while being able to mobilise pro-regime supporters to mobilise. Robertson’s 
theory suggests a new framework to understand the politics of protest in hybrid regimes. This 
chapter notes that the role of law and legal institutions have generally been overlooked by social 
movement and political science scholars. It shows that Robertson paid little attention to the 
capacity of the law governing NGOs and of the laws governing public assemblies in shaping 
his three variables. The legal framework and law enforcement practice in Russia directs us to 
conclude that the Putin regime has sought to curtail freedom of assembly through legal 
mechanisms. Therefore, looking at Robertson’s theory from a legal perspective helps to further 
understand the mechanics of political contention in hybrid regimes. Specifically, as this chapter 
has shown by examining Putin’s Russia, legal mechanisms have exerted significant influence 
on the way in which politics occurs by controlling the organisational ecology and state 
mobilisation strategies. The three legal mechanisms in question are the legal frameworks 
governing NGOs, the legal framework governing public assemblies, and public order policing. 
It is clear to me that these legal mechanisms do not comply with IHRL and international 
standards that we have discussed in chapter 2 because they serve a different purpose than 
facilitating and protecting freedom of assembly. This chapter also briefly outlined how 
Robertson’s theory might be extended to the three Southeast Asian hybrid regimes that are the 
focus of this thesis. It demonstrated that laws governing NGOs exhibit similar characteristics 
across Russia, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The next two chapters therefore further 
examine how the three Southeast Asian regimes use the same techniques that we have identified 
in Putin’s Russia to optimise their political dominance – curtailing freedom of assembly 
through the legal framework governing public assemblies (chapter 4) and though public order 
policing (chapter 5).
Protest law & Public Order Policing in Hybrid Regimes - Pat Niyomsilp 
139 
 
 Chapter 4 Securing the Street through Legal 
Frameworks 
Legal frameworks governing public assemblies can be used to shape the scope of freedom of 
assembly. This chapter attempts to flesh out the criticisms of Robertson’s theory raised in the 
last chapter – the omission of any real examination of the legal frameworks governing freedom 
of assembly in hybrid regimes – with specific consideration of three south-east Asian regimes: 
Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand. It suggests that these three regimes have legal frameworks 
constraining freedom of assembly which control the ability of the opposition groups to use 
public assemblies against the respective regimes. Moreover, there is a complex legislative 
matrix involving laws directly and indirectly relevant to the exercise of these civil and political 
rights. Only when these different pieces of legislation are viewed together does their cumulative 
impact become clear – citizens significantly lose the ability to exercise freedom of assembly. 
This chapter attempts to demonstrate that hybrid regimes unfairly limit how anti-government 
protesters can exercise their right to freedom of assembly. The legal frameworks in hybrid 
regimes do not fully comply with international standards because hybrid regimes’ goal is not 
to create a democratic society but rather to create a street-proof mechanism. They want to filter 
out threats while allowing low-level protests. At the same time, these legal frameworks allow 
the incumbents to mobilise regime supporters to show their dominance. This chapter starts by 
arguing that the laws governing public assemblies in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand contain 
special characteristics that enable the incumbents to use it to gain political advantage over their 
challengers. Then, it argues that the regimes seek to curtail the scope of freedom of assembly 
by imposing content-based restrictions, blanket bans and onerous notification requirements.  
 Characteristics of laws governing public assemblies in hybrid regimes 
Laws governing public assemblies in hybrid regimes adopt legal characteristics imitating in 
both democratic and in authoritarianism polities. On the one hand, they adopt international 
standards and ratify international standards and that individuals have the right to assemble 
peacefully. Some explicitly state that their objective is to facilitate assemblies according to 
IHRL and international standards. On the other hand, the laws give vast discretion to the 
authorities without any effective review system. This part attempts to illustrate that the laws 
governing public assemblies in hybrid regimes have two main characteristics allowing the 
regime incumbents to shape how people exercise freedom of assembly. 
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The Public Assembly Act/ Peaceful Assembly Act/ Law on Peaceful Assembly (PAAs) in all 
three Southeast Asian hybrid regimes mentions ‘peaceful intention’ as a compulsory ingredient 
of assemblies. However, they ultimately emphasise the lawful rather than the peaceful intention 
of the organisers or participants. PAAs in these regimes state that their purpose is to enable 
people to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as protected under the constitution.1 However, 
these laws define a peaceful assembly restrictively. 
As chapter 2 highlighted, international standards direct that restrictions on freedom of assembly 
should not be used to limit the freedom disproportionately.2 International review bodies have 
thus used the strict test of necessity and proportionality to determine the degree of 
restrictiveness.3 Importantly, the notion of ‘peaceful assembly’ under international standards 
emphasizes the peaceful nature of the assembly over the lawfulness of the actions of 
participants. the scope of the right to peaceful assembly should not be interpreted restrictively. 
Moreover, international standards require a system of effective judicial review to protect 
individuals’ rights and freedoms from State restrictions. 
A major difference between legal frameworks governing public assemblies in consolidated 
democracies and in hybrid regimes is that international standards do not have much traction in 
hybrid regimes. In consolidated democracies, there are both domestic and international 
institutions to protect freedom of assembly. In contrast, hybrid regimes may have domestic 
institutions that do not fully appreciate the protection properly afforded to freedom of assembly 
under international standards. Hence, these regimes may redefine the scope of the right and 
impose laws that enable the imposition of wide-ranging restrictions. This section aims to 
establish that legal frameworks governing public assemblies in hybrid regimes adopt some 
international standards but, at the same time, use legal techniques to open opportunities for the 
regime rulers to interfere. The legal frameworks shape the scope of freedom of assembly by 
providing widely-framed legal grounds for restricting the freedom without providing adequate 
judicial review. 
 
1 Law on Peaceful Assembly (Cambodia PAA) 2009 s2, Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 (Malaysia PAA) s2, 
Public Assembly Act 2015 (Thailand PAA) annotation. 
2 Kirsanov v Belarus (5 June 2014) Communication No. 1864/2009 CCPR/C/110/D/1864/2009, para 9.7;  
Turchenyak et al v Belarus (10 September 2013) Communication 
No.1948/2010CCPR/C/108/D/1948/2010, para 7.4. 
3 Praded v Belarus (25 November 2014) Communication No. 2029/2011, para 7.5.; Kudrevičius and Others 
v Lithuania, app no 37553/05 (ECtHR, 15 October 2015), para 91. 
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4.1.1 Providing overly broad legal grounds for restricting freedom of assembly without 
providing for the strict test of necessity and proportionality. 
According to international standards, laws restricting freedom of assembly must pursue a 
legitimate aim and must be necessary in a democratic society. A public assembly is presumed 
peaceful until proven otherwise.4  However, the restrictions on public assemblies in hybrid 
regimes do not meet these principles. One of the reasons is that their legal frameworks provide 
overly broad grounds.  
In Cambodia, it was recommended in 2008 that the Government should urgently enact laws on 
demonstrations.5 Afterwards, the violation of the freedom of assembly became more frequent 
because the PAA was implemented in a manner that inconsistent with the country’s 
international human rights obligations. 6 The definition of a peaceful assembly in the PAA 
meets the international standards that it considers peaceful assemblies must follow forms or 
means that are peaceful.7 However, the Cambodian PAA gives the authorities vast discretion to 
ban or to restrict any assembly. The law requires a notification even when assembling on private 
property.8 Upon notification, the authorities may respond negatively toward a notification if 
there is clear information that the demonstration may cause danger or may seriously jeopardise 
security, safety and public order. Then, the authorities can call the organisers in for a discussion. 
If they fail to reach an agreement, the Minister of Interior has the authority to provide a decisive 
opinion.9    
The legal grounds for banning an assembly stated in the Cambodian PAA are the security, safety 
and public order. These legal grounds can be interpreted vastly. By contrast, in Statkevich and 
Matskevich v Belarus, the CCPR reaffirmed that the domestic authority has a duty to explain 
why the picket on the proposed location would jeopardise national security.10 However, this 
principle slips through the legal loophole in the Cambodian PAA. Under the Cambodian legal 
 
4 Human Rights Council, First Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai,  para 25; Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (Second edn, ODIHR 2010) guideline 2.1. 
5 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for human rights in 
Cambodia, Yash Ghai (29 February 2008 ), para 101. 
6 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, 
Surya P. Subedi (11 October 2012), para 240. 
7 Cambodia PAA s4. 
8 ibid s14. 
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10 Statkevich and Matskevich v Belarus (16 December 2015) Communication No 2133/2012 
CCPR/C/115/D/2133/2012, para 9.4. 
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framework, referring a case to CCPR for judicial review is not an option. It depends on the 
domestic court to apply international standards. Furthermore, in the event that an approved 
peaceful assembly turns violent, the PAA directs that the authorities shall take proper measure 
to prevent and stop the demonstration immediately.11 This section provides a vast discretion to 
the authorities to stop or ban a public assembly. The PAA does not require the authorities to 
consider whether the violence is coming from the organisers/participants or from agent 
provocateurs. Such provision goes against the international standards (as discussed in 2.2.2) 
that a violent public assembly is a result from the violent intention of the organisers or 
participants and peaceful assemblies should not be stopped because of the violence caused by 
the others.12  
The absence of strict tests of necessity and proportionality in Cambodia PAA means that the 
authorities do not have to consider the democratic quality enshrined in IHRL and the 
international standards. This characteristic allows the authorities to switch between democratic 
policing style and authoritarian policing style.  For instance, the presumption in favour of 
holding a peaceful assembly does not exist in the PAA.13  Although the PAA states that if the 
authorities fail to give any response to a notification within 3 days, such notification is assumed 
approved.14 The PAA uses vaguely worked phrase “shall respond positively… toward the 
notification letter” to disguise the differences between notification and authorisation.15 In 
practice, Amnesty International has reported that Cambodian authorities frequently ‘either 
attempt to impose restrictions on assemblies or ban them outright’.16 On this issue, Rhona 
Smith, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, has expressed her 
concern that the Cambodian government unduly silence political opponents through broadly 
defined restrictions on freedom of assembly.17 Especially during the period before the national 
 
11 Cambodia PAA s20. 
12 Christians against Racism and Fascism v The United Kingdom App no 8440/78 (ECHR, 16 July 1980). 
13 cf Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and of association, Maina Kiai A/HRC/23/39, para 50. 
14 Cambodia PAA s10. 
15 Amnesty International, Taking to the Streets Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Cambodia (Amnesty 
International Ltd 2015) 32. 
16 ibid 33. 
17 OHCHR, 'Cambodia: UN experts concerned at Government moves to silence political opponents' 
(OHCHR, 19 June 2019) 
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elections on 29 July 2018, Smith reported that the government had created an atmosphere of 
fear and causing self-censorship by intimidating the opponents.18   
The Cambodian PAA s9 empowers the authorities to decline a notification when there is a clear 
information indicating that the demonstration may cause danger or may seriously jeopardise 
security, safety, and public order. While s17 of the PAA directs that the authorities shall take 
measures to protect and shall not interfere with the conduct of the peaceful assembly, s20 directs 
that the authorities may bring an end to a demonstration if no notification letter has been 
submitted, regardless of how peaceful the demonstration is.19 Thus, the lack of precise 
guidelines on declining a notification makes the provision problematic because the Cambodian 
authorities have an opportunity to treat organiser and participants discriminately.20 The PAA 
provides immense legal grounds for the authorities to ban any anti-government demonstration 
while the incumbents are able to mobilise their ersatz social movements to display their 
dominance. On this issue, in 2017, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of 
assembly and of association (UNSRFAA) has reported that legislation and the judicial system 
have been used by the Cambodian Government to restrict freedom of assembly without 
concerning that any restriction on freedom of assembly must meet a strict test of necessity and 
proportionality. 21 
The Malaysian PAA presents a similar pattern. The PAA states that one of the objectives is to 
ensure that the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly is subject only to restrictions deemed  
necessary or expedient in a democratic society in the interest of the security of the Federation 
or public order or to protect the rights and freedoms of other persons.22 However, apart from 
being mentioned as one of the objectives, the PAA does not explicitly mention the strict tests 
of necessity and proportionality in a democratic society anywhere else. The Malaysian PAA s8 
gives vast discretion to the police by stating: ‘a police officer may take such measures as he 
deems necessary to ensure the orderly conduct of an assembly in accordance with this Act and 
any other written law.’23 Section 15(1) of the PAA states that the authorities may impose 
 
18 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Repporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia 
(15 August 2018) A/HRC/39/73, 13. 
19  Cambodia PAA s20, para 3. 
20 Siena Anstis, 'Using Law to Impair the Rights and Freedoms of Human Rights Defenders: A Case Study 
of Cambodia' (November 2012) 4 Journal of Human Rights Practice 312, 319. 
21 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and of association (31 May 2017) A/HRC/35/28/Add.3, para 306. 
22 Malaysia PAA s2(b). 
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restrictions for ‘the purpose of security or public order, including the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of other persons’.24 However, these objectives do not tell us what can be 
considered as the “deems necessary” measures under the section 8. It can be seen that the 
wording here is very subjective and lacks any requirement the officer can only ‘deem it 
necessary’ on. 
The Malaysian police can interpret the PAA arbitrarily. For example, the PAA defines an 
assembly as ‘an intentional and temporary assembly of a person in a public place, whether or 
not the assembly is at a particular place or moving.’25 However, “street protest” under the PAA 
means ‘an open air assembly which begins with a meeting at a specified place and consists of 
walking in a mass march or rally for the purpose of objecting to or advancing a particular cause 
or causes.’26 Before the ban on street protest was lifted in July 2019, these definitions provided 
the authorities with vast discretion to ban a public assembly without much considering the 
necessary in a democratic society requirement.  
Besides, the police can arrest any organiser or participant who does not comply with any 
police’s restriction under the PAA without a warrant.27 The police may issue an order to 
disperse in the circumstance that any person commits an offence under any written law or do 
not comply with the restrictions and conditions imposed under s15.28 To enforce the dispersal 
order, the law directs that the police officer may use all reasonable force.29 The PAA describes 
an appealing process on restrictions and conditions under s15 to the Minister in charge of home 
affairs.30 It gives the Minister 48 hours to respond to the appeal. However, in the case that police 
impose restrictions too close to the proposed event or impose them during the event, it would 
be less useful to appeal to the Minister as the police can enforce the restrictions swiftly and 
forcefully. 
In addition, the lack of necessity and proportionality principle is noticeable when considering 
blanket bans in the legal frameworks in Malaysia. For example, the Malaysian PAA imposes 
blanket bans on any person younger than 21 years old from organising an assembly and bans 
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any person below the age of 15 from participating.31 This means that the authorities can use this 
legal ground to suppress student movements. This legal ground goes against the international 
standards that freedom of peaceful assembly is to be enjoyed equally by everyone.32 It also 
violates the Article 15 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which Malaysia 
ratified in 1995. (blanket bans will be discussed at length in 4.2.2)   
The Thai PAA s19(5) empowers the police to restrict freedom of assembly of the organisers or 
any participant on the ground of (1) facilitating participants or (2) protecting public safety or 
(3) minimising the effect of an assembly on the traffic and the surrounding communities. I see 
that the limit causes are absent from this provision, as well as from the rest of the PAA. These 
three legal grounds do not explicitly limit the police’s power to restrict freedom of assembly 
because they can be interpreted to cover every measure. Moreover, the PAA s24 
indiscriminately imposes flagrant offences to anyone presents in the control area without the 
permission of the authorised official in charge of the public assembly.33  The PAA s24(4) 
empowers the police to order the prohibition of certain acts for the benefit of terminating the 
assembly without listing any limiting criteria. For example, the police need to focus their 
dispersal measures to only the parties subjected to a court’s dispersal order. Arguably, if there 
are two public assemblies that share the same area, the police can apply dispersal measures to 
both of them even when the court has only ordered to disperse one of them. Therefore, the 
incumbents can use this legal gap to disperse a targeted public assembly by mobilising their 
 
31 ibid s4(1) (d)-(e). 
32 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (n 4), guideline 2.5.  
33 Thailand PAA s24 states: 
Upon the expiration of the prescribed time period for the participators to vacate the 
control area, if there is a participator in the control area or enters the control area 
without permission of the authorized official in charge of the public assembly, such 
person shall be deemed to have committed a flagrant offence, and the situation 
controller and person assigned by the situation controller shall take action to enforce 
the termination of the public assembly pursuant to the court order. In this regard, the 
situation controller and person assigned by the situation controller shall have the 
following powers:  
(1) Arrest a person in the control area or person who has entered the control area without 
permission from the authorized official in charge of the public assembly; 
(2) Search, seize, attach or remove property used or held for use in the public assembly;  
(3) Act as necessary pursuant to the plan or guidelines for public assembly supervision as 
provided under Section 21;  
(4) Order the prohibition of certain acts for the benefit of terminating the assembly. 
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supporters to cause violent on the assembly area. Then, the police have an opportunity to seek 
a court dispersal order which can be applied indiscriminately on a particular area.34   
In addition, the authorities had overly broad legal ground to restrict freedom of assembly when 
the Thai PAA was enforced alongside the National Council for Peace and Order’s order No. 
3/2558 (NCPO Order), which prohibited any political gathering of more than 5 participants 
between 2014 and 2018. The authorities had vast discretion to decide which law would be 
applied upon whether the gathering expresses any political message.35 Obviously, there is not 
any requirement demanding the authorities to consider the strict tests of necessity and 
proportionality in the NCPO Order.    
In short, it can be concluded that the legal frameworks governing public assemblies in 
Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand present the same pattern. First, they provide overly broad 
legal grounds for the authorities to impose restrictions on freedom of assembly. Second, the 
strict tests of necessity and proportionality is absent from the PAAs. The authorities are 
empowered with vast discretion without clear guidelines. In my opinion, these two 
characteristics provide opportunities for the authorities to apply the law discriminately.    
4.1.2 Lacking adequate judicial review 
A lack of adequate judicial review can serve to greatly limit freedom of assembly. the judiciary 
must be able to perform judicial review effectively and be able to deliver enforceable remedies, 
grounded in the application of the important tests of necessity and proportionality. However, 
legal frameworks governing public assemblies have been used to reduce and circumvent the 
judicial power. In Lashmankin and Others v Russia, the ECtHR found a violation because the 
test of necessity and proportionality was absent from the Russia legal frameworks.36 Lacking 
adequate judicial review means that the domestic courts do not examine whether restrictions on 
freedom of assembly are well reasoned and comply with IHRL. This characteristic can be found 
in all three Southeast Asian states.         
The Cambodian PAA provides no procedure regarding the appeal process for a judicial review. 
It only provides that when a discussion (negotiation) between the organisers and the authorities 
fail, the Minister of Interior can give a decisive opinion. On this issue, Amnesty International 
 
34 Thailand PAA s23. 
35 Administrative Court Red No. 2058/2561, 28 September 2018, 11. 
36 Lashmankin and Others v Russia App no 57818/09 and 14 others (ECtHR, 7 February 2017), para 358. 
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reported that the dispute resolution process under the Cambodian PAA is flawed because the 
PAA does not entitle the organisers to be heard in person to explain their position during 
negotiations with the local authorities.37 Moreover, while the Minister of Interior can give a 
decisive opinion, the PAA does not require the Minister to provide detailed reasons to the 
appealing organisers.  In practice, the local authorities have opportunities to impose restrictions 
on freedom of assembly or ban public assemblies outright without much scrutiny from the 
judiciary. The reasons provided for such decisions are often inconsistent with the international 
standards and IHRL.38 For example, on 14 January 2014, Mam Sonando sent a notification of 
his demonstration to Phnom Penh City Hall. He had intention to hold a series of demonstrations 
daily from Monday to Friday between 7 – 8 a.m. in front of the Ministry of Information. His 
requests were rejected by the local authority without providing any specific reason. Later, in 
March 2014, Mam Sonando notified the City Hall to hold a demonstration protesting the 
Ministry of Information.  The local authority banned the demonstration on the ground that it 
would disturb peace, public order, and the regularity of the people.39 In addition, on 5 June 
2014, Phnom Penh City hall banned the Cambodian Youth Network from holding a gathering 
of the World Environment Day in front of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 
The responding letter according to the PAA s11 did not provide any reason for this decision.40 
Nevertheless, if anyone challenges the authorities under the Cambodian PAA, he/she will have 
to face another problem with how the judiciary interprets the concept of “threat to public 
order”.41 Judges and prosecutors in Cambodia do not have adequate training in human rights 
and on interpreting domestic law under the light of international obligations.42 For example, 
Tep Vanny, a land right activist, was arrested during a peaceful demonstration on 15 August 
2016. Vanny and members of Boeung Kak community were conducting a traditional cursing 
ceremony as a form of peaceful protest before a group of para-police broke the meeting.43 They 
arrested only Vanny and Bo Sophea, another prominent land activist. Sophea received a six-
 
37 Amnesty International, Taking to the Streets Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Cambodia (n 15) 33. 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid 34-35. 
40 ibid 36. 
41 Surya  Subedi, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia' 16 
September 2010) <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/161/45/PDF/G1016145.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 9 August 
2019, para 99. 
42  ibid para 100. 
43  LICADHO, 'Free Tep Vanny: Two Year Too Long' 14 August 2018) <https://www.licadho-
cambodia.org/articles/20180814/150/index.html> accessed 3 January 2018. 
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day sentence while Vanny faced another lawsuit for allegedly inciting violence during a protest 
in 2013 (which she committed three years prior to this case).44 Vanny was accused of 
‘intentional violence with aggravated circumstances’ under s218 of the Criminal Code. On 23 
February 2017, the Phom Penh Municipal Court sentenced her to two years and six months.45 
To this case, the World Organisation Against Tourture (OMCT), an NGO based in Geneva, 
reported: ‘[d]uring the trial, no credible evidence was presented to either justify the charges 
brought against Ms. Tep Vanny or to prove that any violence had been committed against the 
para-police.’46 Later, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld the conviction.47 
Vanny spent 735 days in prison for her dissent protests before she was granted a royal pardon 
on 20 August 2018. Vanny’s cases illustrate the absence of effective judicial review in 
Cambodia. Her arbitrary detention and prosecution were clearly aimed to silence her and to 
send warning message to other human rights activists in Cambodia.48     
The Malaysian PAA is silent on the judicial review process. There is not any provision 
mentioning the imperative of a speedy procedure to expendite an appeal. The judiciary may not 
provide an enforceable remedy after reviewing an appeal involving the PAA. The provision of 
remedies for an enforcement of fundamental rights is provided under Paragraph I of the 
Schedule of the Court of Judicature Act 1964.49 Although the law was enacted in 1964, the 
Court initiated it for the first time in 1997.50 It was because many judges did not notice its 
existence. They rather applied English common law, which was a narrower approach than the 
provision under the Court of Judicature Act.51 Because the Act is an ordinary law, the method 
of interpretation is bound by the restrictive rules under English common law tradition. This 
shows that the Court was reluctant to exercise its power to protect the fundamental rights, which 
were guaranteed by the Constitution. For example, during the running up period to the Bersih 
4.0 protest on 29-30 August 2015, police warned that the gathering was illegal because the 
organisers failed to obtain permissions from premises owners according to the PAA s9. The 
 
44 Phnom Penh Municipal Court decision on 22 August 2016, Ms. Tep Vanny and Ms. Bov Sophea. 
45 Phnom Penh Municipal Court decision on 23 February 2017, Ms. Tep Vanny. 
46  World Organization Against Torture, 'Cambodia: Release of land rights defender Ms. Tep Vanny 
following 735 days of detention' (OMCT, 22 August 2018) <http://www.omct.org/human-rights-
defenders/urgent-interventions/cambodia/2018/08/d25000/> accessed 24 July 2019. 
47 The Appeal Court decision on 8 August 2017, Ms. Tep Vanny; The Supreme Court of Cambodia decision 
on 7 February 2018, Ms. Tep Vanny. 
48 World Organization Against Torture (n 46). 
49 The Schedule of the Court of Judicature Act 1964 (Malaysia).  
50 R Ramachandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145. 
51 Gan Chee Keong, 'The Remedies for Enforcement of Fundamental Rights in Malaysia and India' (2018) 
3 Saudi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 335, 336. 
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Kuala Lumpur City Hall rejected the organisers’ request to use Merdeka Square for the rally.52 
It suggested the organisers to use city’s stadiums instead. The police also warned the public 
that any participant to this rally could face legal action under the PAA.53 Two days before the 
event, the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission blocked websites 
promoting Bersih 4.0 on the ground that the rally was illegal and warned the public not to share 
any information relating to the event on the internet.54 The organisers continued their plan on 
the streets around the Merdeka Square. The events went on peacefully with a police blockade 
preventing protesters from entering the square. According to this event, the organisers did not 
have any effective legal procedure to seek remedies. In addition, around two months later, the 
organisers were charged under the PAA for organising a rally without giving a notification to 
the police.55 This clearly demonstrates that the Malaysian PAA has been used as a deterrence 
law rather than facilitating a public assembly. 
The Thai PAA is different from the Cambodian PAA and the Malaysian PAA because it 
provides both an internal appeal procedure and a judicial review process. For instance, under 
the PAA s11, organisers can appeal a banning order to the superintendent of police who has to 
give a respond within 24 hours. The superintendent of police also has the power to approve a 
late notification request.56 The Thai PAA demands that the police must obtain an order from 
the Civil Court before they can disperse an illegal assembly.57 The police may use necessary 
force to contain the assembly while waiting for the dispersal order.58 Upon the court order, 
police, without a warrant, may arrest anyone who remains in the dispersal zone. They can 
impose any restriction to end the assembly. Organisers or participants who disagree with the 
order can appeal to the Civil Court within 30 days. The Appeal Court has the power to give a 
 
52 The Straitstimes, 'Malaysian police say Bersih 4 rally is illegal' 26 August 2015) 
<https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysian-police-say-bersih-4-rally-is-illegal> accessed 5 
January 2019. 
53  The Straitstimes, 'What you need to know about Malaysia's Bersih movement' 27 August 2015) 
<https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/what-you-need-to-know-about-malaysias-bersih-
movement> accessed 5 January 2019. 
54  The Straitstimes, 'Malaysia blocks Bersih rally websites' 28 August 2015) 
<https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-blocks-bersih-rally-websites> accessed 5 January 
2019. 
55 Mayuri Mei Lin, 'Court of Appeal strikes out Bersih chief's illegal assembly charge' (Malaymail, 7 
September 2016) <https://www.malaymail.com/s/1200813/court-of-appeal-strikes-out-bersih-chiefs-
illegal-assembly-charge> accessed 5 January 2019. 
56 Thailand PAA s12. 
57 ibid s21 para 2. 
58 ibid s21 para 3. 
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decisive decision.59  This provision on judicial review makes the Thai PAA different from 
PAAs in neighbouring countries.  
Nevertheless, the Thai PAA does not explicitly mention the necessary in a democratic society 
criteria. There is not any provision reflecting a democratic value apart from the annotation (a 
remark follows the end of the law demonstrating a particular reason for enacting the law). This 
presents two problems in the interpretation of this law. First, the Thai legal system does not 
weight the contents in the annotation and in the preamble as much as the contents under each 
section. Second, where Thai Courts follow dualism, international law does not automatically 
applicable until it is incorporated by domestic legislation. Thus, one could doubt whether the 
Civil Court would consider the necessary in a democratic society when reviewing cases under 
the PAA. For example, Anon Numpa was sentenced to a THB 1,000 fine for failing to notify 
his event.60 On 27 April 2016, Anon invited the public on his Facebook page to attend his stand-
still activity to protest the military Junta. Five peoples stood for a few minutes before a group 
of riot police took them to a police station. They were released two hours later without any 
charge. A week later, the police charged them under the PAA. Dusit Municipal Court ruled that 
Anon was an organiser because he had posted an invitation online stating the date, time, and 
place for a public assembly. The Court found that the manner in which they stood still was as 
an expression in which the public could join.61 Therefore, Anon had a duty to notify the police.  
Anon appealed the fine to the Court of Appeal arguing that the PAA was unfairly enforced 
because his stand-still activity was peaceful and his protest was protected by ICCPR under the 
right to freedom of expression.62 He argued that his arrest was unlawful because the intention 
of the PAA was to facilitate public assemblies. The police did not facilitate but rather restricted 
his freedoms. The police did not request the Civil Court for a dispersal order before arresting 
him. The Court of Appeal ruled that Anon’s arrest was lawful because the police made the 
arrest according to the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court saw that failing to notify a public 
assembly is a flagrant offence which the police can make an arrest. There was no law prohibit 
the police from making an arrest without a dispersal order.  In relation to the issue of 
constitutionality, the Court of Appeal ruled that the PAA was lawfully enacted. If the appellant 
 
59 ibid s25 para 2. 
60 Dusit Municipal Court Red No. Aor.317/2560 on 10 February 2017. 
61 ibid 6. 
62 Thai Lawyers For Human Rights, 'ศาลอุทธรณ์พิพากษาตามศาลชั้นตน้ปรับทนายอานนทพ์นับาท คดี ยืนเฉยๆ' (TLHR, 
7 November 2017) <https://www.tlhr2014.com/?p=5634> accessed 5 January 2019. 
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believed that the PAA was unconstitutional, he could file a case before the Constitutional Court. 
The Appeal Court approved that the fine was appropriate.63 Later, the Supreme Court agreed 
with the Appeal Court to fine Anon. The Supreme Court refused to review the issue on unlawful 
arresting and stated that the issue needed to file in a separated lawsuit.64  Noticeably, it was 
clear that the Municipal Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court failed to assess the 
proportionality of the notification requirements and failed to review the police’s obligation to 
facilitate public assemblies. 
Again in 2018, the Court of Appeal, in Appeal Court Red No.14177/2561, refused to review 
the authorities’ operation according to ICCPR.65 After a year under the National Council for 
Peace and Order (NCPO), thirteen activists peacefully assembled in front of the Bangkok Art 
and Culture Centre to protest the military government by standing still watching items that can 
tell the time such as clocks and watches silently. However, they were forcefully dispersed and 
arrested under the NCPO Order 3/2558. They argued that their gathering was protected under 
the Constitution and ICCPR. The NCPO Order 3/2558 prohibiting political gathering was 
unconstitutional. Also, they argued that the NCPO Order was implicitly revoked by the 
enactment of the PAA. The Court of Appeal ruled that the NCPO Order was constitutional 
because it had not been explicitly revoked. The Court saw that the Order was nether ambiguous 
nor causing uncertainty. Regarding the issue relating to ICCPR, the Court explained that there 
was no domestic legislation dictating that a domestic law would be unenforceable if it did not 
comply with Thailand’s international obligations.66  The Appeal Court reaffirmed the judgment 
of the lower court that the authorities’ operation was legitimate. This judgment demonstrates 
that domestic courts limited judicial review to the available domestic legal framework without 
considering the obligation under IHRL. Secondly, the court refused to review any Junta’s order 
because they were all made constitutional by default.67 Last, all NCPO Orders are enforceable 
until they are explicitly revoked.   
In short, we can conclude that Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand have legal frameworks 
governing public assemblies that share two similar characteristics. First, their legal frameworks 
provide expansive grounds for imposing restrictions and conditions without providing the strict 
 
63 ibid. 
64 Supreme Court Black No. Aor.1107/2559 on 27 August 2019. 
65 Appeal Court Red No.14177/2561 on 17 October 2018. 
66 ibid 22. 
67 Thailand Interim Constitution B.E. 2557 s48 directs that persons acting upon NCPO’s orders are exempted 
from any legal liability.   
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test of necessary and proportionality. As a result, police are entrusted with almost unlimited 
discretion to perform their duties. In other words, the legal frameworks provide opportunities 
to the authorities to enforce the law discriminately. The second characteristic is that their legal 
frameworks do not provide any effective judicial review procedure. Their PAAs carry a defect 
that there is not much effective judicial review which can deliver enforceable remedies.   
In chapter 3, I have argued that social movement scholars, including Robertson, overlooked 
legal factors in their studies. Then, in this heading, I have identified the two main characteristics 
of the legal frameworks governing public assemblies in hybrid regimes. Here, I argue that these 
two characteristics in their legal frameworks provide opportunities for the authorities to enforce 
the law discriminately. Thus, the following headings discuss how legal frameworks are being 
manipulated in details. They attempt to illustrate that the legal frameworks governing public 
assemblies directly affect political contention in hybrid regimes. The restrictions found in the 
three hybrid regimes are evidence showing that the three regimes curtail their legal frameworks 
to control Robertson’s state mobilisation strategies similar to the legal framework in Russia 
(discussed in 3.5.2).  
 Curtailing the scope of freedom of assembly through legal frameworks 
According to international standards on public assemblies, states are required to provide the 
necessary conditions for the enjoyment of freedom of assembly.68 In chapter 2, we have 
identified that international standards use the three-prong test to justify any restriction to the 
freedom. In circumstances (as in hybrid regimes) where this test is absent from the domestic 
legal framework, law enforcement officials and the courts tend to enforce the restrictions 
according to the domestic legal frameworks without also considering their obligations under 
IHRL. Hybrid regime incumbents use this condition to create street proof mechanisms 
protecting themselves from street protests. The following part argues that hybrid regimes use 
content-based restrictions, blanket bans, and onerous notification requirements to shape how 
people exercise freedom of assembly. 
4.2.1 Content-based restrictions 
International standards direct that content-based restrictions should be avoided because they 
prevent the public to consider the content themselves. Any content-based restrictions must be 
 
68 United Nations, Report of the Human Rights Council, ‘The promotion and protection of human rights in 
the context of peaceful protests’ (6 July 2018) UN Doc. A/73/53/, 206. 
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subjected to a high level of scrutiny.69 However, hybrid regimes impose content-based 
restrictions to prohibit public assemblies advocating some sensitive issues affecting the 
regimes’ political stability. For instance, The Malaysian PAA allows a police officer to issue 
an order to disperse if there is ‘any person at the assembly does any act or makes any statement 
which has a tendency to promote feelings of ill-will or hostility amongst the public or does 
anything which will disturb public tranquillity’.70 This provision can be enforced arbitrarily 
upon the police’s opinion. There is not any requirement for the police to consider the necessity 
and proportionality. The PAA s8 simply states that ‘a police officer may take such measure as 
he deems necessary to ensure the orderly conduct of an assembly in accordance with this Act 
and any other written law.’  
In addition, one should be aware that the reasonableness standard can be very subjective and 
often prejudice towards a particular preference.71 When the law empowers the authorities to use 
reasonableness, the police could be trapped in the reasonableness that reflects only the 
majority’s judgement on a particular value or style.72 Baker pointed out that ‘it is wrong if 
reasonableness involves some balancing of the interests of those who want to assemble against 
the interests of those who find the assembly annoying or offensive…’73 As such, there is a need 
to consider international standard and IHRL when considering content-based restrictions in 
public assemblies.  
PAAs in Cambodia and Thailand are silent on content-based restrictions. However, all three 
hybrid regimes impose content-based restriction by enforcing PAAs alongside other laws which 
are unrelated to freedom of assembly. PAAs in all three countries have a provision stating that 
individuals who exercise freedom of assembly have a duty to comply with other laws.74 This 
study found at least three areas of law being applied alongside PAAs to impose content-based 
restrictions: defamation laws, military orders, and contempt of court proceedings.  
 
 
 
69 For example, Alekseev v The Russian Federation (2 December 2013) Communication no 1873/2009 
CCPR/C/109D/1873/2009, para 9.6; Primov and Others v Russia App no 17391/06 (ECtHR, 12 June 
2014), para 135. 
70 Malaysia PAA s21(1) (c). 
71 Edwin Baker, 'Unreasoned Resonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner 
Regulations' (1983-1984) 78 Northwestern University Law Review 937, 948. 
72 ibid. 
73 ibid 948-949. 
74 Cambodia PAA s9, Malaysia PAA s6 (1) and s7 (a)(iv), Thailand PAA s6.  
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4.2.1.1 Defamation and lèse-majesté provisions 
Defamation and lèse-majesté laws can be used against organisers of public assemblies and 
political activists as a technique to nullify potential threats from the street. These laws can be 
considered as another type of content-based restrictions on freedom of assembly. In a 
democratic society, people should be able to criticise their political leaders on public issues. 
However, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand impose harsh penalties on defamation offenders, 
especially when the contents involve criticism of the head of the state.  
Cambodia and Thailand enforce lèse-majesté offences arbitrarily to silence political activists 
and organisers of anti-government protests.75  On this issue, David Kaye, UN Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
expressed the view that ‘lèse-majesté provisions have no place in a democratic country. 76 He 
has urged Thailand to repeal lèse-majesté law. Despite its obligations under IHRL, the 
Cambodian government amended the Criminal Code in February 2018 to insert a lèse-majesté 
charge.77 It carries a penalty of one to five years imprisonment and/or a fine from 2 to 10 million 
Riel.78 The law does not give clear details of what constitutes an insult to the king. It can be 
interpreted widely to include almost any criticism on the monarch. This crime is a very effective 
tool to harass and restrict the opposition. For example, around two months before the general 
election in July 2018, Ban Somphy, a CNRP district deputy party leader, was arrested and 
sentenced to 7 months imprison because he shared text and an image on Facebook deemed 
insulting the King.79 Although he did not write the text, he was considered to be liable equally 
to the person who wrote it.80  
 
75  Charlie  Campbell, 'The Draconian Legal Weapon Being Used to Silence Thai Dissent' (Time, 31 
December 2014) <http://new.time.com/3650981/thailand-lese-majeste-article-112/> accessed 12 
Jaunary 2019. 
76  OHCHR, 'Thailand: UN rights expert concerned by the continued use of lèse-majesté prosecutions' 
(OHCHR, 7 February 2017) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21149&LangID=E> 
accessed 13 January 2019. 
77 Cambodia Criminal Code s437. 
78  International Commission of Jurists, 'Cambodia: end efforts to introduce lèse-majesté law' (ICJ, 2 
February 2018) <https://www.icj.org/cambodia-end-efforts-to-introduce-lese-majeste-law/> accessed 
13 January 2019. 
79  LICADHO, 'Prisoners of Interest' <http://www.licadho-cambodia.org/court_watch/#poi> accessed 13 
January 2019. 
80  International Commission of Jurists, 'Submission of the International Commission of Jurists to the 
Universal Periodic Review of Cambodia' (ICJ, 12 July 2018) <https://www.icj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Cambodia-UPR-Advocacy-Non-legal-submission-July-2018-ENG.pdf> 
accessed 13 January 2019, footnote 28. 
 
Protest law & Public Order Policing in Hybrid Regimes - Pat Niyomsilp 
155 
 
In Thailand, the legal framework on lèse-majesté is even harsher. Those who found guilty can 
face a prison term up to 15 years. After the 2014 coup, many protest leaders have been arrested 
arbitrarily on this ground. For example, Jatupat Boonpattararaksa (Pai Dao Din), a student 
activist who consistently organised protests against the Junta government, was arrested and 
sentenced for two and a half years imprisonment because he shared a BBC Thai’s Facebook 
post which critiqued the new king in 2017. Similar to Ban Somphy’s case, Jatupat did not write 
the content. Out of around 2,600 Facebook users who had shared the same content, he was the 
only one who has been prosecuted. Even the administrator of the BBC Thai account and the 
author of the article was not charged from posting the news. It was clear to me that his 
prosecution had the political motive to create a chilling effect among those who protested 
against the Military government. Within four years under the NCPO government, there were at 
least 94 people charged under lèse-majesté law and 91 charged with Sedition81   
Malaysia Sedition Act 1948 defines a “seditions tendency” very widely providing the 
authorities with an opportunity to silence critics of the government or its officials.82  For 
example, a “seditions tendency” means to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection 
against any Ruler or against any Government, to raise discontent of disaffection amongst the 
subjects of the king or any state’s ruler, to question any privilege of the Malay majority 
protected by the Constitution or to question the special status of the indigenous people in Sabah 
and Sarawak.83  Under this Act, any police officer from the rank of Inspector can make an arrest 
without a warrant when he/she reasonably suspects someone for committing, abetting or 
possessing the material breaching this law.84   
Malaysia government has been using the Sedition Act to repress social movements against the 
government. For example, leaders of the Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) were arrested 
and charged under this law after they organised protests against the alleged marginalisation of 
ethnic Indians in 2007.85  In addition, Adam Adli Bin Abdul Halim, a student activist, has been 
 
81 ilaw, 'Latest Statistic' (ilaw, 22 May 2018) <https://freedom.ilaw.or.th/en/content/latest-statistic> accessed 
16 January 2019. 
82 OHCHR, 'Malaysia Sedition Act threatens freedom of expression by criminalising dissent' (OHCHR, 8 
October 2014) <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15144> 
accessed 13 January 2019. 
83 Sedition Act 1948 (Malaysia) s3(1). 
84 ibid s11. 
85 Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (8 February 2011), para 36. 
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arrested six times for calling others to join his peaceful protests.86 In 2014, he was sentenced to 
a year in jail of sedition due to his speech in the 2013 general election protest. While he was on 
bail pending appeal, the government placed a new charge on participating in an unlawful street 
protest. Later, he was expelled from his college due to his role in organising the protest. Chua 
Tian Chang, the vice-president of an opposition party (PRK), was charged with sedition for his 
speech and for wearing a banned Bersih yellow t-shirt.87 He has also been charged many times 
on the ground of participating in unlawful assemblies. Human Rights Watch reported that the 
authorities used PAA and the penal code to criminalise participants to unlawful assemblies 
while Sedition Act was initiated to silence organisers, including those who invited or called 
others to attend peaceful rallies.88  
The Barisan Nasional government used Sedition Act to arrest and prosecute its critics for many 
decades. During the campaign leading to the general election in 2013, PM Najib Razak 
announced that he would repeal the law. However, after Najib won the election, his government 
resumed the use of the law aggressively to the oppositions who organised public rallies against 
the election’s result.89 After Barisan Nasional lost the election in May 2018, the new 
government led by PM Mahathir Mohamad continued to use the Act to repress political 
dissenters.90 Although repealing the Act was on the agenda before the 2018 election, there was 
no exact timeline when the law would be repealed.91  
4.2.1.2 Military junta orders  
ICCPR directs that when a state suspends freedom of assembly, it must be able to justify all 
their measures derogating from the ICCPR.92 The principle of strict necessity and 
proportionality must be applied to all derogation measures.93 In Thailand, where we had 
identified earlier that these principles are missing from its legal frameworks and judicial review. 
 
86 Human Rights Watch, Creating a Culture of Fear The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Malaysia 
(Human Rights Watch October 2015), 2. 
87  ibid 3. 
88  ibid 4. 
89  ibid 5. 
90 The Star, 'Sedition Act will continue to be applied for now, says Dr M' (The Star, 9 October 2018) 
<https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2018/10/09/pm-no-timeline-to-repeal-law-sedition-act-will-
continue-to-be-applied-for-now-says-dr-m/> accessed 14 January 2019. 
91  ibid. 
92 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of 
Emergency  CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para 5; UN Economic and Social Council, Siracusa Principles 
on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1985) U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (1985). 
93 ibid para 54. 
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Under this condition, content-based restrictions were imposed through Revolutionary Order 
during the NCPO rule. In 2015, the Junta imposed NCPO Order No.3/2558 prohibiting any 
political gathering of more than 5 participants. The NCPO Order imposes content-based 
restrictions on political assemblies alongside the PAA. The dual existence of these two laws 
provides the authorities with vast discretion which law would be applied to a particular event –
they had to decide what contents constitute a political assembly. It was common to find that a 
gathering to support the prime minister and ministers (the Junta’s leaders), especially when they 
visited a province, was not considered to be a political gathering while an assembly condemning 
a corruption scandal in the government was seen as a political gathering.  
For example, on 7 December 2015, 11 student activists were stopped on the train to Rajabhakti 
Park. They accused the government of the corruption on the park building project and called 
for a protest at the Park. They were prosecuted under the NCPO Order 3/2558. Later, Thanes 
Anantawong, one of the protesters, was arrested on the ground that he had shared a Facebook 
post explaining Rajabhakti Park’s allegations.94 He was prosecuted under the s116 of the Penal 
Code (Sedition) and s14(3) of the Computer Crime Act 2007.95 On 16 December 2018, 14 
activists attempted to protest at Rajabhakti Park on the same allegations. Despite the NCPO 
Order 3/2558 had been lifted, they still could not assemble at the park. They were stopped and 
searched on the way to the park several times. The trip to the park should take around 2.5 hours. 
After seven hours on the road, the organisers were forced to abandon the plan.  
On 20 January 2018, People Go Network organised We Walk Rally. Organisers’ plan was to 
walk 450 km. from Thammasat University Rangsit Campus to Khonkaen to raise awareness on 
the human rights situation in Thailand. Around 100 participants were blocked by the police at 
the university’s gate for 7 hours. The local police commander stated that the demonstrators had 
violated NCPO Order No.3/2558 because the organisers sold t-shirts, which contain messages 
inviting the public to sign their petition abolishing NCPO Orders.96 He saw that these messages 
had political meanings. Therefore, the rally was a prohibited political assembly according to 
the NCPO Order 3/2558.97 As a result, the organisers decided to change their manner from 
 
94 ilaw, 'นัง่รถไฟไปอุทยานราชภกัด์ิ' (ilaw, 6 November 2018) 
<https://freedom.ilaw.or.th/case/704#progress_of_case> accessed 12 January 2019 
95 Thai Lawyers For Human Rights, 'ศาลทหารให้ประกันธ เนตร  ข้อหา  116' (TLHR, 18 December 2015) 
<https://tlhr2014.wordpress.com/2015/12/18/thanate-116-military-court/> accessed 12 January 2019. 
96 Supreme Administrative Court Order No. Kor Ror 33/2561, 15 February 2018, 10. 
97 Administrative Court Red No. 2058/2561, 28 September 2018, 11. 
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walking together as a united group to walking separately in many four-people groups to avoid 
breaching the NCPO Order.98. 
In addition, laws governing special events can also be used to impose content-based restrictions. 
During a running up period to a constitution referendum, on 23 June 2016, 13 activists from 
the New Democracy Movement (NDM) were arrested after they distributed leaflets advocating 
negative effects in a draft constitution. It was the period before a referendum.99 They were 
prosecuted under s61(1) of Constitution Referendum Act 2016 (causing disturbance to the 
referendum). The law imposes imprisonment up to 10 years to anyone who disseminates texts, 
pictures, or sounds that are inconsistent with the truth to persuade voters to vote or to refuse to 
vote.100 In this case, the authorities imposed restrictions to the contents in the leaflets which 
perusing the public to vote no in the coming referendum.101 At the same time, the authorities 
did not prevent any leafletting advocating people to vote accept to the draft constitution. The 
Constitution Referendum Act was a mechanism to mobilise regime supporter to vote for the 
Draft Constitution. It contains a provision prohibiting anyone except the government to provide 
free transportation to voters on the referendum date.102 It prohibits anyone from publishing 
polling results on the referendum seven days before the election days. As a result, PAA and the 
Referendum Act have proven to be effective content-based measures to suppress the dissenters’ 
campaigns. 
4.2.1.3 Contempt of court proceedings 
Contempt of court under Thai Civil Procedure Code s31 was used to impose content-based 
restrictions around courts’ premises. On 10 February 2017, a group of student activists 
protested a court’s verdict by erecting an unbalanced scale, which had a military boot on one 
side and an empty basket on the other side. They placed the scale on the footpath in front of the 
court’s main sign and read out a statement, sang songs, and read poems contributing to Pai Dow 
Din who had been sentenced to jail for sharing a BBC post. Later, Khonkaen Provincial Court 
ruled that they commit a contempt of court.103 The students argued that it was their freedom 
 
98 ibid 16. 
99 ilaw, 'ขู่ - ห้ า ม - จั บ  พ . ร . บ . ป ร ะ ช า ม ติ ฯ  ก ก ต . ใ ช้ จ า กั ด ก า ร รณ ร ง ค์ อ ย่ า ง ไ ร บ้ า ง ' (ilaw, 29 June 2016) 
<https://ilaw.or.th/node/4168> accessed 12 January 2019. 
100 Constitution Referendum Act 2016 s61, para 2. 
101 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and of association (n 21), para 390. 
102 Constitution Referendum Act 2016 (Thailand) s62. 
103 Khonkaen Provincial Court Red No. Lor Mor.1/2560, 2 November 2017.  
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under ICCPR Article 19.  The Appeal Court ruled that their scale was an expression within a 
court premises convincing the public that the court of justice had a prejudice against Pai Dow 
Din and was interfered by the military.104 In this case, the Court interpreted ‘the Court’s 
precincts’ to include the area in front of the Court’s footpath. It is worth noting that the Supreme 
Court does not have exact meaning for this term. In the past two decades, the term ‘the Court’s 
precincts’ has been interpreted both narrowly and widely by the Supreme Court. 105 In my 
opinion, the unbalance scale case is clearly contradict to the comment of the ECtHR in Skałka 
v Poland which states: ‘the court, as with all other public institutions, are not immune from 
criticism and scrutiny. … A clear distinction must, however, be made between criticism and 
insult.’106   
4.2.2 Blanket bans 
According to Mead, the term ‘blanket bans’ refers to restrictions that are not tailored towards 
any threat but are applied in a uniform fashion.107 They can be useful if they meet a pressing 
social need.  However, since the previous section has pointed out that PAAs in the three 
countries are silent on the three-prong test. Blanket bans can greatly limit the scope of the 
freedom of assembly. When the PAAs impose broad restrictions, authorities can easily make 
an excuse to arrest, to prosecute or to order dispersal, even there is no serious disturbance.108 
International standards have reaffirmed the sight and sound principle: public assemblies should 
be facilitated within “sight and sound” of their target audience. Organisers of a public assembly 
have the right to choose time, place, and manner to express their opinion.109 Nevertheless, this 
sight and sound principle does not have much traction in hybrid regimes. Blanket bans have 
been used extensively to limit the scope of freedom of assembly.  
 
 
104 Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, 'ศาลอุทธรณ์ภาค 4 ยืนตามศาลชั้นต้นคดี 7 นศ.ละเมิดอ านาจศาล ' (TLHR, 14 
January 2019) <https://www.tlhr2014.com/?p=10427> accessed 15 Jaunary 2019. 
105  interpreted narrowly in Supreme Court Cases 4102/2549, 12413/2547, 4498/2546, and 3227/2542; 
interpreted widely in Supreme Court Cases 635/2559, 7920/2554, 5801/2550, 7-8/2543, and 5462/2539. 
106 Skałka v Poland App no 43425/98 (ECtHR, 27 May 2003), para 34. 
107 David Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest. Rights and Regulation in the Human Rights Act Era (Hart 
2010) 101. 
108 Baker (n 71), 986. 
109 Daniel Simons, 'Protest as you like it: time, place & manner restrictions under scrutiny in Lashmankin v. 
Russia' (20 February 2017) <https://strasbourgobservers.com/2017/02/20/protest-as-you-like-it-time-
place-manner-restrictions-under-scrutiny-in-lashmankin-v-russia/> accessed 24 April 2017. 
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4.2.2.1 Restricting who can assemble and how to assemble 
The right to enjoy freedom of assembly, according to international standards, belongs to 
everyone. Therefore, everyone can be an organiser or a participant to a public assembly. The 
laws governing public assemblies must not discriminate against any individual or any group.110 
In practice, the three hybrid regimes impose blanket bans on the ground of citizenship, 
minimum age, and unregistered or banned organisations.  
Citizenship 
Citizenship becomes a restriction for enjoying the freedom of assembly in Cambodia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand. The least restrictive is the Thai PAA. It does not contain any provision explicitly 
discriminating on the ground of citizenship. However, the notification form under the PAA s10 
requires an organiser’s national identification number.111 Foreigners are allowed to participate 
in any public assembly. However, when the Thai Government declared an emergency decree 
to control a protest, police can arrest any foreigner violating the decree and deport him/her. 
During the PCAD anti-government rally in 2015, the police issued a deportation notice to Satit 
Segal, an India national who was a core leader of the protest.112 Segal had been living and 
working in Thailand for decades. It was clear that the deportation notice was issued because he 
led a protest against the government.   
The Cambodian PAA assures the right to peaceful assembly to only Khmer citizens in accordant 
to the Cambodian Constitution Article 41, which grains the right to only Khmer citizens.113 The 
Implementation Guide to the Law on Peaceful Demonstration released by the Cambodian 
Government mentions the principle of discrimination: ‘[t]he law must be applied to all people 
equally an in a way that abolishes discrimination. The right to peacefully assemble is a right 
that should be enjoyed by all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, gender, political opinion or 
other.’114  The PAA and its guidelines are silent on non-nationals, although the law does 
explicitly define that organisers need to be citizens. The law assumes that persons in any group 
of individuals who wishes to organise a peaceful assembly can be considered as the organisers 
of an assembly who have the responsibility to notify the authorities.115 One of the requirements 
 
110 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (n 4), guideline 2.5. 
111 Thailand Royal Gazette Book 132 Special Section 239 Ngo (3 November 2015) 4-5.  
112  Khaosod English, 'Satit seeks royal intervention to fight deport notice' (Khaosod, 6 March 2014) 
<http://www.khaosodenglish.com/politics/2014/03/06/1394084750/> accessed 9 Januray 2019. 
113 Cambodia PAA s2. 
114 Royal Government of Cambodia Ministry of Interior, Implementation Guide to the Law on Peaceful 
Demonstration , i. 
115 Cambodia PAA s5 and s14. 
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to accompany a notification letter is the organisers’ Khmer national identification cards. 
Therefore, it can be implied that only Khmer nationals can organise a public assembly. Because 
the law is silent on foreign nationals, non-Khmer can participate in any public assembly at their 
own risk.  
In addition, the Cambodian police can enforce the law arbitrarily against foreign nationals. For 
example, James Ricketson, an Australian filmmaker, was arrested on 3 June 2017 on the ground 
of espionage after he flew an unauthorised drone filming an anti-government rally, which was 
organised by the main opposition party.116 He was arrested a day after the event. The authorities 
saw his journalism damaged the country’s reputation. The Phnom Penh Municipal Court 
sentenced him to six years in prison on the ground of espionage and collecting information that 
is harmful to the nation. Jonathan Head, BBC correspondent, commented, in September 2018, 
that a case like this was common before a general election and Ricketson would be released 
before the full term. Head pointed out that PM Hun Sen became intolerant of criticism, 
especially before the general election. His critics would be released when they posed no threat 
to his regime.117 Head’s prediction was correct. Less than a month later, Ricketson was granted 
a royal pardon.118 It was after Hun Sen’s party won a landslide election in July 2018.119 
Ricketson’s case sent a strong message to foreign nationals, including the international media 
reporting the opposition’s rallies. Ricketson’s prosecution certainly created a chilling effect 
because any foreign national filming or reporting the opposition rallies could be arrested on the 
same ground.  
The most explicit blanket ban on the ground of citizenship is the restriction under the Malaysian 
PAA. It denies outright the right of non-citizens to organise an assembly or participate in an 
assembly peaceably.120 Any non-citizen who organises or participates in a public assembly is 
liable to a fine up to RM 10,000.121 For example, on 30 August 2017, more than a thousand of 
Rohingya (a stateless ethnic group from Myanmar) gathered in front of a building in Kuala 
 
116  BBC, 'Cambodia jails Australian filmmaker found guilty of espionage' (31 August 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-45364695> accessed 8 January 2018. 
117  ibid. 
118 The Guardian, 'Cambodia to deport Australian film-maker James Ricketson after royal pardon' (The 
Guardian, 22 September 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/21/cambodia-
pardons-australian-filmmaker-james-ricketson> accessed 8 January 2019. 
119 Hannah Ellis-Petersen, 'Camobodia: Hun Sen re-elected in landslide victory after brutal crackdown' (The 
Guardian, 29 July 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/29/cambodia-hun-sen-re-
elected-in-landslide-victory-after-brutal-crackdown> accessed 9 January 2019. 
120 Malaysia PAA s4(1) (a). 
121 ibid s4(3). 
 
Protest law & Public Order Policing in Hybrid Regimes - Pat Niyomsilp 
162 
 
Lumpur. They planned to march to the Myanmar embassy to hand over a petition regarding the 
ethnic cleansing in Myanmar. The police announced it was an illegal protest and arrested 44 of 
the protesters.122    
Minimum age 
According to international standards, children can enjoy the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly. However, the Malaysian PAA imposes a blanket ban on the age of the organiser and 
participant. The PAA prohibits children below the age of fifteen from participating in any public 
assembly.123 Anyone below the age of twenty-one years old is not allowed to be an organiser. 
The law prohibits any person from bringing a child or allows a child to attend an assembly 
unless the assembly meets the criteria that under the PAA such as religious assemblies, funeral 
processions, assemblies related to custom, and assemblies approved by the Minister.124 This 
may show that the PAA portrays public assemblies as dangerous and violent activities which 
children should not be involved. The PAA allows any police to arrest any organiser or 
participant who violates the provision without any warrant.125 For example, after an opposition 
parties’ rally, Himpunan Kebangkitan Rakyat (people uprising rally) on 12 January 2013, police 
were looking for 14 participants who allegedly brought children to the rally.126 Pictures of these 
participants and their children were uploaded on the official City police Facebook page and the 
police urged them to step up to facilitate investigations.127 The crime under this provision does 
not limit to the parents who bring children to an assembly. It includes the organisers who bring 
or recruit a child to their public assembly. Needless to seek a warrant, this provision offers an 
opportunity to arrest organisers and participants to an assembly swiftly to end a public 
assembly. For instance, on 1 August 2015, three activists from Gabbungan Anak Muda Demi 
Malaysia (“The Coalition of Youth for Malaysia”) were arrested for organising a peaceful 
protest in Kuala Lumpur. It was a peaceful protest in response to a corruption scandal. The 
majority of arrests occurred after protesters began calling for Prime Minister Najib’s 
 
122 United States Department of State, 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017' (21 April 2018) 
<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2017&dlid=277095> accessed 
9 January 2019. 
123 Malaysia PAA s4(2)(e). 
124 ibid s4(2)(f), Second Schedule. 
125 ibid s20 (1)(c). 
126 Joint urgent appeal, 14 February 2013, Case no. MYS1/2013. 
127  Nation, 'Cops seek 14 for taking kids to Jan 12 rally' (The Star, 30 January 2013) 
<https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2013/01/30/cops-seek-14-for-taking-kids-to-jan-12-
rally_1/> accessed 9 January 2019. 
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resignation. There were 29 protesters arrested including a 14-year old child. They were accused 
of organising unlawful assemblies.128 There was a sharp contrast after Najib lost power in 2018, 
the Pakatan Harapan government allowed the anti-ICERD (International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination) leading by UMNO and its alliance to 
assemble on the Merdeka square advocating the Malay’s racial and religious supremacy. The 
police allowed anti-ICER demonstration to gathering peacefully on the Merdeka square even 
there were many children participating the event.129 This example shows that the police could 
apply double standards in regulating public assemblies upon government’s signal.  
Unregistered or banned organisations 
It is worth reminding that chapter 3 pointed out that hybrid regimes use NGOs law to shape the 
organisational ecology. An NGO will lose the capacity to organise or participate in any public 
assembly when its registration is revoked under the NGOs law. In Malaysia, only registered 
organisations under the Societies Act 1966 may legally function as societies. The Societies Act 
provides the Minister responsible for the registration of societies with absolute discretion to 
declare any societies unlawful on the ground of ‘incompatible with the interest of the security 
of Malaysia or any part thereof, public order or morality.’130 An unregistered organisation who 
breach the mandatory registration is liable to a fined up to RM 5,000 and a fine not exceeding 
RM500 for every day after the first day during which the breach continues.131 
Malaysia restricts student movements through the Universities and University Colleges Act 
1971 (UUCA). Politicised youth movements, especially movements of the educated middle 
class, have been one of the main forces demanding political change.132 Unlike Thailand where 
students were able to spark uprisings against their authoritarian rulers, Malaysia has been able 
to suppress student movements effectively. The UUCA imposed a blanket ban on students from 
joining political parties or take part in political campaigns or protests.133 It criminalised any 
student who express, or do anything which may reasonably be construed as expressing support 
 
128 Joint allegation letter, 18 August 2015, Case no. MYS 3/2015. 
129 Emmanuel Santa Maria Chin and Azril Annuar, 'Parents who brought kids to anti-ICERD rally wanted 
to teach patriotism' (Malaymail, 8 December 2018) 
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wanted-to-teach-patriotism-vid/1701395> accessed 10 July 2019. 
130 Societies Act 1966 (Malaysia) s5(1). 
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132 Thyen and Gerschewski, 'Legitimacy and protest under authoritarianism: explaining student mobilization 
in Egypt and Morocco during the Arab uprisings' 1. 
133 A. Munro-Kua, Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia (Palgrave Macmillan UK 1996) 83. 
 
Protest law & Public Order Policing in Hybrid Regimes - Pat Niyomsilp 
164 
 
for, or sympathy with, or opposition to any unlawful society or any society which the Board of 
Directors of the University determined to be unsuitable.134 Students who violate this law could 
face disciplinary action, be fined, or even be expelled from their universities.  
In 2009, an amendment was made to allow a vice chancellor to grant permission for students 
to join a political party. However, roughly a year later, there was no report showing any 
permission had been granted and university students were still being detained by the police on 
the ground of ‘campaigning for a political party’. 135 In April 2010, a group of students were 
charged on the ground of campaigning for a political party during a by-election in Hulu 
Selangor. Afterwards, they filed a lawsuit against their university.136 The Kuala Lumpur High 
Court had previously upheld that the ban was constitutional. The Court of Appeal judges, on 
31 October 2011, ruled that the UUCA s15(5)(a) was unconstitutional. The provision reads: 
‘“No student of the University shall express or do anything which may reasonably be construed 
as expressing support for or sympathy with or opposition to any political party, whether in or 
outside Malaysia.” Two of the three judges in this case agreed that the banning impeded the 
‘healthy development of a critical mind and original thoughts, an objective that higher 
institutions should strive to achieve.’137 However, the UUCA was not repealed by the Court. 
An amendment was made to s15 in 2012 to allow students to join political parties and campaign 
as candidates in election on a condition that they are not engaging in political activities on 
campus.138  
The UUCA and the PAA are the legal measures suppressing the oppositions’ political activists 
on campus. The PAA restrict any person below the age of twenty-one years old from the right 
to organise a public assembly while the UUCA continues to be a useful tool to selectively 
exclude university students from participating in national political activities or scrutinising the 
government. For example, in 2016, numbers of students were suspended and fined after 
participating in peaceful rallies, the #TangkapM01 rallies. The rallies were organised by 
students calling for the arrest of the person named ‘M01’ who corrupted the state fund 1MDB. 
Asheeq Ali Sethi Alivi, a law student at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) became an 
 
134 Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (Malaysia) s15(3). 
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136 Yojana Sharma and Honey Singh Virdee, 'MALAYSIA: Landmark court ruling on campus freedom' 
(University World News, 1 November 2011)accessed 20 April 2017. 
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offender under the UUCA. He later filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the 
UUCA Section 15(3)(b).139 Similarly, in 2017, four university of Malaya students (the 
UMANY4) were disciplined for holding placards protesting the 1MDB fund scandal in a 
university event.140 They claimed that the university the disciplinary action was 
unconstitutional as it violated their freedom of assembly. On 27 February 2018, High Court 
Judge Azizah found that the University’s Disciplinary Committee did not comply with a rule 
requiring the committee to allow students to present their evidence to defend themselves before 
determining a disciplinary action.141 Nonetheless, the judge did not rule on the constitutionality 
issue.142 Undeniably, these two legislations continue to give a chilling effect to university 
students and channelling them away from national politics. 
A similar tactic to exclude or ban some organisations can be found in the Law on Political 
Parties and Election Law shaping organisational ecology of the political parties in both 
Thailand and Cambodia. When a political party is dissolved by the court, it cannot organise an 
assembly. In Thailand, 36 political parties have been dissolved by the Constitutional Court 
since 2005. This includes the ruling parties, Thai Rak Thai. In 2007, around a hundred Thai 
Rak Thai party’s executive members were banned from engaging in any political activity for 
five years.143 In Cambodia, in March 2017, the Law on Political Parties was enacted to prohibit 
anyone convicted to an unsuspended prison term from holding political office. Sam Rainsy was 
forced to step down from the leader of CNRP party due to his conviction for defamation. In 
July, the law was amended again to prevent any political party from using voice message, 
documents or activities of a person convicted of any crime. An offender may receive a ban from 
political activities, including organising or participating in public assemblies, for up to five 
years, or dissolution of the party concern.144 Two months later, Kem Sokha, one of the leaders 
of the CNRP was arrested on the ground of seeking to overthrow the Government with foreign 
support. In November, CNRP was dissolved by the Supreme Court in which the Presiding Judge 
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was a member of the ruling party’s Standing Committee.145  118 of CNPR’s senior officials 
were banned from any political activity for five years.146 As such, these oppositions are banned 
from organising or participating in any public protest. 
4.2.2.2 Restricting when and where an assembly can take place 
This thesis has established (in 2.2.4) that people have the right to assemble within sight and 
sound of their target audience because it is the key element to the freedom of assembly.147 There 
is little use of being able to assemble in the middle of nowhere and shouting to themselves. In 
contrast, legal frameworks in hybrid regimes impose blanket bans on some sensitive places or 
have mechanisms that allow the authorities to impose blanket bans on time and place. This is 
because restricting when and where people can protest is a means of channelling. Crocker points 
out that the location where peoples speak is often just as important as the content of their 
messages.148 A political protest becomes meaningless if it cannot convey its dissent message to 
the targeted government official or to the public.149 This thesis has argued earlier that hybrid 
regimes are likely to open some public spaces for citizens to assemble but they unduly impose 
restrictions to create chilling effects. Hence, this section explores legal mechanisms in 
Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand that impose blanket bans on time and place.  
The Cambodian PAA does not explicitly list out any prohibited place. The PAA imposes a 
blanket ban on time and manner when a public assembly is held at the freedom parks or on 
private property.150 The law prohibits from holding any assembly in these places from six p.m. 
to six a.m.151 Also, the maximum number to participants to an assembly in these places must 
not exceed two hundred persons. In other places, the law prohibits assembling on the national 
holidays and religious festivals namely the King’s birthday, Coronation Day, water festival, the 
National Independence Day, Khmer New Year day and Pchum Ben Day.152   
 
145  ibid para 20. 
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The PAA grants the authorities the power to impose any blanket ban on time, place, and manner 
when there is clear information indicating that the demonstration may cause danger or may 
seriously jeopardise security, safety and public order.153 Under this provision, the authorities 
commonly reject notifications and use roadblocks to prevent peaceful assemblies.154 For 
example, on 31 October 2017, Kem Sokha, a leader of the major opposition party, was put on 
trial. The authorities banned all assemblies and protests on that day. Security forces blocked all 
roads around the Supreme Court.155 On 27 March 2018, when Kem Sokha attended a hearing 
at the Appeal Court, security forces barricaded nearby streets to prevent any demonstration. 
CNRP supporters were blocked at these barricades. One of them protested by drawing symbols 
with chalk on the street, he was slapped by a security officer. Then the peaceful assembly at the 
barricade was dispersed by force.156 Prior to the general election in July 2018, the Cambodian 
authorities impose blanket bans on assembling or marching in front of the National Assembly 
complex to keep security, safety, and public order.157 In addition, the authorities also place 
blanket bans on international commemorative events such as International Labour Day, the 
International Day of the World’s Indigenous People, Human Rights Day, and International 
Women’s Day.158 For example, on International Labour Day March in 2017, the police blocked 
around two-thousand demonstrators from marching towards the National Assembly to hand in 
a petition.159 In 2018, Phnom Penh City Hall rejected the notification of the Labour Day march 
on the ground of traffic and public safety concerns.160 The City Hall ban any assembly in front 
of the National Assembly and suggested that the new Freedom Park, which located in the 
suburb of the city, should be used instead.161 In 2019, the authorities denied the request to march 
3 km. from Wat Phnom to the National Assembly on the Labour Day. The Labour Day march 
 
153  ibid. 
154 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia 
(n 144) para 48. 
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election/4374596.html> accessed 10 January 2019. 
158  Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia 
(27 July 2017) A/HRC/36/61, para 46;  
159 Ben Sokhean and Zombor Peter, 'Riot Police, Guards Block Labor day Marchers' (The Cambodia Daily, 
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128959/> accessed 10 January 2019. 
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again> accessed 10 January 2019  
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was relocated to two Freedom Parks away from the National Assembly and the route was 
limited to 1 km around a city block.162       
It is worth noting that Freedom Parks under the PAA are usually situated in remote areas, and 
often do not provide any shelter from the sun.163 Moreover, they are too small to accommodate 
a sizeable crowd.164 The PAA limits the maximum number to only 200 participants. Authorities 
use these parks as an excuse to ban or to relocate assemblies elsewhere.165 The Freedom Park 
in Phom Penh city was closed down on 4 January 2014 as a response to anti-government 
protests led by CNRP between July 2013 and July 2014. It was reopened in July 2014 with a 
blanket ban on large protests.166 In December 2016, Hun Sen announced a plan to cancel the 
Freedom Park in Phnom Penh city centre and designate a new site in an industrial area in the 
north of the city. He argued that ‘the park was causing “anarchy” and the central location was 
a mistake…’167  The order to relocate designated site can be seen as an attempt to silence 
political dissenters as the Freedom Park in Phnom Penh city had been symbolically used by the 
opposition as the major political struggle site, especially between late 2013 and early 2014. 168  
The Malaysian PAA defines “prohibited places” as (1) prohibited places declared under the 
Protected Areas and Protected Places Act 1959 and (2) places specified in the First Schedule. 
Apart from these two types of prohibited places, police can impose any blanket ban on time, 
place, and manner.169  The Protected Areas and Protected Places Act allows the authorities to 
declare an area protected such as airport, police and military buildings. Only authorised persons 
are allowed to enter.  This law has been invoked to arrest a participant to a public assembly. 
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MP Chua Tian Chang was arrested with 512 participants to the Bersih 3.0 rally in April 2012. 
They were taken to a police facility. After he was released, he remained on the site to help 
facilitate the release of the other participants. The police charged him again under the law for 
allegedly disobeyed police order to leave the police building. The Session Court convicted him 
in 2014.170  On the other hand, the places specified in the First Schedule are utility facilities 
such as dams, water treatment plants, petrol stations, electricity generating stations, hospitals, 
transportation terminals, fire stations, ports, docks, canals, places of worship, kindergartens, 
and schools.171 The PAA place blanket bans on any assembly to be held at or within fifty metres 
from the limit of the prohibited places.172 However, the law also includes places of worship, 
kindergarten and schools as prohibited places. It is worth noting that while the law exempts 
religious assemblies from the notification requirement, it prohibits public assemblies on the 
places of worship. If one maps out all the prohibit places and their fifty meters radius, many 
public areas for gathering are banned, especially in small towns. For example, on 22 June 2013, 
four former student activists were charged for participating in an assembly held within the 50-
meter radius from Masjid Ar-Rahman and Universiti Malaya.173 Under this charge, each of 
them could be fined up to RM 10,000. The university main entrance is next to the Masjid. To 
enter the Masjid, one must go through the university’s gate. If the Masjid goers can tolerance 
the traffic causing from the university, there is less reason why they cannot tolerate a public 
assembly. When it is a blanket ban, there is no question of proportionality or necessity.   
The Thai PAA imposes blanket bans on time and places. The PAA bans any demonstration 
between 6.00 p.m. and 6.00 a.m. unless it is authorised by authorities.174 This blanket ban has 
been proven to be effective in harassing anti-government demonstrations that start in the 
afternoon and continue after 6.00 a.m. The authorities have the discretion whether to allow a 
march to continue or seek a dispersal order from the Court of Justice. For instance, on 24 March 
2018, a pro-democracy group organised a march demanding a general election. They rallied 
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around 2 kilometres from Thammasat University to the Army Headquarter. The march 
continued peacefully from 5.00 p.m. to 8.40 p.m. However, five days later, the police 
summoned the 57 organisers and participants (from around 350 participants).175 One of the 
charges was rallying after 6 p.m. It should be noted that the PAA does not provide any criteria 
to guide the police when deciding whether a rally should be authorised under s16(8). Despite 
being a peaceful rally, the police can request a dispersal order, arrest, and prosecute the 
organisers/participant to the rally after 6 p.m. The provision offers opportunities to treat anti-
government rallies discriminately.            
The blanket bans on places in the PAA are also problematic. A public assembly must be held 
away at least 150 meters from the royal palaces and the royal residences, including the 
residences of the heir to the Throne, princes or princesses, his/ her majesty representatives and 
guests.176 The law bans public assemblies in the National Assembly, the Government House 
and the Courts. In addition, the police have discretion to ban any public assembly within a 
radius of 50 meters from the boundary of these places.177 These blanket bans are very effective 
in locations where some of the royal palaces and residences are clustered. They create strategic 
zones where protesters are banned. For example, the Royal Field (Sanamlung), where people 
had traditionally assembled to rise an issue to the government, is surrounded by the Royal 
Palace and the Supreme Court. Hence, a large part of the Field became illegal to assemble. The 
plaza in front of the Bangkok Art and Cultural Centre is another popular place for anti-
government protesters. The local police commander (Patumwan District) declared that the plaza 
and its surrounding areas are banned from any public assembly because that they are in the 
prohibited radius from Sapratum Palace.178 For example, pro-democracy protesters (known as 
MBK39) were prosecuted for protesting on a walkway next to the plaza on 27 January 2018.179  
In contrast, on 5 March 2019, Palang Pracharath Party, a pro-military party, was able to 
assemble to promote their candidates on the plaza.180  
 
175 Thai Lawyers For Human Rights, 'ศาลยกค าร้องฝากขงั 5 แกนน า คดีคนอยากเลือกตั้ง ARMY57' (TLHR, 9 April 
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The Palace is situated in the middle of a business area and next to a mega shopping mall where 
noise from busy traffic and the Skytrain system is common and bearable. The nuisance from 
several hundred protesters on the Bangkok Art’s Plaza would be relatively small when 
compared to nuisance from the thousands of customers in the shopping mall next to the palace 
or from the busy traffic surrounding the palace. In addition, prohibited zones also create 
problems for rallies organisers. They have to avoid passing through these prohibited areas. For 
example, a rally in front of the Parliament cannot be allowed because the parliament is 
surrounded by royal palaces. On 30 March 2017, six organisers were arrested after they led a 
hundred of the People’s Alliance for Energy Reform protesters rallying from the Parliament to 
the Government House in order to hand a petition to the Prime Minister demanding the 
government to withdraw the amended petroleum bill.181 Police arrested them on the street in 
front of the parliament on the ground of organising a demonstration within the 150-meter radius 
of Chitrada Palace.182 Without the key organisers, the demonstration ended on the same day.183 
According to international standards, restrictions on this ground should be considered on case 
by case basis. Banning on the ground of vicinity to palaces does not meet international standards 
because the restriction fails to provide a chance to consider ‘the necessary in a democratic 
society’ principle. The ECtHR, in Alekseyev v Russia184, did not focus on the lawfulness of a 
restriction on public assembly but it looked whether the aim and the domestic lawfulness of the 
ban ‘fell short of being necessary in a democratic society’.185 Under this approach, the existence 
of domestic law, i.e. prescribed law, designed to curtail the right to peaceful assemblies do not 
automatically provide a justification for imposing restrictions.186 Hence, imposing blanket bans 
on time and locations may fall short of being necessary for a democratic society. In addition, 
the Thai PAA s19 grants the authorities to impose any restriction, including blanket bans, in 
order to facilitate and protect public assemblies and affected parties. The law is silent on the 
strict test of proportionality and necessary to control this ability. For example, on 24 June 2019, 
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the police ban a demonstration organised by ilaw (to advocate the abolishment of junta’s orders) 
on the ground that the proposed route could cause traffic problems and the route would pass in 
front of a kindergarten during the school hours. The organisers claimed that the ban was 
unreasonable because they planned to march on the footpath which was wide enough to march 
on without disturbing any traffic lane.187 However, the police did not let the organisers amend 
their plan to reduce the effects from their demonstration. Instead, the police recommended the 
organisers to send some representatives to submit their proposal to the relevant authority instead 
of organising a demonstration.   In contrast, on 27 November 2018, the police facilitated a group 
of disable people to organise a demonstration demanding their better access to the mass transit 
system in front of the Administrative Court. The police closed a traffic lane for the march and   
allowed them to assemble on the Court’s carpark.188 These two cases show that the police 
applied double standards. ilaw’s rally was seen as a anti-government gathering while the disable 
people’s rally was facilitated well because it did not threaten the government’s stability. 
Although organisers and participants who are affected by the police’s restrictions under the 
PAA may seek an injunction from the Administrative Court, it would take several days before 
they complete the process.189 The procedure to obtain an injunction is unclear and time-
consuming. The Administrative Court has ruled that organisers have to exhaust the internal 
appeal process before bringing the case to the Administrative Court. Organisers need to appeal 
restrictions to the superintendence of the police and wait for a response for at least 24 hours 
before filing the case to Court.190 Moreover, the Court has established that only the organiser 
whose name is on the notification of an assembly can appeal police’s restrictions to the Court.191 
Courts’ office hours is another limitation in the appealing process. A request for an injunction 
must be made between the Courts’ office hours 8.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. (Monday to Friday). 
Therefore, it is not possible to seek an injunction from the Courts during weekends or in the 
evening when public assemblies are most likely to be held.192   
 
187 ilaw, 'มาตรา 19(5) พ.ร.บ. ชุมนุมฯ มาตรการสยบการชุมนุมโดยสงบ' (ilaw, 25 June 2019) 
<https://ilaw.or.th/node/5303?fbclid=IwAR1sa2-pgMPTMgseFQiM30Yjtc-
DsVDFfCI9v8mxpYM4KbR7r5QVz0UMf18> accessed 26 June 2019. 
188 MGR Onine, 'คนพิการฟ้องเอาผิด รฟม.ละเลยจัดส่ิงอ านวยความสะดวกคนพิการบนสายสีม่วง ' (MGR Online, 27 
November 2018) <https://mgronline.com/politics/detail/9610000118319> accessed 1 August 2019 
189 Administrative Court’s injunction Black No.154/2561 on 26 January 2017. 
190 Administrative Court Red No.925/2561 on 21 May 2018. 
191 ibid. 
192 For example, We Walk’s organisers went to a Provincial Court on Saturday 20 January 2018 to seek an 
injunction to prevent the police blocking their rally. They were refused and were asked to submit the 
request on Monday (the next working day).   
Protest law & Public Order Policing in Hybrid Regimes - Pat Niyomsilp 
173 
 
4.2.2.3 Restriction on manner 
Restrictions on manner refer to any restriction on how organisers and participants to a public 
assembly assemble and deliver their messages. International standards direct that organisers 
have not only the freedom to choose when and where to assemble but also the freedom to choose 
how to assemble. PAAs in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand grant power to the authorities to 
impose blanket bans on manner without having to consider the proportionality and the 
necessary in a democratic society.  
Simultaneous assemblies are treated differently in the three regimes. The Cambodian PAA 
states that if there are more than one notification to assemble at the same time and place, the 
priority will go to the group that first submits its notification letter.193 The Thai PAA are silent 
on the counter assemblies and simultaneous assembly. However, the police may allow and 
facilitate counter assemblies. For example, on 18 January 2019, a pro-democracy submitted a 
notification to organise assembly demanding a general election to. Two hours later, a counter-
assembly notification was submitted by a pro-regime group. The police did not prioritise the 
first group. Both of them were allowed to use the same area. Later, the confrontation on the 
social media forced the pro-democracy group to change the venue because the organisers were 
afraid that the stand off would lead to violence causing by agent provocateurs.194 On the 
contrary, the Malaysian PAA explicitly gives discretion to the police to impose restrictions on 
time, place, and manner to any notified simultaneous assembly. The police must give the 
priority to the organiser who first submitted the notification unless the place of assembly is 
traditionally or contractually to be used for other assemblies.195 If there are more than one 
notification arrived at the same time, the PAA direct that the police will make a draw from all 
the notifications.196 The Malaysian PAA states that the police can ban a notified counter-protest 
if there is evidence that the organisation of the counter assembly will cause conflict between 
the participants of the assemblies.197 To this, the law does not mention to what degree the 
conflict must be. To me, it is rather unreasonable to expect no conflicts between the organiser 
if there is a counter assembly. The purpose of holding any counter assembly is to express 
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disagreement to the people who advocate it. According to international standards, it is the 
police’s positive duty to facilitate and protect all sides from violence.  
In addition, the Malaysian PAA imposed a blanket ban on street protests until 4 July 2019. 
‘Street protest’ were referred as ‘an open air assembly which begins with a meeting at a 
specified place and consists of walking in a mass march or rally for the purpose of objecting to 
or advancing a particular cause or causes’.198 Therefore, marches and rallies were banned.  This 
provided a legal basis for the police to make an arrest.199 The UN Special Rapporteur, Maina 
Kiai, commented that providing access to public space and protecting the participants are the 
crucial factors for facilitating peaceful assemblies.200 In Christians against Racism and Fascism 
v United Kingdom, the Commission stated that ‘the freedom of peaceful assembly covers not 
only static meeting, but also public processions.’201Individuals should have access to public 
space, including public streets, roads and squares, to conduct peaceful assemblies. It is normal 
that freedom of assembly and freedom of movement conflict with each other when there is a 
peaceful assembly. Disruptions to the normal routine of daily life can be expected. To create 
some disruptions in order to express an opinion is a part of the mechanism of a pluralistic 
society. 202  A democratic society needs to uphold pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.203 
After the UMNO’s regime lost the 2018 general election, the new government amended the 
PAA to decriminalise street protest and to shorten the notification period from 10 days to seven 
days.204 The new leading collation parties, which had benefited from Bersih movements  hoped 
to see an increase in peaceful public assemblies.205    
The Thai PAA imposes a blanket ban on using amplifiers louder than 115 dB(A) or louder than 
70 dB(A) on 24-hour average. 206  These maximum limits meet with the Sound Standard given 
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by the National Environment Board.207  In practice, the police enforce Advertisement by 
Amplifier Act 1950 arbitrarily. This legislation is already outdated and unnecessary. It requires 
an organiser to request a permit to use loudspeaker from the local authority while the PAA 
notification is made at the local police station. Advertisement by Amplifier Act grants police 
and local authorities to order any loudspeaker user to reduce the volume or stop using the 
amplifier if it causes public nuisances.208 The law also requires that speech going through 
loudspeakers must be in Thai. Such restriction reduces the opportunities for non-Thais to protest 
even though the PAA is silent on this issue. When this legislation is applied, it means that police 
have the power to stop organisers from using any amplifier. Every public assembly creates 
noise, which can be considered as public nuisances. Advertisement by Amplifier Act has many 
restrictions and procedure that do not conform to international standards on freedom of 
assembly. Nevertheless, the police have been applying this law to impose bans on loudspeakers 
and harass organisers.209  
4.2.3 Onerous notification requirements 
Notification requirements in PAAs play an important role in shaping the scope of freedom of 
assembly. Unlike authoritarian regimes where they prohibit public assemblies almost 
completely, hybrid regimes impose onerous notification procedures to control the level of 
protest on the street. Notification requirements affect Robertson’s state mobilisation strategies 
because the authorities can impose them to filter who, what, when, where, and how a public 
assembly can be organised. The international standards on public assemblies recommend that 
governments should have the presumption in favour of holding assemblies.210 We have 
established in chapter 2 that the true purpose of having a notification requirement is to enable 
the authorities to facilitate and protect peaceful assemblies.211 It must not be operated against 
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the object and purpose allowed by IHRL.212 Notification requirements should not be 
automatically imposed on all assemblies.213 Nevertheless, hybrid regimes utilise notification 
requirements not as a means to manage, or even to facilitate protests, especially where there 
may be conflict or counter-protests, but instead both to as a tool to screen out undesired 
assemblies and, having been forewarned, as a means to ensure that pro-regime supporters are 
able to mobilise. 
The PAAs in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand are silent on the right to hold a spontaneous 
assembly. Therefore, organisers must notify the authorities according to the timeframe requires 
by the PAAs. The notification procedures in these regimes are strictly enforced. The Thai PAA 
requires a 24-hour prior notification while the authorities can issue restriction orders or ban the 
assembly within 24 hours after receiving the notification.214 The Cambodian PAA requires a 5-
working-day prior notification.215 The Malaysian PAA requires a 10-day-notification.216 Here, 
the length of the notification period is worth considering. If the notification period is too short, 
like in the Thai PAA, the argument that the notification process allows authorities to prepare 
themselves to facilitate becomes less reasonable because the authorities have little time to 
prepare. On the contrary, when the notification period is too long, we still need to see how the 
authorities prepare to facilitate the assembly during that period. If they do too little or do nothing 
to facilitate, then, the notification process becomes not necessary. In the case of Cambodia, the 
PAA requires only 5 working days in advance. However, the PAA does not explicitly state that 
the authorities have a duty to facilitate. The PAA states that the organisers can request for 
assistance from the authorities and the authorities shall respond with full attention towards 
appropriate request in accordance with the law to ensure the exercise of the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly.217 In practice, Rhona Smith, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in Cambodia, reported that the PAA was not being applied consistently to all people.218  
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PAAs in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand consider unnotified assemblies to be illegal 
assemblies, the effect of which is that the authorities can issue a dispersal order and then arrest 
the organiser without having to consider the peacefulness of the assembly. Here, I argue that 
there are two special features in their notification systems. First, their PAAs impose assumed 
organisers. This feature provides the authorities with an opportunity to harass political 
dissenters by assuming them as organisers. This technique aims to apply limited public coercion 
to targeted activists and harass them with less visible coercion after their events had ended.219 
Second, the notification systems in the three regimes acting as de facto authorisation 
channelling people away from protest. Their PAAs provide the authorities with vast power to 
ban or to modify notified plans. Hence, the notification systems in these hybrid regimes enable 
the authorities to apply coercive and channelling techniques. 
4.2.3.1 Assumed organiser 
Empowering a state to deem any one individual as the organiser of a protest, without having to 
demonstrate that they are, allows the authorities to choose anyone as being responsible for a 
public assembly, and then to impose sanctions on them for failing to abide by the duties of an 
organiser. In differing ways, this is true in each of the three countries in our study, as we shall 
see. PAAs in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand impose responsibilities that organisers need 
to follow.220 Failing to fulfil their responsibilities, they are liable to criminal penalties, including 
imprisonment. One of the responsibilities is to notify the authorities of their public events 
according to the PAAs.  Here, the ability to assume someone as an organiser allows the 
authorities to pick and choose a leader out of a crowd and prosecute him/her for failing to notify 
the authorities.  
The Cambodian PAA does not define either “an organiser” or “demonstration leaders”. 
However, it requires any group of individuals who wish to organise a peaceful assembly must 
notify the authorities in writing.221 Although the PAA s6 states that the notification letter shall 
indicate three leaders, the authorities can assume more than three organisers when making an 
arrest.222 For example, on 20 July 2015, around 50 activists marched in front of a market 
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handing out leaflet the NGOs law. Only five well-known activists were arrested for failing to 
notify the authorities of their event.223 Again, on 27 July 2015, six activists dressed in prison 
uniforms and chained together to protest against the NGOs law in front of the parliament. The 
police arrested them all for failing to notify their event. In these two events, the police detained 
them at the local police stations for several hours before releasing them without further 
prosecution. In my opinion, the coercion tactic was completed because the police had removed 
some key protesters from their protest sites.    
The Malaysian PAA s19 allows the authorities to assume ‘any person who initiates, leads, 
promotes, sponsors, holds or supervises the assembly, or invites or recruits participants or 
speakers for the assembly, shall be deemed to be the organiser of the assembly.’224 The reason 
behind is that the law imposes burdensome responsibilities to the organisers. The organiser has 
the responsibility to ensure that an assembly complies with the Act and any other written law. 
The ambiguous responsibilities include the duty to ‘ensure that he or any other person at the 
assembly does not do any act or make any statement which has a tendency to promote feeling 
or ill-will or hostility among the public at large or do anything which will disturb public 
tranquillity.225 The organiser also has the duty ‘to ensure that the assembly will not cause any 
significant inconvenience to the public at large’.226 With these burdens, the authorities have 
vast legal grounds to prosecute targeted political dissenters. For example, On 8 November 2014, 
a group of students arrange an academic freedom talk inside the International Islamic 
University (UIA). The university closed off the university gates denying three speakers access 
to prevent the event taking place inside the university. Then, the students organised the event 
by gathering outside the campus gates. Around 18 months later, Abdul Aziz Bari, Safwan 
Anang, and Fahmi Zainol, the three speakers, were summoned by the police. They were 
investigated for their part in the rally.227   
The Thai PAA defines an organiser as ‘a person who organises a public assembly, including 
any person who desires to organise a public assembly and any person who actively encourages 
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or begs others to attend public assembly or behave in any manner to convince other that he/she 
is an organiser of such assembly.228 In other words, the PAA imposes assumed organiser status 
to anyone who acts as if he/she is an organiser. In addition, UN Special Rapporteurs commented 
that “organiser” in the Thai PAA was defined too widely.229 The law demands that the 
organisers must fulfil several responsibilities such as cooperating with the authorities, 
controlling the participants, and organise the public assembly peacefully and without arms 
according to the constitutional rights.230 Police may use this as an opportunity to harass 
protesters. For instance, on 30 March 2017, Panthep Puapongpan was accused of failing to 
notify the authority of an assembly. Panthep was filmed using a speaker talking to the 
participants of a rally. He argued that he was asked by the police to ask the participants to 
disperse and he broke away from the assembly. Dusit Municipal Court dismiss this case on the 
ground that he there was lacking evidence showing that Panthep had acted as an organiser by 
inviting others to join the rally.231   
On 4 March 2018, Sirawit organised a public assembly demanding a general election in Pataya. 
He failed to notify the local police of his event. After the event, the police accused 12 protesters 
(including Sirawit) for organising an unnotified public assembly. The Pattaya Municipal Court, 
on 31 July 2019, ruled that only three of them could be considered as organisers. The other 
protesters who helped taking photos and holding banners were not acting as the organisers.232 
This case shows that the police assumed all of the participants as the organisers instead of 
prosecuting only Sirawit who actually made a call to the local police station and inform the 
police verbally (the PAA requires a written notification).     
4.2.3.2 De facto authorisation  
Both notification requirements and authorisation requirements provide three benefits namely 
allowing better traffic planning, reducing scheduling conflicts, and easing the police to provide 
protection and facilitation.233 However, Baker has argued that, historically, the primary function 
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of authorisation requirements was to harass, control, and suppress unpopular groups.234 It 
provides the authorities with an opportunity to reject the application or amend the proposed 
plan. Obviously, the authorities have the upper hand when bargaining with organisers. On the 
contrary, notification requirements can maintain all three benefits without giving up the 
opportunity to the authorities. However, the notification systems in Cambodia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand are de facto authorisation.      
In chapter 2 (2.2.3), this study has identified that international standards and IHRL prefer 
notification over authorisation. They agree that it is not necessary to require notification from 
some types of assemblies and failing to comply with the notification requirements does not 
justify a dispersal of a peaceful public assembly. According to the OSCE Panel of Expert, ‘prior 
notification…should only be required where its purpose is to enable the state to put in place 
necessary arrangements to facilitate freedom of assembly and to protect public order, public 
safety and the rights and freedoms of others.’235 In some jurisdictions like Moldova and Poland, 
an assembly of a small number of participants is not required to notify the authority.236 The 
reason for that is clear: a small group of, say, three or four does not need policing and so any 
rationale for requiring notification simply falls away. In contrast, hybrid regimes notification 
processes can be disguised as de facto authorisation. 
Although authorisation requirements can be found in some consolidated democracies, the 
application of de facto authorisation in hybrid regimes has a greater extent in hybrid regimes. 
This thesis (in 3.4.3) has argued that hybrid regimes have the incentive to prevent serious threats 
from the oppositions’ protests and still be able to mobilise pro-regime supporters to show their 
dominance. Thus, I see that authorisation requirements, as a channelling technique, allow small 
and insignificant assemblies to obtain public visibility while enabling regimes to mobilise their 
own supporters to show their domination. Here we can see that the PAAs in the three regimes 
provide vast discretion to the authorities to achieve this outcome. 
In Cambodia, the notification procedure is a de facto authorisation procedure.237 The 
Cambodian PAA s9 directs that ‘the authorities receiving a notification letter shall respond 
positively in writing toward the notification letter except if…’ This procedure shows an 
ambiguity because a notification should not be subject to any decision of the authorities 
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involved.238 The local authorities may call for a meeting if they have clear information 
indicating that the demonstrations may cause danger or would seriously jeopardise security, 
safety and public order.239 If they fail to meet an agreement, the decision of the authorities shall 
be reviewed by the Minister of Interior.240 However, the law does not require the Minister to 
give his decision in writing. Neither does it provide any procedure to appeal the Minister’s 
decision to the court of law. Therefore, this lengthy dispute resolution process is ineffective and 
makes the notification become permission de facto.241  
The Cambodian PAA provides the authorities with broad power to approve or ban almost any 
peaceful protest.242  Notification of a peaceful assembly can be rejected simply because the local 
authorities ‘have clear information indicating that the demonstration may cause danger or 
would seriously jeopardize security, safety and public order.’243 When the law is silent on the 
strict test of proportionality and necessity, the authorities are prone to have the presumption 
that any public assembly is a threat to public order and public safety.244  
Under the Cambodian PAA, the authorities issue demonstration permits at their discretion. It 
has been reported that lower-level government officials, especially in the capital, routinely 
denied requests unless the national government specifically authorised the gatherings.245 
Although stability and public security are the common grounds for denying assembly permits, 
the authorities systematically rejected notifications without justification.246 When the PAA is 
applied together with NGOs law, the authorities can target anti-regime organisation and prevent 
them from organising any meeting or gathering, even on private property.247 On the contrary, 
they pro-government demonstrators are allowed to mobilise. For example, on 1 May 2019, the 
Cambodian Labour Confederation organised the Labour Day march calling the government to 
lift the 2013 ban which prohibit workers from gathering in public spaces. Their plan was to 
march around the National Assembly to hand in their petition. The Phnom Penh City Hall did 
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not approve the plan and amended the plan to march around Wat Phhom instead. On the same 
day, PM Hun Sen celebrated labour day in a gathering of around 3,700 factory workers in 
Kandal province.248 
The notification requirement in the Malaysian PAA is used and an excuse to harass the 
organisers including arresting and prosecuting them after their events. The law provides two 
exemptions from the notification requirement: assemblies held at the designated places and 
assemblies specified in the Third Schedule of the PAA.249 The law is silent on spontaneous 
assemblies. 250 It empowers police to call a meeting with the organiser and advise the organiser 
on the assembly. The police may impose restrictions and conditions on an assembly.251 These 
restrictions can be on the time, place and manner, including the payment of clean-up costs, the 
environment and cultural factors, or any measure that the authorities see fit.252  Failing to notify 
is liable to a fine not exceeding RM 10,000. In 2013, alleged organisers of the Black 505 rallies, 
nationwide election fraud protests, were arrested for failing the notification requirement.253 The 
government prosecuted activists and opposition figures who had participated in the post-
election protests by assuming them as organisers.254 These protests produced two contrasting 
Appeal Court’s rulings on this matter: Nik Nazmi bin Nik Ahmad v Public Prosecutor255 and 
Yuneswaran v Public Prosecutor.256 
Nik Nazmi bin Nik Ahmad, an opposition MP, organised a Black 505 rally to protest an election 
result in a stadium. He was fined RM 1,500 for failing to notify the police. 257 He later argued 
that the PAA violated his constitutional rights and bring this matter to the Court. The High 
Court ruled that the 10-day notice period under the legislation was not unconstitutional.258  He 
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appealed to the Appeal Court arguing that section 9(5) of the PAA are unconstitutional. The 
Court, on 25 April 2014, held that section 9(5), which imposed a fine on the organiser, ‘failed 
the reasonableness test as well as the proportionality test as it has no nexus to public order, 
national security or a non-peaceful assembly.’259   
Datuk Dr Hj Hamid Sultan Bin Abu Backer, the judge in this case, explained. First, the article 
10 of the Federal Constitution allowed restrictions, but it did not criminalise the breach of the 
restriction.260 The constitutional framers left this task to the existing penal laws to check law 
and order. He referred to section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code of India, which was 
applied to any breach relating to assembly.261 Secondly, he saw that PAA section 9(5) failed 
the reasonable test and the proportionality tests because criminalising someone for not giving 
notice had no connection with keeping public order unless the assembly was not a peaceful 
one.262 The judge took the principle of proportionality, which laid down by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union263, into consideration and reaffirmed that this principle had been 
accepted in civilised jurisdiction where democratic values were norms.264 He further explained 
that it was the organiser’s social responsibility to comply with the ten-day prior notification in 
order to enable police to provide security and to facilitate effectively. If the organiser failed the 
notification requirement, there was no prohibition for the law enforcement agencies to take 
action under the Penal law or the Criminal Procedure Code.265 
Niz Nazmi’s case was a significant milestone in which the principle of proportionality under 
international standards was taken into consideration. In this case, the Appeal Court explicitly 
declared that it is the court duty to ensure than the constitutional guaranteed freedom is not 
violated by any retrogressive law without meaningful grounds consistent with the 
Constitution.266 However, this precedent was short lived. On 2 October 2015, The Appeal Court 
overturned the precedent and reaffirmed the constitutionality of Section 9 (5) in Yuneswaran v 
Public Prosecutor.267  Both cases were originated from the same movement to protest 2013 
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general election. However, they were prosecuted in different states. Under the Malaysian legal 
system, only cases which originate in the High Court can go to the Federal Court. Cases 
involving the PAA are usually filed to Sessions Court. This means that the Court of Appeal is 
the final appeal court. 
Yuneswaran was the organiser of the Black 505 assembly in Jahor Bahru. He failed to notify 
the police according to the PAA. The Session Court sentenced him to a fine of RM 6,000 and 
a three-month jail. He appealed to the High Court. The High Court Judge in Yuneswaran held 
that he was bound by the decision in Nik Nazmi bin Nik Ahmad v Public Prosecutor and ordered 
the fine to be refunded. Next day, the Public Prosecutor filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
The Appeal Court ruled that the requirement to give notice was not a restriction of a right to 
assembly because it did not stop a citizen from exercising his/her right to assemble peacefully. 
The notification procedure was necessary because the police would not be able to perform their 
role as facilitators and regulator effectively. Therefore, failing to notify according to the law 
would affect the police’s ability to provide safety for the assembly participants.268 The 
notification requirement was ‘crucial and reasonable to enable the police to make the “necessary 
plan and preparation” to satisfy their legal obligation under the PAA…’269  The Court saw that 
the requirement met international standard by comparing it to Article 11 of the ECHR and the 
notification requirements in Portugal, France, Italy and The United Kingdom .270 The Court 
then overruled the decision set out by Nik Nazmi bin Nik Ahmad v Public Prosecutor and 
declared that the provision under PAA section 9(5) was constitutional.271 In my opinion, the 
Court has overlooked that the ECHR and those PAAs (in Portugal, France, Italy and The United 
Kingdom ) demand the strict test of necessity and proportionality, in which the Malaysian PAA 
lack of. However, Yuneswaran becomes stare decisis in two later cases: Maria Chin Abdullah 
v Pendakwa Raya and Mohd Rafizi Ramli & Anor v PP & Other Appeals.272 Judges in these 
two cases held that there is no issue on the validity of the PAA s9(5).273 
On this issue, Tew argued that after the Barisan National lost its two-thirds majority in the 
parliament, both 2008 and 2013 general elections, the judiciary appeared to be more rights-
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oriented and showed more willingness to check on legislative and executive actions. 274  
However, the Appeal Court has faded away from this approach in Yuneswaran. Tew suspected 
that Malaysian constitutional politics have played a role, as the powerful political branches 
were attempting to regain their superior status.275  Therefore, I see that the provision under PAA 
section 9(5), a fine for failing to notify an assembly, is a key part of the mechanism to control 
the level of state mobilisation that worth protecting. This could explain why the public 
prosecutor in Yuneswaran quickly appealed to the Appeal Court in less than a day after the case 
was dismissed by the High Court.       
The police in Thailand impose a de facto authorisation procedure in relation to public 
assemblies. The Thai PAA requires 24 hours prior notification.  Upon a notification, police 
must inform the organisers to change venue if they propose to assemble in a prohibited area 
under the PAA.276 If they do not change, then police ban the assembly. Failing to comply with 
the notification requirements makes an assembly illegal which police can issue dispersal 
order.277 If the organisers or participants do not comply with the order, the police need to request 
a dispersal order from the Civil Court. Although the PAA allows an organiser to request for an 
exemption to assemble without notification, the permission depends on the local Police 
Commander’s discretion.278 He has 24 hours to respond to the request. In other words, the PAA 
impose a blanket ban on spontaneous assemblies while the Police Commanders have the 
discretion to allow spontaneous assembly. This procedure allows them to choose who can 
organise counter assemblies and who cannot.  
Under the Thai PAA, a single-person protest is subjected to a notification. On 7 January 2019, 
Akaraj Udomamnoui was detained and brought to a police station, after he attempted to protest 
the Government for postponing the general election date by shaving his head at Victory 
Monument. He notified the police of his event but the police replied that he could not protest 
legally before his notification reached 24 hours after submitting.279 In this case, the police 
denied that Akaraj was arrested. No charge was pressed. He was just brought to the local police 
station twice on that day. It is worth noting that this technique is commonly used to end small 
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protests. Police forcefully invite protesters to the nearest police station and detain them for 
several hours. For example, the police captured and detained Anon Nampa and his friends 
because they failed to notify their “Stand Still” protest on 27 April 2016 (discussed at 4.1.2).280 
To end an assembly, The PAA s21 paragraph 2 requires that the authorities need to obtain a 
dispersal order from the Civil Court before making an arrest on the ground of organising a non-
notified assembly. Since there were a few participants, the police avoided making any arrest 
but forcefully brought organisers to the nearest police station. Later, they were released without 
charge. With this tactic, police avoid obtaining a dispersal order under the PAA. The capturing 
of all participants, including a single person protest, produces the same result as to end an 
assembly.  
In addition, pressing charges after a public event is one of the preferred police tactics to create 
a chilling effect. 281 On 16 May 2019, Sirawit and Thanawat organised a public event to collect 
signatures in a petition letter demanding that all the senators refuse to vote for General Prayuth 
Chan-O-cha (the NCPO’s leader) as the Prime Minister. The event was organised and carried 
out peacefully in front of a monument in Chiang Rai province. It was the third event after they 
collected signatures in Bangkok and Chiang Mai. Almost a month later, on 11 June 2019, the 
police pressed charges against Sirawit and Thanawat on the ground that they failed to notify 
the event in Chiang Rai according to the PAA.282 Chiang Rai police also charged five 
participants who joined the list. It was clear to me that these charges were driven by a political 
motive to silence anti-government movements.  
In another case, on 2 February 2019, two university students, Parit Chiwarak and Tanawat 
Wongchai, posted an invitation on their Facebook accounts inviting the public to join their 
traditional cursing ceremony at the government house. There was no participant joining their 
event because the police denied access to the protest site. The two cancelled the gathering and 
walked to another government house’s entrance to conduct a cursing ceremony. It consisted of 
only two of them and the press. Shortly after, the two were arrested and charged on the ground 
 
280 Dusit Municipal Court judgment Red No. Aor.317/2560 on 10 February 2017. 
281 ilaw, 'พ.ร.บ.ชุมนุมสาธารณะฯ ไมแ่จง้-ไม่เช่ือฟัง เตรียมโดนขอ้หา' (ilaw, 1 February 2018) 
<https://ilaw.or.th/node/4733> accessed 16 January 2019. 
282 Thai Lawyers For Human Rights, 'ตร.ออกหมายเรียก "จ่านิว-บอล- 5 ปชช. เชียงราย" ไม่แจง้ชุมนุม หลงัตั้งโต๊ะล่าช่ือ
ปิดสวิตซ์ ส.ว.' (TLHR, 14 June 2019) 
<https://www.tlhr2014.com/?p=12813&fbclid=IwAR11_NbSIXS2vU7hNB4yFPgI-
D8H2MLthkQxg6pqc9jRqBlQauNfY3DlTi4> accessed 21 June 2019. 
 
Protest law & Public Order Policing in Hybrid Regimes - Pat Niyomsilp 
187 
 
of no prior-notification.283 On 21 August 2019, Dusit Municipal Court fined them on the ground 
that they organised an unnotified public assembly.284 The two argued that their cursing 
ceremony was not an assembly. The Court decided that it was an assembly under the PAA 
because the two organisers distributed leaflets to the press and did not prevent the public from 
joining their event. Noticeably, the Court did not consider the necessity and proportionality of 
the restriction. In my opinion, the advertised event was cancelled because the police denied the 
access to the protest site. Such tactic forced the two organisers to find a new spot where they 
could perform their ceremony. This case shows that the authorities may harass political 
dissenters by charging them on the ground of organising a non-notified public assembly. The 
police enforce the notification requirements without considering necessity and proportionality.  
Restrictions on freedom of assembly presented in this chapter lead us to conclude that hybrid 
regime incumbents rely heavily upon the applicable legal framework to curtail the ability of the 
people to organise a public assembly. This part has illustrated that content-based restrictions, 
blanket-bans, and onerous notification requirements (which do not comply with international 
standards) significantly reduce the protective scope of freedom of assembly in hybrid regimes. 
These restrictions clearly affect how protesters choose their strategies or what means they will 
use to make their voices heard. It stands to reason, therefore, as chapter 3 suggested and this 
chapter has evidenced, that a thorough analysis of the operation of domestic legal frameworks 
governing public assemblies must be central to any consideration and analysis of contentious 
politics in hybrid regimes. 
 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the incumbents in Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand 
curtailed the scope of freedom of assembly through the respective legal frameworks governing 
public assemblies. These regimes do not totally ban public assemblies but rather significantly 
limit the abilities of anti-regime protesters to organise. In chapter 3 (heading 3.3.2), this thesis 
discussed Robertson’s observation that the Putin administration in Russia used a combination 
of coercion and channelling techniques to increase the capacity of the regime to both repress 
opposition protesters and to mobilise pro-government activists.285 We can see in this chapter 
that the three Southeast Asia regimes have pursued a similar approach through the legal 
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frameworks governing public assemblies. Both coercion and channelling are embedded  
characteristics of these domestic legal frameworks. As such, restrictions in these three hybrid 
regimes, similar to those in Russia, serve a different purpose than that established by IHRL 
(and as outlined in chapter 2).   
Evidence presented in this chapter shows that the legal frameworks in Cambodia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand share two similar characteristics: (1) providing overly broad legal grounds for the 
authorities to restrict freedom of assembly without requiring them to consider the strict test of 
necessity and proportionality, and (2) lacking adequate mechanisms of judicial review. The 
legal frameworks in these regimes provide opportunities for the police to exercise their 
discretion in a highly discriminatory manner. The incumbents are in turn able to rely on this 
feature to gain significant political advantage.  
I have argued in Chapter 3 that Robertson overlooked the role of legislation and actors 
governing public protests. This chapter shows that the legal framework governing public 
assembly is part of the strategy to defeat-proof the street – an aspect which Robertson had 
largely overlooked.286 Moreover, by examining the legal framework from Robertson’s 
perspective, we can see that these have been systematically crafted as a tool to control the level 
of mobilisation in hybrid regimes. This chapter has demonstrated that the three Southeast Asian 
hybrid regimes curtail opposition mobilisation through content-based restrictions, blanket bans, 
and notification requirements. When the grounds for restriction are broad, the authorities can 
easily impose restrictions to intimidate anti-regime protests. 
Content-based restrictions, blanket bans, and notification requirements greatly reduce the 
protection afforded by the right of peaceful assembly. These forms of restriction enable the 
authorities to apply highly coercive tactics. Content-based restrictions are tools to repel or 
channel anti-regime protesters away from sensitive issues. Blanket bans on time, place and 
manner provide legal grounds to restrict the scope of freedom of assembly. Notification 
requirements act as filters screening out serious anti-regime protests, as well as channelling 
them away from sensitive zones. With the combination of these three, we can conclude that 
laws governing public assemblies play an important role in shaping the exercise of the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly. The legal framework governing public assemblies determines 
how people mobilise and ought therefore to be a central factor in explaining a State’s 
 
286 Robertson (n 219) 11. 
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mobilisation strategy. The following chapter continues this analysis by focusing on the nature 
of public order policing in the three Southeast Asian hybrid regimes. 
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 Chapter 5 Public Order Policing  
in Hybrid Regimes 
The previous chapter has demonstrated that while legal frameworks in hybrid regimes might 
appear to guarantee freedom of assembly to all citizens, these legal frameworks also enable the 
hybrid regime incumbents to abuse this freedom. Furthermore, chapter 3 highlighted how the 
restrictions imposed on freedom of assembly and the degree of force used against protesters in 
hybrid regimes often depends on the political opportunities that the regime stands to gain from 
either mobilising or demobilising opposition groups. In other words, the incumbents’ political 
interest is the main factor determining whether public assemblies in hybrid regimes will be 
repressed or facilitated.  
This chapter seeks to further explain how public order policing in hybrid regimes differs from 
that in both consolidated democracies and authoritarian regimes. It aims to fill a gap in the 
existing literature on public order policing (noting too that relatively little attention is paid in 
social movement literature to the institutional factors that determine the nature of public order 
policing such as legislation, standards of conduct, policing strategies, mechanisms of internal 
and external control and the judiciary). It illustrates the common characteristics of police and 
public order policing in hybrid regimes: the lack of insulation from political influence and the 
divergence between the police’s cultural norms and international human rights norms.  As a 
result, the police instead ‘swing’ between democratic approach and authoritarian approach upon 
the incumbents’ signals.  
The first part of this chapter distinguishes constitutional policing from colonial era policing on 
the basis that police in hybrid regimes generally retain a colonial mentality – they see 
themselves as protectors of the realm rather than protectors of the people, owing allegiance to 
the rulers not their citizens. This mentality contrasts with the avowedly democratic values 
expressed in their constitutions and laws governing public assemblies. It also runs counter to 
the discernible trend in policing from a control-oriented approach to a service-oriented 
approach.1  
The second part of the chapter then discusses the different facets of the principle of ‘democratic 
policing’ – namely, the rule of law, legitimacy, transparency and accountability, and 
 
1 Organisation of Secruity and Co-operation in Europe, Guidebook on Democratic Policing (OSCE 
Secretariat 2008) 11. 
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subordination to civil authority. As in consolidated democracies, legal frameworks in hybrid 
regimes confer a certain level of discretion on the police. However, in the absence of a human 
rights culture and effective accountability mechanisms, this readily enables recourse to coercive 
force. As such, public order policing in hybrid regimes fails to align with the principle of 
‘democratic policing’. Indeed, the political leaders of hybrid regimes retain the capacity to 
manipulate the police to serve their political agendas and the option of police deployment to 
forcibly prevent or crackdown on public assemblies. Public order policing in hybrid regimes – 
where the principle of popular sovereignty has only been partly conceded – thus represents the 
last line of defence for the incumbent regime. Ultimately, this chapter argues that the principle 
of democratic policing is the key to creating and sustaining a democratic society, but that the 
police in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand retain high levels of discretion without effective 
institutional mechanisms for controlling police activity, enabling them to implement the law in 
a way that benefits the incumbent regime. 
 Characteristics of the police in hybrid regimes 
Drawing on the work of Robert Dahl,2 Feyzi Karabekir Akkoyunlu argues that hybrid regimes 
are ‘political systems built on two contesting sources of legitimacy – elitest and popular – and 
corresponding institutions of guardianship and democracy’.3 On this understanding, democratic 
institutions in hybrid regimes are not the only source of legitimacy: There are also non-
democratic institutions which provide a degree of legitimacy to political actors through their 
existence in history, tradition, religion or revolutionary ideology.4 For instance, in Thailand, 
the monarchy has been providing an alternative source of legitimacy for every successful coup 
since the country abolished the absolute monarchy. The military always claims its legitimacy 
from the palace rather than the citizens. Hybrid regime rulers often paint themselves as the 
guardians of the people. Their authority derives from quasi-guardianship institutions as much 
as from democratic institutions (which co-exist in parallel).5 This insight is also helpful for 
considering the source of police legitimacy. 
 
2 Dahl defined ‘guardians’ as ‘meritorious rulers …, quite likely a very small minority, … who are not 
subject to the democratic process’ (52) and regarded guardianship as the ‘most formidable rival’ to 
democracy (57). See, Robert A Dahl, Democracy and its critics (New Haven ; London : Yale University 
Press 1989) 52, 57. 
3 Feyzi Karabekir Akkoyunlu, 'The Rise and Fall of the Hybrid Regime : Guardianship and Democracy in 
Iran and Turkey' (Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science 2014) 19. 
4  ibid 35. 
5  ibid 40. 
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Della Porta and Reiter identify a number of factors that determine the nature of public order 
policing – namely, institutional variables, the configuration of political power, public opinion, 
the police occupational culture, the interaction with protesters, and police knowledge.6 Within 
these variables, it has been argued in this thesis that legal frameworks can significantly 
contribute to how police behave.7 Discussing the interaction between policing and political 
developments, Bayley emphasizes that we should not think of the police as merely passive 
agents shaped by their political environment.8 Rather and reflexively, police officers are 
themselves important actors who shape their political environment. 
As such, we can hypothesize that since a hybrid regime, as a system of government, is different 
from a democracy, police in a hybrid regime will also be organised and behave differently from 
police in a democracy. The police in hybrid regimes have the mixed characteristics of both 
democracy and authoritarianism. They behave democratically in one situation and can behave 
authoritatively in another similar situation. The police in consolidated democracies see their 
role as the protectors of human rights and democratic process because their institutional settings 
require them to perform such duty. They need to fulfill this obligation in order to thrive and 
become success in their career. In contrast, the police in hybrid regime need to be responsive 
to both the people and the incumbents. As hybrid regimes relies heavily upon the patronage 
relationships, the police bow to the incumbents to thrive.  
5.1.1 The police lack insulation from political influence 
The establishment of the modern police originated from the need to impose social order. The 
police had broad responsibility to oversee everything from economic and political conditions 
to civil life that might disturb the order of a community.9 As such, the history of policing is 
often regarded as being synonymous with the history of state power – with greater or lesser 
degrees of sophistication (the art of seeking to conserve/retain while all the while pretending 
 
6 Donatella Della Porta and Herbert Reiter (eds), Policing protest. the control of mass demonstrations in 
Western democracies (Social movements, protest, and contention: v 6, Minneapolis : University of 
Minnesota Press 1998) 9. 
7Della Porta and Reiter give an example from Italy, noting that although fascist ideology crumbled after the 
end of the war, Italian police continued to use coercive intervention to obstruct any popular protest 
because their legal frameworks allowed them to do so. Indeed, the Italian police continued to employ 
coercive policing styles until the law on meetings and demonstrations was enacted in 1983;  ibid at 11. 
8 David H. Bayley, The police and political development in India (Princeton University Press 1969) 12-13, 
409. 
9 Mark Neocleous, The fabrication of social order : a critical theory of police power (Pluto Press 2000) 3. 
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not to).10 Indeed, the police have been key players in preserving a hierarchical political order in 
many repressive authoritarian regimes.11 Policing during the period of colonisation provides a 
good example.  
The rulers of colonial territories had to decide whether to rule by coercion or by consent. 
Perhaps most obviously, we might contrast colonial and constitutional models of policing by 
observing the difference between the preparedness to use force. As law was a weapon to ensure 
the imperial rule, a compromised system of law was created to incorporate local practices while 
delegitimising others.12 Brogden explains how colonial police were forces belonging to the 
people but insulated from them and not governed by them.13 He observed that the form of 
control and their proximity to the military made colonial police officers more obedient to their 
rulers.14 First, it was necessary for the Governor of a colony to possess direct control over the 
police force. For example, police in Hong Kong and in the Indian provinces were under the 
control of civil officials who reported directly to the Governor. Such subordination 
arrangements were different from the English police whose local commanders and civil 
authorities were separate. Second, colonial police were in close proximity to the military. While 
the British police bore the notion of ‘the citizen-in-uniform’, the colonial police were more akin 
to the military. They often lived in barracks separated from local communities. In cases of 
emergency, they could be quickly mobilised to restore public order in other provinces or even 
conscripted to fight in armed conflicts. Therefore, colonial police structures were more similar 
to the military than the police structure in England. 
This colonial history of policing resonates with the geographic scope of this thesis. Colonial 
police became a common model of policing in Southeast Asia during the colonisation period – 
when most Southeast Asian countries were colonised by western powers. Malaysia was 
colonised by the British and Cambodia was annexed to the French Indochina. Although 
Thailand (Siam) was not colonised by any Western power, it was heavily influenced by 
European models.15 Police forces, legal systems, and bureaucratic systems in colonies usually 
 
10  ibid xi. 
11 In this regard, Neocleous notes Adam Smith’s observation that laws and government generally existed for 
the defence of the rich against the poor.  ibid 42. 
12 Mike Brogden, 'The emergence of the police—the colonial dimension' (1987) The British Journal of 
Criminology 4, 11. 
13  ibid, 10. 
14  ibid, 13. 
15 Siam avoided being colonised by reforming state organs and legal system after western powers, especially 
the British Empire on its western and southern front and the French Empire on its eastern front. In 1860, 
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focused on the defence and maintenance of the established rule rather than focusing on service-
oriented policing.16 As colonial ventures were profit-motivated, colonial police aimed to protect 
their masters’ interests and to maintain colonial domination. This perception continued after 
colonies gained independence. Even though some colonial police went through reforms, they 
continued to have the same perspective over their role and their powers. Police report directly 
to the rulers without sufficient democratic scrutiny and their organisational culture reflects that 
of the military. Regime incumbents in Southeast Asia succeeded in taking over their police 
force from the western powers without substantial reforms. I argue that the conception of law 
as a weapon to ensure imperial rule has been inherited by hybrid regime incumbents. Similarly, 
the police, which suppose (in a democracy) to protect civil freedoms and liberties, remain as 
the coercive arm of the state. Although constitutions in these hybrid regimes guarantee civil 
rights, their citizens are not protected in practice.  
By way of contrast, in democratic contexts, policing should be free from political pressures and 
accountable only to the law.17 The police have ‘positive obligations’ to protect the democratic 
process such as providing security for election processes, voters, and ballot boxes. Aitchison 
and Blaustein suggest that police officers should not be used as political tools to undermine 
democratic institutions.18 They note, however, that the dominant power may manipulate the 
police to create possibilities for external influence and intervention.19   
Historically, the broad duties of the police were subjected to the principle of the rule of law 
when liberal thinkers began to oppose the rule of police in the 1860s.20 In this regard, questions 
concerning the governance of policing have long been central to thinking about the role of legal 
constitutionalism in delimiting an appropriate balance between police powers and individual 
 
King Rama IV appointed a British, Sammoel Joseph Bird Ames, to modernise Siamese police after 
European police. At the beginning of the reform, police officers under Ames’s command were hired from 
British India and British Malaya. Hence, Thai police reform received heavy influence from British 
colonial police. 
16 Mahesh K Nalla and Chae Mamayek, 'Democratic policing, police accountability, and citizen oversight in 
Asia: an exploratory study' (2013) 14 Police Practice & Research 117, 121. 
17 Andy Aitchison and Jarrett Blaustein, 'Policing for democracy or democratically responsive policing? 
Examining the limits of externally driven police reform' (2013) 10 European Journal of Criminology 496 
499. 
18  ibid. 
19  ibid 502. 
20 Neocleous (n 9) 29-30, drawing on Kant’s argument that the existence of diverse views about the good 
ultimately compelled the sovereign to guarantee equality before the law so that individuals could freely 
pursue their own vision of happiness. This, in turn, required that the police power should be limited under 
the rule of law. 
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freedoms. However, a constitutional paradox arises – one that lies at the heart of this chapter. 
Conferring operational discretion on the police is needed to insulate the police from political 
influence and to enable them to effectively protect constitutional rights, but too much 
discretionary power (in the absence of robust safeguards) can contribute instead to the erosion 
of those same constitutional rights. This paradox of constitutional democracy ‘gives us reasons 
to reject some combinations of democracy and law while justifying others’.21 In terms of the 
balance to be achieved in public order policing, it is suggested in the following part that there 
is an international trend demanding that police shift from a control-oriented approach to 
service-oriented approach.  
5.1.2 The divergence between the cultural norms of the police and international human rights 
norms 
The second significant distinguishing characteristic of the police in hybrid regimes is the more 
marked disjuncture between their cultural norms, on one hand, and, on the other, international 
human rights norms and standards and democratic principles, more widely. The attainment of 
democratic policing became a goal for the international community after the end of the Cold 
War. Nations agreed to reform the police according to international human rights standards and 
democratic principles. This global agenda was led by developed countries and multilateral 
organisations such as the UN, the OSCE, and the EU.22 They introduced the notion of rights-
based policing to developing countries aiming to promote human rights awareness. For 
instance, article 2 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials adopted by UN 
General Assembly on 17 December 1979 states that: ‘in the performance of their duty, law 
enforcement officials shall respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the 
human rights of all persons.’ In other words, the protection of human rights became one of the 
core objectives of democratic policing. 
Earlier in this thesis (at 2.4), we saw that there are international standards on public order 
policing that arise from international human rights law (IHRL). In general, police are tasked 
with the responsibility to protect and to facilitate public assemblies. The past decade has seen 
a proliferation of international standards on public order policing: 
• The OSCE Guidebook on Democratic Policing (2nd edition) published in 2008.23 
 
21 Olson Kevin, 'Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy' (2007) 51 American Journal of Political Science 
330. 
22 David Bayley, 'Human rights in policing: a global assessment' (2015) 25 Policing and Society 540 
23 Organisation of Secruity and Co-operation in Europe, Guidebook on Democratic Policing (n 1). 
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• The OSCE Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (2nd edition) published in 
2010, elaborating on both procedural issues and implementing freedom of peaceful 
assembly legislation.24  
• The OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Human 
Rights Handbook on Policing Assemblies published in 2016 emphasising the police 
role in facilitating public assemblies and reaffirms the basic principles of democratic 
policing established by the 2008 Guidebook. 25  It holds that police must pursue 
objectives of democratic policing: ‘maintain law and order, protect and respect 
fundamental rights and freedom, prevent and combat crime, and provide assistance and 
service to the public’.26  
• The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published Resource Book 
on the Use of Force and Firearms in Law Enforcement in 2017. This contains a chapter 
outlining the international human rights framework regarding the policing of public 
assemblies and protest27, and suggests that the police can avoid violence and reduce the 
potential of disorder by getting support from participants through a ‘negotiated 
management approach’— an approach premised on the idea that is  more productive to 
work with crowds rather than against them.28 This requires the police to accept some 
of the disruptive effects of protest in exchange for the continuity of the peaceful nature 
of the assembly.29  
These international standards have served to guide police training and reform in consolidated 
democracies, urging a shift towards democratic policing (with a greater emphasis on human 
rights protection).  
Police in Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand lagged behind their peers in consolidated 
democracies, not keeping up with the newer public order policing standards and tactics, 
developments which, by the late 1990s, were argued as being no longer typified by a control-
oriented approach but by a service-oriented approach’.30 Most obviously this was denoted by a 
cultural shift. Police in consolidated democracies while responsive to the majority were duty-
bound at the same time to protect the human rights of individuals and minority groups, to ensure 
 
24 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 
(Second edn, ODIHR 2010) 17-21. 
25 Organisation of Secruity and Co-operation in Europe, Human Rights Handbook on Policing Assemblies 
(Poligrafus Jacek Adamiak 2016) 22. 
26  ibid 23. 
27 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Resource Book on the Use of Force and Firearms in Law Enforcement (United Nations 
2017) 106. 
28 ibid 114. 
29 ibid. 
30 Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe, Guidebook on Democratic Policing (n 1) 11; Della 
Porta D and Diani M, Social movements: an introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) 198. 
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that citizens can enjoy their freedom and liberty.31 In contrast, while most of the constitutions 
in hybrid regimes commit to the protection of human rights, they do not produce much 
substantial change in society.  
Fundamentally, law enforcement personnel in hybrid regimes do not see their role as the 
guarantor of human rights and democratic principles. Bayley has argued that police practices 
towards human rights protection in the developing world change too slowly because law 
enforcement personnel have not yet shown an acceptable level of commitment towards human 
rights.32 He suggests that the success of human rights reform relies on effecting change in the 
mindset of the police—‘that government is a public good not an opportunity for private 
advantage, that customary authority is not top-down rather than bottom-up and that national 
identity take precedence over subnational ones.’33 Building on these political imperatives, 
Bayley points out that any police reform to enhance human rights protection must work around 
the local customs and the historical and cultural settings.34 Therefore, the colonial policing 
mindset (that we discussed earlier) should be taken into consideration.    
In short, this section has illustrated that there are two characteristics that the police in hybrid 
regimes have in common: that the police are not insulated from political influence and there 
remains a mismatch between policing norms and the norms of international human rights 
standards and democratic principles. The coalescence of these two risks a damaging mix. Police 
in hybrid regimes have not yet adopted a service-oriented approach because they claim their 
legitimacy from more than one source. They still possess a colonial mentality and prioritise 
their duty to protect the realm over the duty to protect the rights of their people. While there 
has been a global agenda to move towards democratic policing, this has not resulted in changes 
in protest policing in hybrid regimes. Here, the police fail to see themselves either as the 
guarantors of human rights or the protectors of democratic principles. In order to identify why 
and how police in hybrid regimes fail to protect freedom of assembly, the next section examines 
in greater detail the different elements that policing scholars have elaborated as underpinning 
the principle of ‘democratic policing’. 
 
 
31 Nathan Pino  and Michael D Wiatrowski, Democratic policing in transitional and developing countries 
(Ashgate Pub. Co. 2006) 72. 
32 Bayley, 'Human rights in policing: a global assessment' (n 22) 543. 
33  ibid 545. 
34  ibid. 
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 Curtailing the scope of freedom of assembly through public order policing 
This chapter is premised on the observation that public order policing in hybrid regimes differs 
markedly from that in consolidated democracies. This is, in part, due to the non-democratic 
sources of police legitimacy (guardianship institutions, as discussed in 5.1) and the elite-driven 
nature of political contention. This thesis (in 3.4.2) has pointed out that while hybrid regime 
incumbents seek to keep political competition partly open, they also rely heavily upon 
restrictions on freedom of assembly to filter out significant threats emanating from the street. 
Hybrid regime incumbents are thus incentivised both to limit the ability of opponents to protest 
and to mobilise pro-regime supporters to display their dominance.35  This section seeks to 
establish that hybrid regimes curtail the right to freedom of assembly through the manipulation 
of public order policing. More specifically, public order policing in hybrid regimes alternates 
(or ‘swings’) between democratic and authoritarian styles because the concept of ‘democratic 
policing’ is missing.  
Let us unpack this concept a little further, Pino and Wiatrowski define ‘democratic policing’ as 
a policing concept that supports and is consistent with democratic values and human rights.36 
They explain that democratisation in emerging democracies was less successful because their 
police did not uphold the concept of democratic policing.37 Neild points out that police reforms 
must dismantle authoritarian structures and move from “regime policing” to “democratic 
policing”.38 Authoritarian leaders often see police as a quick fix and a tool to use coercive force 
to quell public disorder. In contrast, democratic leaders rather focus on maintaining a policing 
ethos that reflects the principle of ‘democratic policing’.39 In this light, the following section 
examines the deficits of public order policing in hybrid regimes in greater details by expanding 
on the concept of ‘democratic policing’ and its constituent elements, namely: the rule of law, 
legitimacy, transparency and accountability, and subordination to civil authority.40 It attempts 
 
35 Graeme B Robertson, The politics of protest in hybrid regimes. managing dissent in post-communist russia 
(New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011) 27. 
36 Pino and Wiatrowski (n 31) 73, 81. 
37 ibid 70. 
38 Rachel Neild, ‘Confronting a Culture of Impunity’ in Andrew Goldsmith and Colleen Lewis, Civilian 
Oversight of Policing : Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights (Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 2000) 
225. 
39 Pino and Wiatrowski (n 31) 69. 
40 ibid 83-87. 
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to demonstrate that the incumbents in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand subvert these 
principles to manipulate protest policing in their regimes. 
5.2.1 The rule of law  
According to Pino and Wiatrowski, the rule of law requires that laws and legal institutions are 
the products of the democratic process.41 Police activities are then carried out with due process 
and within the scope of the laws. Police are law enforcers, not judges. They must not adjudicate 
or punish. The rule of law directs that suspects must be prosecuted under fair trials and the 
police must not align themselves with political parties or with particular individuals. They must 
be answerable only to the law rather than to particular members of society. On the basis of this 
account, it can be argued that Pino and Wiatrowski’s conception of the principle of the rule of 
law conforms only to the formal conceptions of the rule of law (as elaborated further below). 
The rule of law, as a legal principle, has many different definitions. 42 In particular, it can be 
classified as either ‘formal’ or ‘substantive’.43  Formal conceptions focus on the law-making 
procedure. They are not concerned with assessing the merits or defects of any particular law 
but, rather, merely with justifying the law by examining whether certain formal precepts of the 
legislative process have been met.44 Raz, for example, observes that a non-democratic regime 
may meet the formal requirement of the rule of law without producing what might be termed 
“a good society”.45   In contrast, substantive conceptions of the rule of law take the view that 
good laws must go beyond these minimal characteristics espoused by the formalists. Laws must 
also comply with fundamental values such as justice, equality, and human rights. 
Both formal conceptions and substantive conceptions are imperfect. On the one hand, formal 
conceptions leave space for oppressive regimes to claim compliance with the rule of law. This 
risk is heightened because, as Thomas Carothers notes, ‘western policymakers and 
commentators have seized upon [the rule of law] as an elixir for countries in transition.’46 On 
 
41 ibid 83. 
42 Olufemi Taiwo, 'The rule of law: the new leviathan?' (1999) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
151, 154. 
43 Keith Syrett, The foundations of public law : principles and problems of power in the British constitution 
(2nd edn, Palgrave 2014) 54. 
44 Paul Craig, 'Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical framework' (1997) Public 
Law  467. 
45 Syrett (n 43) 55 citing J Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue' (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 195-196. 
46 Thomas  Carothers, 'The Rule of Law Revival' (1998) 77 Foreign Affairs 95, 99. some scholars embraced 
the rule of law as the ‘signal virtue of civilized societies’. See, Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the rule 
of law : a theory of legal reasoning (Law, state, and practical reason, Oxford : Oxford University Press 
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this basis, Rajagopal argues that governments prefer the term ‘rule of law’ over the term ‘human 
rights’ because the former ‘is much more empty of content and capable of being interpreted in 
many diverse, sometimes contradictory, ways’.47 Hence, formal conceptions of the rule of law 
could operate to camouflage mere ‘rule by law’. On the other hand, substantive conceptions 
run the risk of falling into a broader question of what constitutes a good society. Craig argues 
that the substantive conceptions of the rule of law are meaningless because they simply 
reproduce the conclusions of the political theory to which it attaches.48 For example, in many 
Western democracies, liberalism is commonly regarded as providing the ideological template 
for a good society.49 Liberalism, in turn, yields its own substantive definitions of the rule of law 
(which might include the promulgation of laws that seek to achieve the accommodation of 
diversity within society).50 In other places, where political philosophies are different, the rule 
of law is understood differently.  
Hybrid regimes might be regarded as following the most formal conceptions of the rule of law. 
The rule of law in hybrid regimes appears, at least to the Western liberal democracies, as “rule 
by law”—where power is simply exercised via positive law.51 It matters not whether the law – 
and its implementation through protest policing – can be said to promote certain civic values or 
human rights. Instead, the minimalist requirements of the rule of law can be satisfied as long as 
the police formally adhere to the duly enacted laws. Where these laws in turn reflect the long-
term parliamentary dominance of the incumbent regime (rather than the popular will of the 
people), the rule of law then becomes a vehicle for tyranny, and Public Assembly Acts (PAAs) 
inevitably fail to protect the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.   
The PAAs in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand were enacted with very little public 
participation. The parliamentary representatives in these countries are politically subordinate 
to the executive branch and do not possess any real power – they act merely as a rubber-stamp.52 
Thailand’s Public Assembly Bill went through the National Assembly, in which all its members 
 
2005) 12. 
47 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, 'Invoking the rule of law in post-conflict rebuilding: a critical examination' 
(2008) William and Mary Law Review 1347, 1359. 
48 Craig (n 44) 468. 
49 Syrett (n 43) 57. 
50 Duncan Ivison, 'Pluralism and the Hobbesian logic of negative constitutionalism' (1999) 47 Political 
Studies 83 89. 
51 Christopher May, The rule of law : the common sense of global politics (Edward Elgar 2014) 45. 
52 Rory Truex, 'The Returns to Office in a "Rubber Stamp" Parliament' (2014) 108 The American Political 
Science Review 235 
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were appointed by the military. Although the Thai PAA states that its enactment was to set out 
clear rules and regulations to enable the freedom of assembly under the ICCPR53, there was no 
public participation in making this law. Seventeen out of twenty-two Sub-Legislative 
Committee Members in charge of reviewing the bill were either police officers or soldiers. 
During its hearing procedure, only the government agencies and the representative of the courts 
participated in the committee’s inquiry.54 The Thai PAA fulfils the formal conceptions version 
of the rule of law by limiting the freedom of assembly through a law which was enacted by the 
parliament. However, its legislative process lacked any democratic scrutiny. The PAA was 
enacted by unelected legislators and there was no public participation during the enacting 
process. Hence, it does not reflect the popular view of the people on the enjoyment of freedom 
of assembly. 
Similarly, it took the Cambodian Parliament only three days to debate the law on peaceful 
demonstrations.55 The law was passed quickly with affirmative votes of 76 out of 101. The bill 
lacked public participation, especially form the civil society actors. Cheam Yeap, an MP from 
the CCP (the main political party), made a comment (illustrating the finality of formal legal 
enactments): ‘if the opposition is elected, they can make amendments [to the law]’.56 The CCP 
has been one of the longest-ruling parties in the world. Yeap’s comment reflects the most formal 
conception of the rule of law – the rule of law in Cambodia means the rule of law that is 
designed by the CCP. The opposition has no other option but to bow to the legal framework.57 
In Malaysia, when the Bersih movement gained momentum in the 2010s, the government 
proposed the Peaceful Assembly Bill to contain challenges from the streets. Whiting 
emphasises that parliamentary scrutiny of legislation in Malaysia is inadequate because the 
opposition has a very short period to examine the bills in order to prepare questions or suggest 
 
53 Public Assembly Act 2015 (Thailand PAA) annotation. 
54 National Assembly, ‘Report of the Public Assembly Bill Committee’ [รายงานของ คณะกรรมาธิการวิสามัญ
พิจารณาร่างพระราชบญัญัติการชุมนุมสาธารณะ พ.ศ.... ] <https://ilaw.or.th/sites/default/files/d050158-10.pdf> 
accessed 2 November 2017. 
55 Eang Mengleng, 'National Assembly Passes Demonstration Law Limiting Demonstrations' (Cambodia 
Daily, 22 October 2009) <https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/national-assembly-passes-
demonstration-law-limiting-demonstrations-93131/> accessed 28 February 2018. 
56  ibid. 
57  Astrid  Norén-Nilsson, 'Cambodia democracy on the ropes' (East Asia Forum, 5 November 2017) 
<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/11/05/cambodian-democracy-on-the-ropes/> accessed 1 March 
2018. 
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any meaningful amendment.58 The debate on the bill took only a few hours and it was passed 
into law without substantive scrutiny because the opposition protested the bill by a walkout.59 
Although one could argue that it is normal that the government, under the Westminster model, 
has the capacity to force its legislative agenda through the lower house with its majority, the 
Malaysian parliamentary committees do not operate thorough investigation and analysis. In 
practice, after the second reading, the whole house of the Dewan Rakyat is converted to a 
committee to review the bill. The process is rushed with little opportunity for substantial 
debates. Whiting notes that there was not any parliamentary standing committee whose duty 
was to effectively scrutinise bills in order to make sure that they aligned with the existing 
legislation and international law.60  
When the substantive rule of law is absent from the legislative process (and the mechanism of 
enforcement), public order policing in these three hybrid regimes reflect a formalistic 
understanding of the letter of the law. Even strict adherence by the police to the rule of law in 
its formal conception is not without difficulties for protesters. Rigid enforcement of everyday, 
ordinary laws – or their use as a means to quash or dampen protests – is a mark of public order 
policing in hybrid regimes. That is not to say it does not occur elsewhere but its scale and 
preponderance (in combination with other characteristics identified in this chapter) mark the 
difference. Such ordinary laws offer the police greater latitude if used without any appreciation 
of the political context within which protest necessarily occurs. For example, Thai police apply 
the PAA in conjunction with other laws such as the Cleanliness and Tidiness of the Country 
Act, the Land Traffic Act, the Highway Act to arrest key organisers or harass participants, 
without considering lex specialis (special laws ought to take preference over general laws), to 
impose petty fines. Although these laws do not impose harsh penalties on the violators, it 
provides opportunities for the authorities to arrest key protesters and to discourage anyone from 
expressing their opinion. Consequently, the law creates a chilling effect among the protesters 
and hinders the freedom of assembly.61 These tactics are effective in removing organisers and 
 
58 Amanda Whiting, 'Emerging from Emergency Rule? Malaysian Law 'Reform' 2011-2013' (2013) 14 
Australian Journal of Asian Law 1 39. 
59 ibid. 
60 ibid. 
61iLaw, ‘364 วันหลังรัฐประหาร : ประมวลสภานการณ์เสรีภาพในการแสดงออก’ <http://freedom.ilaw.or.th/en/node/240>  
accessed 29 December 2015. 
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leading figures from protest sites.62 Sirawit’s Post-it protest (discussed below) clearly illustrates 
such tactics. 
On 1 May 2016, Sirawit organised a public gathering on a walkway adjunct to a Skytrain station 
(BTS) calling the government to release a political prisoner. Around a hundred participants 
came to write their political messages on Post-its and stick them to the station’s wall. 63  During 
the gathering, Sirawit was surrounded by policemen. Then, he threw Post-it papers to other 
participants and asked them to write their messages. He was arrested and sent to a nearby police 
station. After detaining him for several hours, the police fined him for littering. The police 
invoked only the Cleanliness and Tidiness of the Country Act. The Court of the First Instance 
found him guilty under the Cleanliness and Tidiness of the Country Act B.E. 2535 and ruled 
that he could have given out the post-its by hand rather than throwing them.64  As such, the 
court ruled that Sirawit had the intention to litter since there was no expectation that the 
participants would collect the post-its left behind. Later, the Appeal Court reaffirmed the 
sentence. In this case, the police successfully stopped the gathering by detaining the organiser. 
The Court of Justice adhered to a purely formal conception of the rule of law by applying 
formulaic understandings of ‘littering’ (under the Cleanliness and Tidiness of the Country Act) 
without also giving any consideration to the question of whether substantive human rights 
(specifically, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly) were engaged, interfered with or 
violated. The Court in Sirawit’s case failed to consider that Sirawit was intimidated by many 
police officers surrounding him. It was the police’s interference that caused Sirawit to throw 
Post-it papers to others.  
This rigid application of law is a hallmark of public order policing. It is not always the case – 
as we shall see – but that brings with it claims of inconsistency, arbitrariness and uncertainty, 
oftentimes as damaging to the exercise of the right to protest as draconian enforcement because 
of the unpredictability of the police response. 
During the same event, Titari, a participant in Sirawit’s gathering, was arrested and detained 
for five hours at the local police station and finally fined her under the same Act for 
 
62  These tactics are also common even in consolidated democracies. However, the difference is that 
consolidated democracies have much better access to effective judicial review comparing to authoritarian 
regimes.  Amory Starr, Luis A. Fernandez and Christian Scholl, Shutting down the streets : political 
violence and social control in the global era (New York University Press 2011) 86. 
63 Prachatai, 'อุทธรณ์ยืนสั่งปรับ 'จ่านิว' 1,000 กรณีแจกโพสตอ์ิทให้คนเขียนรณรงค ์ผิด พ.ร.บ.ความสะอาดฯ' (ประชาไท, 3 
October 2017) <https://prachatai.com/journal/2017/10/73529> accessed 24 October 2017. 
64 Bangkok South Municipal Court No. 1619/2559. 
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unauthorised advertising by flyposting. However, the Court of the First Instance found Titari 
not guilty. The Court saw that her action was political expression rather than an illegal 
flyposting.65 Despite being arrested at the same event by the same group of police officers, these 
two cases were decided by different reasoning. To me, both Titari’s and Sirawit’s actions were 
the same political expression. In my opinion, Sirawit’s case was even more politically 
motivated because he had organised many anti-military protests while Titari was only a 
participant Sirawit’s activity. These two cases demonstrate that the different conception of the 
rule of law leads to contradicting precedents.         
The tactic of invoking the ordinary criminal laws to remove protest leaders has also been used 
in environmental protests. On 27 November 2017, a group of anti-coal protesters submitted a 
notification of their demonstration to the local police, but the police responded by stating that 
their demonstration was illegal because their notice did not meet the 24-hour requirement. 
However, the protesters continued with their plan. The march had been peaceful until they met 
a police cordon where police and soldiers used force to disperse the gathering. 66 Police arrested 
some protesters and detained them on charges of resisting arrest, injuring state officers, 
obstructing traffic, carrying weapons (flagpoles) in public areas.67 At the time of their arrests, 
charges were made under the Highway Act, the Land Traffic Act, and the Penal Code without 
regarding the concept of lex specialis.68  These protesters were brought to a police station and 
detained for a night.69 In contrast, on the same day, the Regional Army sent an invitation to the 
press in Songkhla to report about a public assembly supporting Thepa coal power plant project 
in front of the district office. 70 It was clear that the authorities applied a double standard in this 
 
65 Bangkok South Municipal Court No. 1620/2559. 
66  Thai PBS, '16 coal-fired power plant protester prosecuted' (Thai PBS, 13 January 2018) 
<http://englishnews.thaipbs.or.th/16-coal-fired-power-plant-protesters-prosecuted/> accessed 5 March 
2018. 
67  cf Bukta and Others v Hungary, Kudrevičius and others v Lithuania, and Oya Ataman v Turkey – the 
ECtHR has established that a failure to comply with the notification alone does not justify a dispersal as 
long as the assembly remained peaceful.    
68 Teeranai Charuvastra, 'Coal protesters face prison after police scuffle' (Khaosod, 28 November 2017) 
<http://www.khaosodenglish.com/politics/2017/11/28/coal-protesters-face-prison-police-scuffle-
photos/> accessed 5 March 2018. 
69
 Later, on 27 December 2018, Songkhla Provincial Court acquitted all the participants but fined two 
organisers for failing to notify the police under the PAA. See Songkhla Provincial Court Black 
No.115/2561, 12 January 2018. 
70 Khaosod, 'จ้ีหยดุเลือกปฏิบติักลุ่มตา้นโรงไฟฟ้าเทพา [Stop using double stadards agaist anti-Thepa Power Plant]' 
27 November 2017) <https://www.khaosod.co.th/politics/news_648145> accessed 5 March 2018. 
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conflict. While the anti-coal power plant protesters were arrested, the local authorities explicitly 
mobilised and facilitated the power plant’s supporters.  
That illustrates very well the manipulation of the same law for different political ends. That 
lack of the understanding of the substantive rule of law is further betrayed when the police 
routinely apply double standards in enforcing the 24-hours prior notification requirement. 
While anti-military government protesters and environment protesters were arrested or 
dispersed on the ground of no-notification, the regime supporters, especially those who 
organised assemblies when the prime minister made his regional visits, have never been 
dispersed or arrested on the spot on the same ground – even when a public assembly clearly 
violated the notification requirement and assembled on the prohibited area. For example, on 1 
February 2018, a group of pro-regime supporters organised a public assembly in front of the 
Defense Ministry to show their supports for the Deputy Prime Minister who was accused of 
corruption.71  The police did not arrest them on the spot but rather detained and prosecuted the 
organisers four days later, after several anti-regime activists called it a double standard. The 
Dusit Municipality Court fined them for assembling on a prohibit area.72 The public prosecutor 
did not even raise the issue relating to no-prior-notification. In my opinion, had the organisers 
submitted a notification, the police would have an opportunity to stop the picketing before it 
happened. Therefore, this is still another double standard in enforcing the prior-notification 
requirements.     
Turning to Cambodia, the most formal conception of the rule of law is illustrated by the 
contrasting nature of the Cambodian PAA and Cambodian public order policing in practice. 
The PAA was enacted with an aim to assure freedom of expression of Khmer citizens through 
peaceful assembly.73 The implementation guide to the Law on Peaceful Assembly makes a 
reference to the right of peaceful assembly under the ICCPR.74 It states that the implementing 
authorities shall have the duty to adhere to the principles such as having a presumption in favour 
of holding peaceful demonstrations, having appropriate restrictions, non-discrimination, and 
 
71 Asaree Thairakulpanich, 'Don't resigh, plead Prawit Wongsuwan Fans (VIDEO)' (Khaosod, 1 February 
2018) <http://www.khaosodenglish.com/politics/2018/02/01/dont-resign-plead-prawit-wongsuwan-
fans-video/> accessed 22 July 2019. 
72 Khaosod, 'ปรับ 3 พนั แท็กซ่ีชูป้ายเชียร์ 'บ๊ิกป้อม' หนา้กลาโหม' (Khaosod, 5 February 2018) 
<https://www.khaosod.co.th/politics/news_739307> accessed 22 July 2019. 
73 Law on Peaceful Assembly 2009 (Cambodia PAA) s2. 
74  Ministry of Interior, 'Implementation Guide to the Law on Peaceful Demonstration' 
<http://cambodia.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Implementation_Guide-Rev_Eng.pdf> accessed 2 
November 2017. 
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being flexible when dealing with demonstrations.75 In contrast, the authorities routinely use 
excessive force to disperse public assemblies.76  
The lack of the understanding of the substantive rule of law can be seen again when the 
government takes steps to repress grassroots protesters.77 Those who joined protests or invited 
others to join demonstrations were charged on the ground of inciting people to unrest.78As a 
government offensive tactic, there were as many as 306 protesters arrested in 2010. Around 
half of them were released on bail after a period of detention.79  Arrests and detentions were 
aimed to scare protesters and to suppress criticism.80  Such tactic made land activists avoided 
using the term ‘protest’ to describe their social movements on the street.81 In 2010, despite 
being a member of the parliament, Sam Rainsy was sentenced, in absentia, to two years 
imprisonment after he led a political protest in which border markers between Cambodia and 
Vietnam were uprooted.82 He was accused of inciting villagers to uproot the marker along the 
border. It was clear that Rainsy’s case was politically motivated in order to crack down on the 
opposition leader.83   
Even assembling in a designated area like in the Freedom Park in Phnom Penh does not protect 
protesters from policing intervention. In July 2014, numbers of participants in anti-government 
demonstrations were arrested and charged with criminal offences at the Freedom Park.84 The 
protests went peacefully until the park’s security guards tried to remove a banner hung by the 
opposition party, the CNRP. Three CNRP leaders were arrested on the ground of involvement 
in the violence. Seven CNRP’s lawmakers were arrested and detained for several days on the 
 
75  ibid. 
76 LICADHO, The Danger of Dissent: Attacks on Human Rights Defenders (2017); Ministry of Interior, 
'Implementation Guide to the Law on Peaceful Demonstration' 3-6-4. 
77 Steve Heder, 'Cambodia in 2010 Hun Sen's Further Consolidation' (2011) 51 Asian Survey 208, 211. 
78 Chi Mgbako and others, 'Forced Eviction and Resettlement in Cambodia: Case Studies from Phnom Penh' 
(2010) 9 Wash U Global Stud L Rev 39, 56. 
79  May Titthara, 'Over 300 land protesteors charged this year' (Phom Penh Post, 30 December 2010) 
<http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/over-300-land-protestors-charged-year> accessed 25 
September 2017. 
80 Mgbako and others (n 78) 43. 
81  Tim  Frewer, 'Land and Conflict in Cambodia' (New Mandala, 6 January 2012) 
<http://www.newmandala.org/land-and-conflict-in-cambodia/> accessed 25 September 2017. 
82 Associated Press, 'Cambodia: Opposition Leader Convicted in Absentia' (New York Times, 23 September 
2010) <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/world/asia/24briefs-Cambodia.html> accessed 25 
September 2017. 
83  BBC, 'Cambodia issues Sam Rainsy arrest warrant' (BBC, 1 January 2010) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8436851.stm> accessed 25 September 2017. 
84 Amnesty International, Taking to the Streets Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Cambodia (Amnesty 
International Ltd 2015) 105. 
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ground of ‘insurrection’. The CNRP later condemned the government of arrest and detention 
to intimidate and threaten the CNRP for political gain.85 Amnesty International reported that 
cases related to politically motivated detainees such as human rights defenders and political 
opposition activists are ‘routinely resolved through political negotiations between the CPP and 
CNRP’.86 If successful, they would be released on bail, given suspended sentences or a Royal 
Pardon, or a combination of the three. These examples show that the Cambodian PAA, although 
has an objective to protect freedom of assembly, has failed to adequately guide public order 
policing.  
In Malaysia, the most formal conception of the rule of law is reflected in the PAA. The 
Malaysian PAA, until 4 July 2019,  explicitly banned any street protest – ‘an open-air assembly 
which begins with a meeting at a specified place and consists of walking in a mass march or 
rally for the purpose of objecting to or advancing a particular cause or causes.’87 The absence 
of substantive rule of law in public order policing is demonstrated when the police apply the 
domestic law without having to consider the international standards. In 2012, three Bersih 
movements leaders Anwar Ibrahim, Azmin Ali, and Badru Hisham Shahrin were charged on 
the ground of organising a street protest, assembling illegally, and disobeying an order duly 
promulgated by a police officer.88 Later, the government and the KL City Hall launched civil 
lawsuits against these Bersih leaders to make them responsible for the clean-up cost and 
damages caused by the crowd.89 This could be seen as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 
Participation (SLAPP) to bankrupt the Bersih organisers. Apart from the PAA, the Malaysian 
police can initiate several laws to arbitrarily arrest protesters and silence political dissenters (as 
discussed at 4.2.2): Sedition Act, The Printing Presses and Publication Act, the Official Secrets 
Act, the University and University Colleges Act, the Police Act, and the Society Act. Without 
considering the substantive rule of law, the police exercise their discretion to detain protest 
organisers and participants. 90  
The examples presented above illustrate that the inadequacy of the substantive rule of law in 
public order policing across Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The PAAs in these three 
 
85 Radio Free Asia, 'Three Cambodian Opposition Leaders Held Over Freedom Park Protests' 2 August 2014) 
<http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/court-08022014213824.html> accessed 25 September 
2017. 
86 Amnesty International, Courts of Injustice Suppressing Activisim Through the Criminal Justice System in 
Cambodia (Amnesty International Ltd. 2017) 10. 
87 Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 (Malaysia PAA). 
88 Whiting (n 58) 13. 
89 ibid 14. 
90 ibid 5. 
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regimes were enacted and enforced under the most formal conception of the rule of law. When 
the police in these regimes have adhere to their former colonial mentality and not culturally 
attuned to international human rights standards ( as discussed above at 5.1), they perform their 
duties according to the rule by law rather than the rule of law –they all claim compliance with 
the rule of law (in the sense of the most formal conceptions) but fail to facilitate and protect 
freedom of assembly to everyone equally.  
5.2.2 Legitimacy  
Legitimacy might be seen as comprised within the rule of law or at least a function of and 
generated by adherence to it. Nevertheless, Pino and Wiatrowski’s focus on the principle in the 
context of democratic policing is on ‘the source of legitimacy’. This section follows that 
analysis, locating it within a discussion of the legitimacy of public order policing in hybrid 
regimes. It argues that authorities in hybrid regimes can switch between alternative source of 
legitimacy to empower them to use excessive force against protesters. Normally, they seek 
legitimacy from rational-legal authority like those in consolidated democracies. When they 
need more power, i.e. to employ excessive force, they seek legitimacy from the guardian 
institutions which possess traditional authority or charismatic authority, in the Weberian sense.        
Legitimacy, according to Pino and Wiatrowski, is ‘the perception that those exercising authority 
are doing so in accordance with the defined purpose of a social institution or law’.91 Where 
such institutions are perceived as legitimate, people tend to comply willingly when they are 
directed to do so. As a result, the authority is less likely to use excessive force against the 
people. 92 On this issue, Weber has suggested earlier that legitimacy leads to obedience as a 
person believe that ‘the person giving orders has the right to do so’.93 He identified the three 
ideal types of legitimate authority: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal.94 First, the 
traditional authority, such as an absolute monarchy, is based on a belief in tradition and 
practices passed on from previous generations. Second, the charismatic authority is based on 
the special characteristics of an individual leader such as a religious prophet or a populist 
dictator.95 The third, and last legal authority, is based on laws and regulations. Weber has argued 
 
91 Pino and Wiatrowski (n 31) 84. 
92 ibid. 
93 William Brett, Jason Xidias and Tom McClean, An analysis of Max Weber's Politics as a vocation 
(Routledge 2017) 40. 
94 M Weber and others, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (University of California 
Press 1978) 215-216. 
95 Brett, Xidias, and McClean (n 93). 
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that the mix of charismatic and legal-rational authority is the key to becoming a great leader in 
a modern state. 96 Hybrid regime incumbents not only seek legitimacy from the mixed use of 
charisma, and rational-legal authority, but they also rely heavily on traditional forms of 
authority.  
The argument being propounded here is that public order policing in hybrid regimes is not 
always easy to conceive of as legitimate for three reasons, taken cumulatively: claims are made 
to non-rational-legal authority; the police too easily resort to excessive force; and there is an 
over-reliance on executive emergency powers. Legitimacy in public order policing in hybrid 
regimes can come from all three types of authority. This thesis shows (above at 3.2.2.2) that 
democracies routinise collective actions through legal frameworks to ensure that public 
assemblies broadly support and enrich the democratic process. IHRL and international 
standards also attempts to standardise public order policing practices. Hence, in light of 
Weber’s tripartite classification of authority, democracies claim legitimacy in public order 
policing primarily through rational-legal authority. In contrast, the authorities in hybrid regimes 
switch between the three grounds of authority. They switch to traditional or charismatic 
authority to claim the legitimacy beyond the limit of rational-legal authority (which has 
incorporated international standards on public assemblies). Authorities in consolidated 
democracies are bound by international standards and IHRL.97 Both the judiciary and the 
parliament actively review government actions. In hybrid regimes, there are also the judiciary 
and the parliament to review the use of force to disperse public assemblies, but they are 
incapable of scrutinising the government. This lack of scrutiny reflects extended claims to 
legitimacy based in tradition and charisma. 
In Thailand, when a protest becomes critical of the regime, the authorities seek legitimacy from 
the guardian institution to forcefully disperse the protest by initiating emergency laws –often 
without properly justifying all the requirements before derogating from the ICCPR (discussed 
at 2.4.5). However, it is common to see Thai authorities assign the military to assist the police, 
or even to take over public order policing tasks.98 In doing so, the use of lethal firearms to 
 
96 ibid. 
97 The Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials Adopted by the 
Eight United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 
Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990, Principle 12-14: using force or firearms shall be avoided or be 
used only to the minimum extent. The use of firearms in the case of dispersing violent assemblies shall 
be applied only when less dangerous means are not practicable. 
98 There is a sharp contrast between the police dispersal operation on 7 October 2008 in front of the 
Parliament where police did not use lethal weapons and the military dispersal operation on 18 May 2010 
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control the situation becomes somehow more ‘legitimate’. The Police Handbook on the Public 
Assembly Act states that officers must attempt to negotiate to deescalate the situation before 
using reasonable force according to the principle of proportionality and necessity.99 Officers 
must avoid using force, crowd control instruments, or weapon unless it is necessary; force must 
be used only to the minimum extent in light of the particular circumstances (similar conditions 
as described in principle 9 of the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Official). However, these duties and guidelines apply to the police only. There is 
not any specific guideline on public order policing by the military. The military has a different 
view on public order policing.  
The military, as the guardian institution, has been a tool to disperse public assemblies with 
lethal force.100 Despite many violent crackdowns, no senior military officer has ever been 
sentenced by the judiciary for using excessive force. The Red-shirt crackdown in 2010 clearly 
shows that the government transferred public order policing to the military and handed down a 
new rule of engagement allowing security forces to use lethal weapons.101 The authority 
depicted protesters as armed terrorists. 102 The Internal Security Act 2008 (ISA) and Emergency 
Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation 2005 provide legitimate means to use 
the military to suppress political protests. Then, the military deployed sniper squads and 
armoured vehicles to disperse protesters causing deaths and injuries to many unarmed 
protesters.       
Prior to the enactment of the Thai PAA, legitimacy in public order policing came from the 
Emergency Decree. The Decree allows the authorities to ban any political gathering regardless 
 
at Rajaprasong. In the later operation, the military was authorized to used life-rounds including light-
tanks to disperse protesters. See  Robert Horn, 'On Bangkok's Bloody Streets, a Crackdown Breaks 
Protests' (Time, 19 May 2010) <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1990184,00.html> 
accessed 22 July 2019. 
99 The Royal Thai Police, Public Assembly Act B.E.2558 Handbook (2015) 81. 
100  cf The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (n 27) 106. 
101 Human Rights Watch, 'Descent into Chaos Thailand’s 2010 Red Shirt Protests and the Government 
Crackdown' 3 May 2011) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/03/descent-chaos/thailands-2010-red-
shirt-protests-and-government-crackdown> accessed 24 August 2016. 
102 Later, the Court of Justice has ruled that the protesters in the 2010 crackdown were rioters not terrorists: 
Civil Court judgment Black No. ผ บ .4326/54 (1 March 2013); Supreme Court judgment Black No. 
8132/2561 (30 April 2019). 
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of the degree of violence an assembly may pose. 103 Between 2009-2015, there were nine events 
that led the government to declare a “controlled zone” under the Internal Security Act (ISA) to 
restrict the freedom of assembly. 104 By invoking the ISA, the Prime Minister can set up an 
Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) to oversee security issues and enforce curfews, 
direct traffic and prohibit the movement of people. The ISA offers a means to impose special 
security measures without having to declare a state of emergency. The main incentive for its 
invocation was ‘to give the government heightened powers to deal with any unrest’.105  During 
the Red-shirt protests between 29 August 2009 and 20 April 2010, the ISA was invoked 5 
times.106 Between November 2012 and April 2014, the Yingrak administration invoked the ISA 
three times to restrict Yellow-shirt protests. The Emergency Decree on Public Administration 
in Emergency Situations 2005 was seen, by both the Red-shirt government and Yellow-shirt 
government, as a common tool to contain public assemblies. Thupthong and Pankaew have 
pointed out that, if the insurgencies in the Southern most provinces of the country are excluded, 
political protests were the only reason that led to the declaration of an emergency situation 
under the Emergency Decree.107  
The International Commission of Jurists commented when the Decree was declared that the 
Prime Minister and delegated officials can exercise the state power that ‘go beyond the limited 
and proportionate response to a grave threat to the life of the nation, envisaged by Article 4, 
 
103 Sarawut  Thupthong, 'Thai State and the Extertion of Authority in Emergency Situation: A Case Study of 
the Declaration of Emergency Decree on Public Adminstration in Emergency Situation A.D. 2005 from 
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104  Reuters, 'Thai protesters force Asia summit cancellation' (11 April 2009) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-summit/thai-protesters-force-asia-summit-cancellation-
idUSTRE53A06H20090411> accessed 13 September 2017. 
105 Legacy Phuket Gazzette, 'ASEAN meeting: Internal Security Act to be imposed for 15 days' (1 July 2009) 
<https://www.phuketgazette.net/phuket-news/Asean-meeting-Internal-Security-Act-be-imposed-15-
days> accessed 13 September 2017. 
106 iLaw, 'เก็บอาวุธทหาร: ยกเลิกกฎหมายความมั่นคง [confiscate soilders' weapons: withdraw security laws] ' 
(2012) <https://ilaw.or.th/node/273> accessed 13 September 2017. 
107 Sarawut  Thupthong and Attasit  Pankaew, 'ระบบกฎหมายความมัน่คง ขอ้เสนอแนะส าหรับการปฏิรูปโครงสร้างและ
องค์กรในการใช้อ านาจตามหลักธรรมาภิบาลภาคความมั่นคง [Security Law System: Some Guidelines for the 
Reform of the Structures and Organisations that Exercise the Power in Accordance with Security Sector 
Governanace]' (2015) 34 Thammasart University Journal 79; Sarawut  Thupthong, สถานการณ์ฉุกเฉินและ
ความรุนแรง : ศึกษาความเหมาะสมส าหรับการควบคุมและจดัการการชุมนุมประทว้งของภาครัฐในช่วง พ.ศ. 2552-2553 
ผา่นหลกันิติรัฐ [The state of emergency and violence : a study on the appropriate measures for controlling 
and managing mass demonstrations in 2009-2010] (Thammasat University 2014) 107. 
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ICCPR.’108 The Commission expressed the view that there were at least three aspects of 
Thailand’s emergency laws that weaken the rule of law in Thailand: 109 First, definitions and 
provisions under the laws are vaguely defined which offer opportunities for law enforcement 
officials to criminalise a wide range of behaviours (even if they do not pose any demonstrable 
security threat). Second, fundamental rights are at risk of being violated due to the historical 
fragility of Thailand’s legal institutions and the frequent interventions of the military. Last, the 
emergency laws confer substantial discretion upon the security forces which undermines the 
principle of civilian authority.110     
Between 2015-2018, the source of the legitimacy for public order policing was a mixed between 
the Junta’s orders and the PAA.  The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) released 
the Order No.3/2558 prohibiting any political gathering of five or more persons imposing a 
penalty up to six-month imprisonment. Under this Order, the military has the power to detain 
protesters up to seven days before transferring the detainee(s) to police. In 2015, it enacted the 
PAA aiming to set a standard for public order policing. However, the military government did 
not revoke the NCPO Order 3/2558. The NCPO continued to prosecute political protesters 
under both the PAA and the NCPO Order 3/2558. There were more protesters prosecuted under 
the NCPO Order during the first two years of the military rule. 111 For example, on 21 September 
2017, organisers and participants of an academic seminar were charged under NCPO Order 
No.3/2558 because they affixed a poster in the conference room displaying: ‘an academic stage 
is not a military camp’. Their arrests created a chilling effect among academics and represented 
a clear challenged the principle of academic freedom.112  
It is worth noting that under the NCPO Order, arrested protesters were prosecuted in the 
Military Court, casting yet further doubt on claims to legitimacy. This means that the NCPO 
created a means to use the Military Court to selectively prosecute political dissenters. This 
procedure runs parallel to the normal procedures of the Court of Justice. Furthermore, the 
judiciary does not have the authority to review the NCPO Order because the Thai constitution 
 
108 International Commission of Jurists, The Implementation of Thailand's Emergency Decree, July 2017 
(2010) ii, 7. 
109 International Commission of Jurists, Thailand's Interal Security Act: Risking the Rule of Law? (2010) ii. 
110  ibid. 
111 Prachatai, 'กลไกการควบคุมเสรีภาพในการแสดงออกภายใต้ระบอบ คสช. [ the NCPO's Mechanism limiting 
freedom of expression] ' (Prachatai, 18 February 2018) <https://prachatai.com/journal/2018/02/75504> 
accessed 3 March 2018. 
112 On 25 December 2018, Chiang Mai Municipal Court acquitted these five academics because the NCPO 
Order 3/2558 was lifted.     
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contains an amnesty provision that makes all NCPO Orders legitimate.113 The authorities 
benefit from this provision because it guarantees impunity for human rights violations 
committed by the military regime and provides bureaucratic-legitimacy for public order 
policing.  
In Malaysia, the police are perceived as the traditional authority. They existed before Malaysia 
came into being as a national state and represented elite interests during the British colonial 
rule. In term of public order policing, the Malaysian PAA states: ‘a police officer may take such 
measure as he deems necessary to ensure the orderly conduct of an assembly in accordance 
with this Act and any other written law.’114 The law gives power to a police officer to issue an 
order to disperse in several circumstances: assembly in a prohibited place, the assembly has 
become a street protest, any person in the assembly disturb public tranquillity.115 An officer 
may issue a dispersal order when the participants do not comply with the imposed restrictions 
or engage in unlawful violence towards person or property or commit any offence under any 
written law.116 The PAA gives vast discretionary power to the police. For example, when police 
exercise the power to disperse an assembly, this law states that police may use all reasonable 
force.117 On this issue, ‘reasonable force’ under PAA s21 (2) can be interpreted widely. The 
PAA s21 (2) does not state that the police must consider the strict test of necessity and 
proportionality. These two principles are stated in PAA s2 (b) which directs that the exercise 
of freedom of assembly ‘is subject only to restrictions deemed necessary or expedient in a 
democratic society in the interest of the security of the Federation…’118 In practices, when street 
protests were illegal, civil society and opposition demonstrations often met with police’s water 
cannons, tear gas, and mass arrests.119 
 
113 Thailand Constitution s279 para 1 states:  
All announcements, orders and acts of the National Council for Peace and 
Order or of the Head of the National Council for Peace and Order which are in force 
on the day prior to the date of promulgation of this Constitution or will be issued under 
section 265 paragraph two, irrespective of their constitutional, legislative, executive 
or judicial force, as well as the performance of acts in compliance therewith shall be 
considered constitutional, lawful and effective under this Constitution…  
 
114 Malaysia PAA s8. 
115 ibid s21 (1) (a)-(c). 
116 ibid s21 (1) (d)-(f), 
117 ibid s21 (2). 
118 Malaysia PAA S2(b). 
119  United States Department of State, 'Malaysia 2016 Human Rights Report' 
<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265562.pdf> accessed 2 November 2017, 13. 
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Similar to Thailand, Malaysian police, as the guardian institution, seek legitimacy from 
emergency laws when dealing with political protests. The Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) 
equipped the police with a special power to arrest and detain without trial. This law was enacted 
to suppress the armed insurgents in 1960s. During the 1970s, it had become a means to silence 
political dissenters.120After the Nation Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) was 
established in 1999, it launched a report calling on the parliament to repeal the ISA.121 The 
motivation for initiating arrests under the ISA could be varied. One of them was to prevent 
political unrest on the street. The Minister, under section 8 of this law, has the power to order 
detention or restriction of person.122 During the detaining period, detainees were kept in small 
cells without access to legal counsel or to family. Mental and physical stress were usually 
applied during their interrogation.123 When the two-year detention period nearly ended, the 
minister had the power to renew it endlessly.124 Furthermore, the ISA denied judicial review 
and relied solely on unpromising internal review.125 One of the examples was when the 
Mahathir administration used the ISA as a legitimate tool to restrict the Reformasi movement 
started by Anwar Ibrahim. The Reformasi movement was a major force in criticizing 
Mahathir’s political structures in late 1998. To cripple the movement, the government arrested 
Anwar under the ISA and prosecuted him with a series of criminal charges.126  
On 31 July 2012, Malaysia replaced the ISA with a newer version of its security law, the 
Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA). SOSMA was seen as a rebranded 
ISA. The definition of ‘security offences’ under this law excludes political dissent or industrial 
action that is not intended to cause serious harm to the public. The law also states that ‘no 
person shall be arrested and detained under this law solely for his political belief or political 
activity’.127 The punitive sanction by detaining without trail was removed. The investigative 
 
120  Nicole Fritz and Martin Flaherty, 'Unjust order: Malaysia's Internal Security Act' (2003) Fordham 
International Law Journal 1345, 1357. 
121  ibid 1352. 
122 Internal Security Act 1960 (Malaysia) s8(1) states: 
(1) If the Minister is satisfied that the detention of any person is necessary 
with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security 
of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or 
to the economic life thereof, he may make an order (hereinafter referred to as “a 
detention order”) directing that that person be detained for any period not exceeding 
two years… 
123 Fritz and Flaherty (n 120) 1354. 
124 Internal Security Act 1960 (Malaysia) s8 (7). 
125 ibid s8B. 
126 Fritz and Flaherty (n 120) 1358. 
127 Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) 2012 (Malaysia) s4(3). 
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detention period was reduced from 60 days to 28 days. At the end of this period, all detainees 
must be bought to trial or released.128 However, when the government faced challenges from a 
series of mass rallies organised by the opposition, SOSMA has proven to be an available option 
to generate legitimacy for the incumbents to harass dissenters.  
On 18 November 2016, SOSMA was used to arrest and detain Maria Chin Abdullah, the 
chairperson of Bersih 2.0 movement, in order to stop her from leading the Bersih 5 rally.129  She 
was detained for 28 days without judicial review in a secret detention centre, in solitary 
confinement with no windows.130   At least 13 activists were being detained a night before the 
planned Bersih 5 rally on 19 November 2016.131 As organisers were detained under SOSMA, 
such tactic sent a warning message to Bersih protesters and created the fear of government 
prosecution. As a result, the turnout of the Bersih 5 rally was lower than it was estimated.132  
While Thailand and Malaysia authorities seek legitimacy from their traditional authorities (the 
Thai military and the Malaysian police), Cambodia authorities seek legitimacy in public order 
policing from charismatic authority. Hun Sen is generally perceived as Cambodia’s strongman 
prime minister.133 He has been in power since 1985, one of the longest-serving prime ministers 
in the world.134 Hun Sen’s legacy is credited with ending the brutal Khmer Rouge regime, in 
which around 2 million lives (a quarter of its population) were lost. Hun Sen was a commander 
in the Khmer Rouge Armed Force who fled to Vietnam on 20 June 1977.135 Hun Sen has been 
praised by many Cambodian as a national hero after he fought alongside Vietnamese force to 
 
128 ibid s4(5) and (9). 
129 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Communication ref. JAL MYS 4/2015 16 December 
2015. 
130ARTICLE 19, 'Free Maria Chin, Abolish SOSMA!' (24 November 2016) 
<https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38569/en/free-maria-chin,-abolish-sosma!> 
accessed 3 May 2017.  
131 cf Huseynli and Others v Azerbaijan App 67360/11 67964/11 69379/11 (ECtHR, 10 February 2016), para 
89 – The ECtHR saw that pre-emptive arrests aim at preventing individuals to participate in a planned 
demonstration violate freedom of assembly. 
132 Shannon  Teoh, 'Bersih rally: Undeterred by arrests, thousands march against Malaysia PM Najib Razak 
in KL' (The Straits Times, 19 November 2016) <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/protesters-
against-malaysia-pm-najib-razak-undeterred-by-arrests> accessed 25 September 2017. 
133  BBC, 'Hun Sen: Cambodia's strongman prime minister' (27 July 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23257699> accessed 22 May 2019. 
134 Casey Quackenbush, '40 Years After the Fall of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia Still Grapples With Pol 
Pot's Brutal Legacy' (Time, 7 January 2019) <https://time.com/5486460/pol-pot-cambodia-1979/> 
accessed 24 July 2019. 
135 Human Rights Watch, '30 Years of Hun Sen Violence, Repression, and Corruption in Cambodia' 
(Human Rights Watch, January 2015) 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/cambodia0115_ForUpload.pdf> accessed 24 July 
2019, fn 119. 
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end the Khmer Rouge brutal regime in 1979. However, it should be noted that the admiration 
of dictators and dictatorship is essential in any authoritarian regime. Especially during the Cold 
War, it was common to find communist leaders and fascist leaders created personality cults and 
bombarded their population with propaganda.136 Moreover, historical facts, including the 
leaders’ personalities, in these regimes are often distorted for the purpose of political 
agendas.137 Hun Sen was depicted as one of the national rescuers. He was portrayed as a military 
and economic genius – by merging military control with economic dominance.138 Such tactics 
contribute very much to his charismatic legitimacy.  
In terms of public order policing, using excessive force has been one of Hun Sen’s main 
strategies.139 Drăghia claims that Hun Sen has mastered protest for his political aims by 
controlling the main branches of power, namely the administration, the police, and the army.140 
Earlier, this thesis has pointed out (at 4.2.3.2) that the notification procedure under the 
Cambodian PAA is a de facto authorisation procedure. Hun Sen has the legitimate power to 
outlaw any public assembly by withdrawing the authorisation. Then, the assembly will become 
illegal, providing a legitimate ground to disperse the public assembly, usually by force. For 
example, on 3 January 2014, workers’ protests supported by the opposition Cambodia National 
Rescue Party (CNRP) clashed with the police. The protests were largely peaceful until the 
police and the military used excessive force, including the use of live-ammunition.141 Four 
people were shot dead and 23 participants were arrested.142 Later, the Phnom Penh Municipality 
withdrew permissions to hold a demonstration on the Freedom Park effective from 4 January 
2014 until the security situation and social order return to normal.143 This means that the 
 
136 Paul Hollander, From Benito Mussolini to Hugo Chavez: Intellectuals and a Century of Political Hero 
Worship (Cambridge University Press 2017) 120. 
137 Niem Chheng and Erin Handley, 'Documentary recounting Hun Sen’s role in Vietnamese invasion 
divides opinion' (Phnom Penh Post, 4 January 2018) <https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-
politics/documentary-recounting-hun-sens-role-vietnamese-invasion-divides-opinion> accessed 24 July 
2019 
138 Heder (n 77) 209. 
139 Human Rights Watch, ’30 Years of Hun Sen…’ (n 135); cf the Cambodian PAA – the competent 
authorities shall take measures to protect peaceful demonstrations, ensuring security, safety and public 
order, and shall not interfere with the conduct of the peaceful assembly. 
140 Dan  Drăghia, 'De-Democratization in a contentious space. Cambodia after the 1993 UN sponsored 
elections' (2015) 3 South-East European Journal of Policial Science 46-47. 
141 Radio Free Asia, 'Four shot dead as Cambodian Police open fire on workers' protests' (Radio Free Asia, 
3 January 2014) <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/shooting-01032014110118.html/> 
accessed 25 July 2019. 
142 Duncan McCargo, 'Cambodia in 2014 : Confrontation and Compromise' (2015) Asian Survey 207. 
143 Amnesty International, Taking to the Streets Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Cambodia (n 84) 37; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, memorandum No. 014 MFA-IC/Pro. (4 
January 2014).   
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government temporarily suspended the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in Phnom Penh 
outright. The legitimacy in this operation was clearly derived from the Prime Minister Hun Sen.  
In short, while Pino and Wiatrowski conceive legitimacy as concerning the ‘source of 
authority’, we can see that Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand seek the source of authority in 
public order policing from traditional authorities and charismatic authority rather than relying 
on the legitimacy from rational-legal authority alone. In previous heading, this thesis has 
demonstrated that the substantive rule of law in public order policing is inadequate in these 
regimes. Malaysia and Thailand revert to the imposition of vast military authority/police 
authority under emergency laws when they opt to use coercive force against protesters. Under 
the same light, Cambodian authorities revert to Hun Sen’s charismatic authority when they use 
excessive force. In Weberian terms, one of the distinguishing features of public order policing 
in hybrid regimes is that they can switch between alternative sources of legitimacy. Their legal 
frameworks, which lack of the substantive rule of law, allow the authorities to seek legitimacy 
in public order policing from the guardian institutions, particularly when employing excessive 
force to disperse protesters.  
5.2.3 Transparency and accountability 
According to Pino and Wiatrowski, transparency means that ‘government operations should be 
visible by the public’ and accountability means ‘establishing systems that ensure 
responsiveness with citizens, elected officials, and the news media’.144 They explain that 
citizens in a democratic society have the right to view the internal operations of government 
agencies because the government is the creation of its citizens.145 Thus, accountability in Pino 
and Wiatrowski’s democratic policing means there must be a system that ensures the 
responsiveness of elected officials and state authorities to the citizens.146 There is no democratic 
governance without transparency.147 However, hybrid regimes can falsify transparency and 
accountability because the institutions which are tasked with monitoring role are weaken 
significantly.  
Police operations should be subject to public scrutiny unless they will be compromised if 
disclosed to the public. Therefore, democracies need to have mechanisms allowing public 
 
144 Pino and Wiatrowski (n 31) 85. 
145 ibid. 
146 ibid. 
147  Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko, 'Democratic policing' (2015) New York University Law 
Review 1827, 1835. 
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actors, such as the media, civil society organisations, external review boards, human rights 
monitors, to check the police.148 Furthermore, O’Donnell explains that a system of 
accountability consists of horizontal accountability and vertical accountability.149 The 
horizontal accountability is the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms such as courts, the 
disciplinary action in the police force, and the ability of, for example, a police commission to 
review the work of the police.150 The vertical accountability is the control over the government 
through elections.151 Horizontal accountability of the police in hybrid regimes is weak because 
the lack of effective impartial mechanism and the police are not insulated from political 
influence (discussed at 5.1.1). In contrast, police in democracies need to follow democratic 
principles because social demands and media scrutiny can lead public opinion which cause the 
incumbents to lose out in elections.152 To this point, Della Porta and Reiter observe that public 
opinion is one of the factors shaping the public order policing style.153 This thesis (at 3.3.2) has 
noted that the authorities in hybrid regimes manipulate mass media, impose a licensed civil 
society, and mobilise pro-regime supporters to win public opinion, manipulating the vertical 
accountability to render it of very limited value. 
Here, I draw on Bonner’s account of ‘discursive accountability’. Bonner has argued that 
political leaders may shape public discourse to gain political benefits. On the one hand, they 
can frame an incident as if no wrongdoing has happened. Where there is no wrongdoing, there 
is no need to answer nor to punish anyone.154 In consolidated democracies, there are NGOs and 
media who scrutinise the government and demand answers from the authorities.155 These free 
actors exist in hybrid regimes but have limited ability to keep the authorities checked. The 
regimes also use state-controlled media and state agencies to frame an incident as if no 
wrongdoing has occurred by employing techniques such as comparing the incidents to historical 
events (repetition), explaining the consistency with current events, and using the credibility of 
the speakers.156 If this strategy fails to convince the public, political leaders then identify and 
 
148  Pino and Wiatrowski (n 31) 86. 
149 A Schedler, L J Diamond and M F Plattner, The Self-restraining State: Power and Accountability in New 
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prosecute wrongdoers through prejudice committees.157 Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand 
have no effective civilian mechanism or other regulatory mechanisms for oversight, either 
internal or external, created specifically to deal with complaints against the police. 
Prateeppornnarong and Young point out that the lack of impartiality in the police complaints 
system, exacerbated by the patronage system and extremely authoritarian approach to law 
enforcement, leads the police to use underhand tactics to block complaints.158 These tactics 
might include: deflecting attempts to register complaints, informal settlement, discrediting the 
complaints, fabrication of evidence and refraining from reporting the misbehaviour of their 
colleagues, and making the complaints fear of reprisals.159  
Although oversight mechanisms such as human rights commissions, anti-corruption agencies, 
and ombudsmen do exist, they do not have a significant role in providing accountability 
involving public order policing, and thus for regulating police conduct.160 I argue that these 
existing oversight bodies hinder the principle of democratic policing because instead of 
providing transparency and accountability, they act as rubber stamps. Rather than conducting 
investigations into governments’ misbehaviours, they carry out politically motivated 
investigations of the critics and dissenters.161 As a result, the hybrid regime incumbents have 
only the appearance of being accountable to the public through the crippled accountability 
mechanism but, and this is worse, they are ones that can be passed off as effective. For this 
reason, I argue that hybrid regime incumbents shape public discourse and create a cognitive 
environment in which coercive force is acceptable in public order policing. Also, this further 
reinforces the ability of such regimes to draw on the alternative forms of legitimacy identified 
in the previous section. 
 
157 ibid 26. 
158 Dhiyathad Prateeppornnarong and Richard Young, 'A critique of the internal complaints system of the 
Thai police' (2019) 29 Policing and Society 18, 32. 
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160 Nalla and Mamayek (n 16) 122; Human Rights Watch, '"No Answers, No Apology" Police Abuses and 
Accountability in Malaysia' (Human Rights Watch, 1 April 2014) 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/04/01/no-answers-no-apology/police-abuses-and-accountability-
malaysia> accessed 16 August 2019; Human Rights Watch, '"Tell Them That I want to Kill Them" 
Two Decades of Impunity in Hun Sen's Cambodia' (2012) 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/cambodia1112webwcover_1.pdf> accessed 18 
September 2017; Human Rights Watch, 'Thailand:Supreme Court Enshires Impunity for 2010 
Violence' 1 September 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/01/thailand-supreme-court-
enshrines-impunity-2010-violence> accessed 5 March 2018.  
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Discursive accountability affects public order policing style because police are more likely to 
change their strategies according to the environmental settings where the policing takes place 
rather than based on the law alone. 162   Therefore, when particular types of protests are framed 
as wrongdoing, the police understand that they need to be tough on the protesters. The media 
and ersatz social movement organisations may frame the public opinion to justifying repressive 
policing style.163   
The 2010 Red-shirt crackdown in Thailand offers insights into the discursive accountability in 
public order policing. The authorities created the discursive accountability through controlled 
media and the Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES). The crackdown 
was an excessive military operation causing 98 deaths and more than 2,000 injuries due to the 
enforcement of the ‘live fire zones’ covering the Red-shirts’ protest site.164 First, the CRES 
framed the protest as a threat to national security claiming that there were terrorists among the 
protesters.165  When a sniper team was filmed shooting at unarmed protesters, the CRES simply 
explained that it was a normal tactic to keep soldiers safe from terrorists.166 Despite this, there 
were many incidents that soldiers fired at unarmed civilians, soldiers’ misconduct were not 
reported on the mainstream media.167  
After the 2010 crackdown, the government established a truth-finding committee, the Truth for 
Reconciliation Commission of Thailand (TRCT), which released a final report two years later 
reaffirming that there were terrorists operating among the protesters.168 The TRCT concluded 
that the Red Shirt protesters used firearms and grenades to harm officers and innocent civilians. 
The report reaffirmed that the CRES had a legitimate reason to employ excessive force against 
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protesters.169 On that point, Amsterdam argues that the TRCT was lack of independence and 
impartiality and its report was an attempt to acquit senior officials who were responsible for the 
violence.170  
In addition, the National Human Rights Commission released a report on this crackdown stating 
that the Red Shirt’s protest was not a peaceful assembly protected by the constitution.171 
However, this report contains a misleading logic – it states that it was impossible to identify the 
affiliation of the agent provocateur but concludes that the protesters were not peaceful because 
authorities stationed at the protest site were targeted and shot at. This reasoning goes against 
the international standards that the authorities have the positive obligation to protect public 
assemblies from violent parties (discussed above at 2.2.2 and 2.4.1.2).172 If the authorities 
accepted that there were agent provocateurs among the protesters then it was the government’s 
duty to separate the violent parties from the peaceful protesters. Another fallacy is that while 
the Commission concluded that the CRES’s crackdown was legitimate and conformed with the 
laws governing public assembly, the Commission further suggested that the authorities needed 
to investigate whether there was any officer went beyond his/her legal power. 173 In my opinion, 
it is unreasonable to conclude that the operation was legitimate and conformed with the laws 
without first establishing that the authority did not act ultra vires.   
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Although the operation caused many deaths and injuries, none of the high-level officers or 
policymakers in this operation have been charged. 174  In 2014, there was an attempt to bring 
Prime Minister Abhisit and his Deputy Prime Minister to justice on the ground of murder and 
attempting murder because they ordered CRES to employ lethal force. Later, the Supreme 
Court, on 31 August 2017, ruled that the Criminal Courts have no jurisdiction to hear the case.175 
In my opinion, the judges in this case should not have taken this long to find an answer on the 
legal issue relating to court jurisdiction. The culture of impunity, especially in the military, is 
yet another major problem that needs to be challenged. On the contrary, the organisers of the 
Red-shirt protest were charged on several grounds including inciting the public and committing 
an act of terrorism. After 9 years in the legal battle, the Criminal Court acquitted all of the 
organisers due to the lack of evidence.176 The Court ruled that the Red-shirts protest was an 
exercise of constitutional rights which could not be considered as an act of terrorism.  
In short, public order policing in hybrid regimes lacks transparency and accountability because 
there is no effective impartial mechanism to review police operations, civil actors are too weak, 
the media are heavily controlled by the regime, and judges ignore accusations that the 
authorities exceed their power. Hybrid regimes may create discursive accountability to guide 
the public opinion in justifying repressive policing style. The 2010 Red Shirt crackdown 
provides a good testimony. The mainstream media reported the facts established by two bias 
truth-finding commissions. The government has never officially apologised to those affected 
by the crackdown. Neither has it prosecuted any officer who were involved in the operation.177 
With discursive accountability, the authorities reinforce the culture of impunity. Yet, state-
sponsored violence towards peaceful public assemblies continues and the responsiveness of 
elected officials and state authorities to citizens is based on the regime’s monopolised narrative.  
5.2.4 Subordination to Civil Authority  
According to Pino and Wiatrowski, subordination to civil authority means that the military must 
always take orders from democratically elected officials. 178 This concept has traditionally been 
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applied to the military rather than the police. Pino and Wiatrowski extend this principle to cover 
both military and police. This thesis earlier demonstrated that the military is an important factor 
in applying coercive means to crackdown on protesters. It is even more common to see military 
personnel performing policing duties in hybrid regimes than in consolidated democracies 
because the concept of civilian control of the military is weaker. Croissant and Kuehn explain 
that, in a democracy, civilians alone have the power to decide on national policies.179 They point 
out that civilians may delegate some decision-making power to the military, but the military 
does not have autonomous decision-making power outside the specifically defined area given 
by the civilians.180 Most importantly, the civilian authorities must have the power to effectively 
control the implementation of their decision.181 Croissant and Kuehn further argue that freedom 
of assembly, among other fundamental rights, is in jeopardy if the concept of civilian control is 
ineffective.182 The lack of civilian control leads the military to become lawless – the military 
can implement policies without being checked by actors who can be judicially or electorally 
held accountable.183  
Thus, the lack of civilian control provides a loophole for the incumbent to use their armed forces 
to crackdown on protesters. Consolidated democracies limit the mission of the military to 
external defence and, on the domestic plane, they restrict the use of states of emergency or 
exception which deprives constitutional rights.184 In contrast, incumbents in hybrid regime 
deploy military units or private militants to disperse public assemblies violently. These units 
are neither subordinate to civil authority nor accountable to legislative, community or legal 
processes. They respond to the incumbents who give them authority rather than to the public.  
The use of the military in public order policing has further applications and purposes in 
authoritarian regimes than in consolidated democracies. As, Przeworski notes, a consolidated 
democracy needs democratic institutions to maintain its democratic environment.185 In contrast, 
political actors in hybrid regimes do not limit themselves to democratic institutions. The 
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military see themselves as guardians of the realm preventing the regime change or enforcing a 
regime change – a revolution will hardly succeed if the military does not support the 
revolutionary force.186 Equally, the ability to mobilise armed forces to control political protests 
in authoritarian regimes is a crucial tool to prevent a regime change. Authoritarian regimes use 
more brutal force than democracies because their soldiers and police are not subordinate to their 
civil authority. To this point, Costa and Thompson points that the ability of the security forces 
to act freely is a necessary condition of the prevailing structure of domination.187 When there is 
no democratic control, they eventually become part of an institutional arrangement to 
strengthen the political elites.188         
Taking Russia as his example, Robertson notes that ‘coercion in Russia is overwhelmingly 
carries out by special units of the state apparatus’.189 The Interior Ministry (MVD) and Federal 
Security Services (FSB) were restructured to secure the political power of its incumbent.190 Any 
demand to transfer public order policing tasks from the federal to the regions were swiftly 
ignored by both the MVD and the presidency.191 Moreover, the FSB is ‘a self-contained and 
closed system’ upon which there is no independent organ to check and no court to balance its 
power.192 Alongside the FSB control over the security services, Putin also established the 
National Guard on top of the regular army. The creation of the National Guard was to prevent 
colour revolution.193  Unlike the regular army, these special units are less reluctant to use force 
against protesters on the street.194 Security forces in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand were 
established on the similar pattern as Russia. They have pro-regime units that can be mobilised 
against any threat from the street regardless of the principle of subordination of civil authority. 
Southeast Asian hybrid regimes utilise two technique to weaken the principle of subordination 
to civil authority. Firstly, they staff security forces with pro-regime agents to weaken 
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democratic control. Secondly, they derogate public order policing duties to other security units 
including the military, para-military, and private security.  
5.2.4.1 Staffing security forces with pro-regime agents 
Modifying police structure to lessen democratic control can be achieved by placing pro-regime 
agents into police decision-making bodies and police oversight bodies. Thai police and 
Malaysia police are not independent of the dominant political power. In Thailand, military 
dominance has shaped internal police organisation and management. In Malaysia, the police 
are dominated by UMNO under a strong patronage system. Cambodian police are not different. 
Hun Sen has managed to appoint his relatives to high-level positions in the security forces. All 
three countries present the same pattern that their police forces are dominated by pro-regime 
agents.  
In Thailand, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) leaders saw that having 
politicians as the highest commander enabled politicians to take advantages from the force 
through a patronage system.195  They removed the external members from the Board of Royal 
Thai Police and replaced them with two members who are selected by the Senate. 196Six 
specialist positions in the Police Commission Committee were also removed and replaced by 
two senior police officers who are selected by the Senate.197 Despite the NCPO’s intention to 
eliminate politician influence in the police’s organisation, these were attempts to insert the 
military’s influence over the police force because, under the 2017 Constitution, all of the 
senators in the first term will be appointed by the NCPO.198 Therefore, the NCPO will have a 
substantial influence on selecting four persons in the Board of Royal Thai Police and in the 
Police Commission Committee. After the Senator’s first term has ended, the second term 
senators will be elected by professional group members, whom the NCPO can influence during 
the selection process. As a result, the police are guided by the military rather than the elected 
representatives. Clearly, the representatives’ proportion in the police board and the Police 
Commission Committee demonstrates that Thai police subordinate to the military elites rather 
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than to the civil authority. 199 This organisational structural reflects the deficit of the principle 
of subordination to civil authority. 
The dynamic and inconsistencies of the public order policing tactics employed during political 
protests in the past decade reflects the contention between the military, protest camps, and the 
civilian government over the police force. Sombutpoonsiri points out that the politicisation of 
the police was one of the crucial factors in Thai police applying mixed tactics to political 
protests, swinging between forceful dispersion and negotiation.200 Thai police are trapped 
between the conflict between the elected government, the anti-government protesters, and the 
military. The conclusion to political conflicts in Thailand between 2005 to 2015 depended on 
the military’s allegiance. When the military aligned itself with the government, the military 
employed excessive force against protesters. When the military aligned with the protesters, it 
led to a coup.   
In Cambodia, Hun Sen consolidated his power by appointing the police chief. He made sure 
that the police chief would report directly to him.201  In 2009, Hun Sen continued his power 
grab by appointing his long-time comrade to oversee the Armed Forces.202 While his dominant 
political party kept tight control of every position in the bureaucracy, traditional coercive 
instruments such as police, armed forces, and intelligence agencies were used to stabilise his 
regime.203 After major security positions were taken, Hun Sen personalised his regime by 
utilising the Cambodian neopatrimonial tradition to drive his nepotistic agenda.204 He maintains 
his regime through the recurring appointment of his relatives to high-level posts.205 This 
arrangement created a network of political elites that run Hun Sen’s regime. With his sons and 
relatives holding important positions in both security services and ersatz social movement 
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organisations such as the CPP’s Youth, Hun Sen has created a shield against protests on the 
street.206 
In Malaysia, the police have more power and influence than the military. Compared to the 
military, it has more equipment, troop strength, and superior organisational structure.207  
Bertrand has argued that the stability and longevity of UMNO’s regime were the effects of 
institutional manipulation and patronage.208 Government organisations, laws, and constitution 
were amended to sustain UMNO’s dominance and elite unity.209  Under a highly politicised 
environment, the appointment of the Interior Ministry and of the Inspector General Police 
depended on the UMNO’s patronage system. UMNO maintained its dominance through 
patrimonial ties.210 Although it seems like the police follow the principle of civilian control 
because UMNO is a political party, the selective use of excessive force by the police to suppress 
political dissenters tells us otherwise.  
Here, we can see a pattern that these three hybrid regimes have been able to exert domination 
over their police force by ensuring police organisations are staffed by pro-regime actors. 
Although it seems like the police in these regimes are controlled by political parties according 
to the requirement of the principle of subordination to civil authority, the police do not 
accountable to the people under democratic control.  In the case of Thailand, the military can 
influence the Police Board and the Police Commission Committee through unelected senators. 
Malaysian Police perform their duties under the influence of UMNO’s patronage system. 
Cambodia police are under the direct control of Hun Sen and his relatives. Police in these 
regimes do not respond to civil authority but rather to the incumbents. 
5.2.4.2 Transferring public order policing duties to other security units 
Empowering other security units to carry out public order policing duties rather than police 
units is another method to bypass the principle of subordination to civil authority. Given the 
constraints of law and regulations to keep the police checked, this allows incumbents to use 
coercive force against political dissenters. In general, the government should assign riot police 
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to perform public order policing tasks rather than the military.211 Riot police are usually 
equipped with protective clothing and with non-lethal weapons and are specialised in crowd 
control tactics.212  However, maintaining riot police can be costly. Another option is to create a 
temporary fusion between the regular police and the military. This can create problems because 
the joined forces do not have to ‘cultivate good relations with those they are policing’ and opt 
to use aggressive tactics easily.213  Furthermore, military or para-military personnel may not 
have adequate policing skills. Under intense pressure, they may use aggressive force and 
threaten demonstrators in the same way as their enemy.214 The combined forces may prefer to 
use lethal weapons and military tactics, with which they are more familiar, to manage protesters. 
Therefore, there is more chance the troops will overreact when they are provoked. Moreover, 
soldiers have a different approach from the police when handling the rule of engagement. 
Soldiers mainly focus on securing a parameter by eliminating threats. In contrast, police follow 
the judicial process and fulfil any legal requirement such as getting warrants for gathering 
evidence and arresting suspects. Danlap further explains that ‘military personnel tend to revert 
to the combat-oriented architecture that they understand and in which they are comfortable 
operating’.215 Under the same circumstance, riot police personnel have to reach a much higher 
threshold before they apply self-defence. This kind of self-restraint is usually absent in military 
practice.216 Nevertheless, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand deploy combined forces between 
military, police, and paramilitary to perform public order policing tasks.  
Apart from having an option to mobilise the military against protesters (discussed above at 
5.2.2), the Thai incumbents can also assign the paramilitary to perform public order policing 
duties.  Thailand’s Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC) is a paramilitary corps working under the 
Ministry of Interior. It has duties to respond to natural disasters and to assist the military. VDC 
personnel are recruited from the local population. They can be assigned to perform policing 
task affixed to the police.217 Compared to the standard police training course, both VDC and 
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military personnel do not have adequate legal training on public order policing.218 However, 
VDC and the military are often tasked with public policing duties. For example, in February 
2016, an anti-potash-mining protest was interrupted by VDC who claimed that the protest did 
not conformed with the PAA.219 On 7 April 2017, VDC and military personnel intimidated an 
anti-mining activist who led a series of protests opposing a potash-mining project in Sakon-
Nakorn province.220 These security units put the protest leader and participants on surveillance 
in order to make them feel insecure and give up their activities.221  
In Malaysia, the People’s Volunteer Corps (RELA) play the supporting role in public order 
policing. Malaysia Volunteers Corps Act gives that officers and members of RELA have a duty 
to assist any security force or authority established under written law upon request of the force 
or authority.222For example, in 2007, around 5,000 RELA personnel were deployed to assist the 
police during the first Bersih rally.223 Their main task was to manage traffic around the event. 
Although RELA is a paramilitary corps under the ministry of home affairs, it has over three 
million members, out of 32 million population in Malaysia. RELA was accused of functioning 
as a political machine for BN and UMNO.224 Its member expanded drastically since 2008. There 
were only around half a million members in 2008. In 2010, the membership expanded to 2.5 
million in 2010, and over 3 million in 2018. In 2011, Prime Minister Najib Razak made a 
comment in an RELA conference that RELA could be mobilised against any mass 
demonstration. 225 In 2015, the government announced that it would deploy a thousand RELA 
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personnel to help policing the Bersih 4.0 rally.226 It was obvious that RELA could be mobilised 
as an alternative security force and a social movement to sustain UMNO’s dominant. In 
addition, the Malaysian Government has special security service similar to the Russian’s FSB 
– the Malaysian Special Branch Department.227 The Special Branch Department is in charge of 
intercepting subversive activities threatening the nation’s stability.228 Its personnel often target 
opposition party members and NGOs by putting them under surveillance discriminately.229 This 
tactic has proven to be a significant deterrent to the opposition’s supporters in Malaysia.230 One 
can easily predict that the collaboration between the Special Branch Department and RELA 
will create a greater chilling effect on political dissenters. 
In Cambodia, the government has an option to use coercive tactics against protesters through 
military, gendarmerie (military police), and para-police. Hun Sen has two military units which 
act as his private army: Brigade 70 and the Bodyguard Unit.  In practice, the gendarmerie is 
deployed when civilian police are unable to provide effective crowd control.231 Cambodian 
para-police are not professional police. Their duty is to assist police officers and non-police 
auxiliaries carry out legal and administrative measures. They often do not have sufficient 
technical security training.232  These para-police are often assigned as shock troops against 
opposition gathering.233 Moreover, in 2010, the Ministry of Interior initiated ‘the people’s 
defence movement’ as an unarmed villager movement under local command.234 The movement 
was designed as an auxiliary intervention force assisting local police, gendarmerie and other 
competent forces to suppress crimes. They can arrest individuals committing crimes and 
transferring them to the authorities or issue warnings to people to refrain from participating in 
illegal activities.235 Although they are referred to as ‘police agents’, they neither have clear legal 
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authorisation nor legal background to disperse public assemblies.236 These para-police are seen 
as agents provocateurs They are not recognised as police under the law but are assigned to 
govern public assemblies.  The police can keep their hands clean by letting them do the dirty 
works. In addition, civilian control of the military and police in Cambodia is not an 
institutionalised form of control under law but rather a more personalised form of control under 
‘neo-sultanistic tendencies’—similar to Belarus and Azerbaijan.237 Chambers points out that 
the Cambodian military is integrated into the regime by arranging the patronage relationship 
between security personnel and the dominated CPP.238 As a result, the military has become the 
guardian institution which provides stability and sustains regime survival.239 
In short, the principle of subordination to civil authority under the principle of democratic 
policing is neglected in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand because the police structures in 
these regimes have been modified to respond to their incumbents’ command rather than to 
respond the civil authority. Despite the fact that some of the positions in the police force reflect 
some degree of civilian control, pro-regime agents in the force can influence the force with less 
democratic control means. The police structures in these three regimes reveal that the 
incumbents gain control over public order policing by staffing police organisation with pro-
regimes agents and having other standing security forces, rather than the police, to perform 
public order policing duty. Under these circumstances, the incumbents have opportunities to 
confer public order policing tasks on other security units which are more loyal to the regime 
and more willing to use coercive force upon their commands.   
 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that public order policing in hybrid regimes is structured to 
facilitate swing between a democratic approach and an authoritarian approach because hybrid 
regime rulers benefit from having police that can change their policing styles. This chapter has 
identified that police in hybrid regimes share two characteristics: the lack of insulation from 
political influence and the divergence between the police’s cultural norms and international 
human rights norms. The police in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand have a colonial mentality 
perceiving their role as the protectors of the realms rather than the guarantors of people rights 
and freedoms. In chapter 3, we have seen that hybrid regime incumbents have an incentive to 
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restrict anti-regime protest while retain the ability to mobilise pro-regime supporters. In chapter 
4, the thesis showed that hybrid regimes curtail freedom of assembly through legal frameworks. 
As the legal frameworks provide overly broad legal grounds for restricting freedom of assembly 
and inadequate judicial review, authorities in hybrid regimes abuse the discretion provided by 
the legal frameworks. Then this chapter demonstrates that the incumbents manipulate police 
and public order policing by diminishing the concept of ‘democratic policing’ namely the rule 
of law, legitimacy, transparency and accountability, and subordination to civil authority. The 
principle of democratic policing is twisted or neglected in order to present an opportunity to 
use a more aggressive public order policing style. 
Regarding the rule of law, this study found that Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand implement 
this principle under the most formal conceptions. They restrict the freedom of assembly through 
laws which are enacted by the parliaments without much scrutiny and with very little, and 
usually no, public participation and substantive discussion. PAAs in Cambodia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand were enacted quickly with an aim to be a tool to quell political challenges on the street 
rather than to guide the authorities to govern public assemblies according to international 
standards. The police enforce their PAAs without considering the substantive conceptions of 
the rule of law. 
Regarding the principle of legitimacy, we saw that the three hybrid regimes avoided the limits 
in rational-legal authority, which incorporated IHRL and the international standards on public 
assemblies, by seeking legitimacy from other sources. While consolidated democracies claim 
legitimacy mainly from rational-legal authority, these three hybrid regimes have options to 
claim their legitimacy from other two grounds of authorities: traditional authority in the case of 
Malaysia and Thailand, and charismatic authority in the case of Cambodia.  
We then saw how hybrid regimes can falsify transparency and accountability because of the 
democratic deficit in institutional setting. The institutions, including the media and civil society 
actors, which are tasked with monitoring role are weakened significantly. The 2010 Red-shirt 
crackdown illustrated how the Thai incumbents applied discursive accountability by framing 
the incident as no wrongdoing had happened. Discursive accountability is effective in pursuing 
public opinion under three conditions: no strong civil actors to scrutiny the government, the 
media are heavily controlled by the state and no effective impartial mechanism to review 
complaints against the authorities. All these conditions are common across Southeast Asian 
hybrid regimes. The lack of transparency and accountability in public order policing is a part 
of a much bigger problem: ‘the culture of impunity’. The authorities in these regimes will 
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continue to use excessive force against protesters because they know that they will not be held 
responsible for their misconducts.  
 Last, for the principle of subordination to civil authority, this study found that all three hybrid 
regimes have the means to deploy military, para-military, and/or para-police to perform public 
order policing. Cambodia and Thailand have their military as the regimes’ guardian institutions 
while the police are the guardian institution in Malaysia. International standards give that it is 
not appropriate to deploy soldiers to perform public order policing. Soldiers are trained 
differently and have a different mindset about using force against civilians. They do not have 
much concern about IHRL or the democratic process. This study has demonstrated there are 
two techniques to weaken the principle of subordination to civil authorities: staffing security 
forces with pro-regime agents and transferring public order policing duties to other security 
units which are more loyal to the incumbents. Upon the incumbents’ signals, public order 
policing tasks can be undertaken by these units to ensure that public assemblies will pose no 
threat to the regimes. From the evidence shown in this chapter, it can be concluded that hybrid 
regime incumbents have curtailed the scope of freedom of assembly through public order 
policing. The scope is significantly limited when the principle of democratic policing is 
manipulated. In my opinion, the application of the legal frameworks governing public 
assemblies depends heavily on police practice. Even when the legal framework governing 
public assembly is neutral on its face, the scope of freedom of assembly can still be limited 
significantly by police practices. This problem is also common in consolidated democracies. 
However, in hybrid regimes where the legal frameworks were designed to give the incumbents 
unfair political advantages, undemocratic public order policing magnifies the restrictions on 
freedom of assemblies.   
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 Chapter 6 Conclusion 
While international human rights standards on public assemblies seek to enable individuals to 
exercise freedom of assembly as a part of the democratic process, laws governing public 
assemblies and public order policing in hybrid regimes are used by incumbent leaders to curtail 
the exercise of freedom of assembly rather than to secure it for its citizens. The case law from 
CCPR and ECtHR presented in chapter 2 reaffirms that there is a substantial body of 
international standards on governing public assemblies – setting up a minimum level of 
protection for the freedom. However, it protects only peaceful assemblies which sustain the 
democratic process and comply with three democratic values: pluralism, tolerance, and open-
mindedness. This democratic test is also expressly incorporated in the three-prong test relied 
upon by the CCPR and ECtHR to scrutinise any restriction on the freedom of assembly.1 As 
such, conformity with democratic values forms an essential part in assessing the necessity and 
proportionality of restrictions. However, hybrid regimes, although they appear formally 
committed to (at least, core) international standards and IHRL, their true objective is to gain 
benefits from allowing freedom of assembly while minimising effects from anti-regime 
protests.  
Hybrid regimes carefully curtail the scope of freedom of assembly with an aim to give the 
regime the upper hand in dealing with political contention on the street. Thus, the legal 
mechanisms governing public assemblies in hybrid regimes do not serve the purpose which is 
enshrined in the heart of international standards. These laws serve primarily as ‘street-proofing’ 
mechanisms enhancing the incumbents’ political power. Closed authoritarian regimes ban 
almost all public assemblies and heavily restrict civil society because social movements can 
lead to a revolution or a regime change. Elites in closed authoritarian regimes refrain from 
mobilising because of the lack of genuine civil society to sustain social movements and there 
is no freedom of assembly. In contrast, in hybrid regimes, there are genuine civil society actors 
to drive social movements. The elites in hybrid regimes can use public assemblies as their 
political strategies to demand renegotiation or to overthrow the incumbents. Therefore, there is 
a need to have legal mechanisms that allow some freedom of assembly while significantly 
reducing threats from the street.  
 
1 They assess whether a restriction: (1) is prescribed in conformity with the law, (2) pursues a legitimate aim, 
and (3) is necessary in a democratic society (comply with a strict test of necessity and proportionality). 
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This thesis has shown (in chapter 3) that Robertson, as well as other leading social movement 
scholars, have overlooked the role of law and its institutions governing public assemblies in 
shaping the nature of contention in hybrid regimes. The domestic legal frameworks and the 
nature of public order policing impact upon Robertson’s variables. The legal framework under 
the Putin administration is a good example to prove this claim. This study reveals that Russia 
controls what Robertson describes as “organisational ecology” precisely through legal 
frameworks governing NGOs. The Federal Law No.18-FZ, No.121-FZ, and No.129-FZ impose 
a licensing regime which expressly limits the role of civil society actors to organise a public 
assembly. Moreover, the Putin administration also controls Robertson’s “state mobilisation 
strategies” through the Federal Law No. 54-FZ (Russian PAA). The law provides widely 
framed legal grounds for the authorities to restrict freedom of assembly. Evidence presented in 
chapter 3 reaffirms that Robertson paid little attention to these laws when he evaluated the 
nature of political contention in Russia. However, Robertson’s framework allows us to establish 
that there is a strong relationship between his three variables and the characteristics of the law 
and the law enforcement governing public assemblies.  
Additionally, the incentive of the incumbents in hybrid regimes to restrict freedom of assembly 
can affect the characteristics of the legal mechanisms governing public assemblies. To defeat-
proof the street, the incumbents want legal mechanisms that enable them to impose restrictions 
limiting the ability of political dissenters to mount protests whilst also allowing them to 
mobilise ersatz social movements to display their dominance. These incentives shape the 
characteristics of legal frameworks governing public assemblies and public order policing in 
hybrid regimes. The legal mechanisms governing public assemblies in hybrid regimes have at 
least two main components. First, the legal frameworks provide overly broad legal grounds for 
the authorities to act arbitrarily in favour of the incumbents. Second, the incumbents need law 
enforcement agents that are willing to act arbitrarily to protect the regimes’ dominance. To 
maintain these two configurations, the judiciary in hybrid regimes must refrain from advocating 
IHRL and the international standards on public assemblies. In other words, the legislation 
governing public assemblies, although it may appear neutral on its face, is being implemented 
among other laws in a highly discriminatory manner. The evidence supporting this claim is laid 
out in chapter 4 and chapter 5. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that the incumbents in hybrid regimes curtail the scope of freedom of 
assembly through legal frameworks governing public assemblies. It highlighted how the legal 
frameworks in all three Southeast Asian hybrid regimes provide overly broad legal ground 
without requiring authorities to consider the strict test of necessity and proportionality. Also, 
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they do not provide any adequate judicial review. All three regimes have been using content-
based restrictions, blanket bans, and onerous notification requirements to shape how people 
exercise freedom of assembly. One of the clear examples in chapter 4 is the power to impose 
content-based restrictions in Malaysia. The Malaysian PAA empowers the police to issue an 
order to disperse if anyone in the assembly does any act or makes any statement which has a 
tendency to promote feelings of ill-will or hostility amongst the public or does anything which 
will disturb public tranquillity.2 Such provision provides the authorities with an opportunity to 
act arbitrarily in favour of the incumbents. In Thailand, the military government discriminately 
enforces the Junta’s order that prohibits any political gathering of more than five people. The 
order uses the term “political gathering” which can be interpreted subjectively by law 
enforcement agents. A gathering to support the prime minister (the Junta’s leader) was not a 
political gathering while a gathering to advocate against a corruption scandal in the government 
was characterised as such. 
The legal frameworks in the three hybrid regimes impose many blanket bans to uniformly limit 
the scope of freedom of assembly. These uniform restrictions dictate who can protest, and when, 
where and how a protest can be organised. When the judiciary refrains from applying IHRL 
and international law, these restrictions significantly limit the scope of freedom of assembly. 
Furthermore, this study found that the onerous notification requirements provided in the PAAs 
in these hybrid regimes play an important role in controlling the level of protest on the street. 
They act as filters screening out anti-regime protests and provide a legal ground for dispersing 
or harassing the organisers. Although these PAAs use the term ‘notification’, in practice they 
are de facto authorisation requirements because the PAAs provide the authorities with an 
opportunity to reject or amend the proposed plan. As the authorities always have the upper 
hand, they negotiate with a ‘take it or leave it style’. Again, the core problem here is not only 
that the law provides broad legal grounds to restrict the freedom, but also the lack of any 
requirement to consider the necessity and proportionality of restrictions imposed. The law 
contains no internal constraints on the nature of its enforcement. This is the main reason why 
the PAAs in these regimes appear neutral on their face but providing the authorities with 
opportunities to enforce the law arbitrarily to favour the incumbents.     
In consequence, this study has found that public order policing in hybrid regimes swings 
between a democratic approach and an authoritarian approach because the incumbents are able 
to manipulate the principle of democratic policing. As argued earlier, incumbents in hybrid 
 
2 Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 (Malaysia PAA) s21 (1) (c). 
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regimes need law enforcement agents that are willing to act arbitrarily to protect the 
incumbents’ dominance. The examples presented in chapter 5 confirm this assumption. The 
police in all three hybrid regimes share two common characteristics: the lack of insulation from 
political influence, and the divergence between the cultural norms of the police and 
international human rights norms. The incumbents in these regimes curtail the scope of freedom 
of assembly by manipulating the structure of policing institutions and bending the principle of 
democratic policing in public order policing. When there is a transformation from an 
authoritarian political system to democracy, the police must be reformed to dismantle the 
authoritarian structure and introduce a new concept of policing which is compatible with human 
rights and democratic values.3 However, the police in the three hybrid regimes have not yet 
dismantled the colonial mentality. They perceive their role as the protectors of the realm rather 
than as the guarantor of human rights and democratic principles. 
This thesis uses the concept of democratic policing, proposed by Pino and Wiatrowski, to assess 
public order policing in the three hybrid regimes. 4 This principle consists of the rule of law, 
legitimacy, transparency and accountability, and subordination to civil authority. Although one 
can find some evidence of these principles in the three hybrid regimes, chapter 5 shows that 
these jurisdictions do not align with Pino and Wiatrowski’s conceptualisation. First, under the 
rule of law, the police in the three regimes practice the ‘rule by law’ instead of the ‘rule of law’. 
All PAAs in these regimes were enacted quickly without much debate or public participation 
as they were aimed to contain the rise of street protests. As a result, these laws do not reflect 
the values of human rights and democratic principles. The lack of understanding of the rule of 
law is clearly shown when the police enforce the PAAs together with other (non-subject 
specific) laws to limit public assemblies. This might be regarded as a departure from the concept 
of lex specialis (a maxim that implies that special laws ought to take preference over general 
laws). For instance, the Thai police invoke the Highway Act, the Land Traffic Act, the Penal 
Code, and the Cleanliness and Tidiness of the Country Act to remove protest leaders and 
technically end public assemblies without having to seek a court dispersal order according to 
the Thai PAA. 
In terms of ‘legitimacy’ (the second of Pino and Wiatrowski’s principles), consolidated 
democracies receive legitimacy solely from rational-legal authority, which has a strong link 
 
3 Rachel Neild, ‘Confronting a Culture of Impunity’ in Goldsmith and Lewis, Civilian Oversight of Policing 
: Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights 225. 
4 Nathan Pino and Michael D Wiatrowski, Democratic policing in transitional and developing countries 
(Ashgate Pub. Co. 2006) 83-87. 
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with democratic institutions governed through a democratic process. This study found that the 
authorities in the three hybrid regimes can switch their legitimacy source in performing public 
order policing from rational-legal authority to traditional authority or charismatic authority, 
especially when they need to use excessive force against protesters. When protests become a 
critical threat to the regime, the incumbents can ‘legitimately’ seek assistance from the guardian 
institution, such as the military in the case of Thailand, to crackdown on demonstrators.  
For transparency and accountability, chapter 5 illustrated that hybrid regimes can falsify 
transparency and accountability because there are no effective monitoring actors to keep the 
police accountable. Hybrid regimes can implement discursive accountability techniques to 
frame an incident as if there is no wrongdoing. Independent social actors (including civil society 
groups), although they exist in hybrid regimes, do not have the capacity to keep their 
government in check. Most importantly, these regimes have no effective impartial mechanism 
to review police operations.  
Finally, in relation to the subordination of the police to a civil authority, this study found that 
the incumbents in the three hybrid regimes have modified their police structures to make them 
responsive only to their command (rather than to civil authorities, in indeed these can be said 
to exist at all). They staff the decision making bodies on public order policing with pro-regimes 
supporters. Also, they retain the option of delegating public order policing tasks to other 
standing security forces which are less likely to refuse to act in favour of the incumbents. In my 
opinion, it is this ability to channel public order policing tasks from the normal police force to 
special units more loyal to the regime that enables public order policing in hybrid regimes to 
‘swing’ between the policing styles associated with closed authoritarian regimes and 
consolidated democracies. When the regimes mobilise these special units, public order policing 
becomes more authoritarian and, in the absence of any credible principle of democratic 
policing, the law enforcement agents involved are willing to enforce the law arbitrarily to 
protect the incumbents’ dominance. 
This thesis has shown that the incumbents in Russia, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand have 
curtailed the exercise of the freedom of assembly specifically through legal frameworks 
governing public assembly and public order policing. Social movement scholars and political 
scientists should therefore look more closely to these two legal factors when assessing the 
nature of contention, and the variables that shape it, in hybrid regimes. Similarly, legal scholars 
should not neglect the incumbents’ incentive to use legal mechanisms to shield themselves from 
street protests and mobilise their supporters to display dominance. This thesis has sought to 
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address this gap by explaining why the authorities in hybrid regimes do not always uphold 
IHRL and international standards. All the evidence in chapter 4 and chapter 5 points to the 
conclusion that the scope of freedom of assembly in hybrid regimes has been legally managed 
so as to secure regime stability (a point that further underscores the important distinction in 
IHRL, as noted in chapter 2, that international standards confer protection on ‘peaceful’ 
assemblies, not merely ‘lawful’ assemblies).  
To enable public assemblies as a part of the democratic process, there is a need to ensure that 
both legal frameworks and public order policing comply with international standards and IHRL 
– in particular, by ensuring narrowly-framed legal grounds for restricting freedom of assembly. 
The case law from the CCPR and ECtHR provide the judiciary with interpretative guidance and 
this jurisprudence ought to inform any adequate process of judicial review. Issues regarding 
public order policing should not be justified by relying exclusively on domestic legal 
frameworks. Rather, IHRL and the international standards on public assemblies ought to have 
greater traction in domestic legal systems. Furthermore, in structural terms, the law 
enforcement agencies responsible for public order policing should be insulated from political 
influence and should themselves also be encouraged to adhere to IHRL and international 
standards. 
In my opinion, freedom of assembly in hybrid regime can be improved significantly through 
the judicialization of politics – the process by which courts and judges increasingly dominate 
the making of public policies that had previously been made by legislatures and executives 
through judicial process.5 When this process occurs, politicians will be more aware of the 
review power of the judiciary.6 With an effective judicial review, courts can expand existing 
civil rights, including freedom of assembly, through their evolving jurisprudence.7 I see that the 
international standards on public assemblies and IHRL should be incorporated into domestic 
 
5 Javier Couso, ‘The Judicialization of Chilean Politics: The Rights Revolution That Never Was’ in  Rachel 
Sieder, Line Schjolden and Alan Angell, The judicialization of politics in Latin America (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2005) 106; Torbjörn Vallinder, 'The Judicialization of Politics. A World-Wide Phenomenon: 
Introduction' (1994) 15 International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique 
91. 
6 For example, after almost two decades under Pinochet’s rule, the Chilean court became active in expanding 
civil rights since the country returned to democracy. Although the government and the legislature failed 
to uphold the constitution and the international human rights treaties that were parts of Chile’s domestic 
law, the court played an important role in defensing and expanding individual rights. See futher Couso 
(n 5) 114. 
7 ibid 3. 
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law.8 However, this thesis (in chapter 4) has noted that the judiciary in hybrid regimes refrains 
from judicial review – even when the legal frameworks governing public assemblies provide 
opportunities for judicial review. It is plausible to conclude that the judiciary in hybrid regimes, 
like the police, have also been manipulated by the regime incumbents in order to consolidate 
their political dominance. The politics of the judiciary in hybrid regimes ensures that adherence 
to international standards is superficial at best. O’Donnell has noted that demands for order and 
national security can lead to judicial tolerance of unlawful actions committed by the authorities, 
especially the police and law enforcement agents.9 Therefore, I suggest that the role of the 
judges in defending freedom of assembly in hybrid regimes should also be studied further.  
Case law from the CCPR, especially those complaints submitted by applicants from Belarus 
and Russia, demonstrates that the first Optional Protocol provides both a feasible and robust 
channel of external review in relation to public order policing in hybrid regimes 
(notwithstanding the protracted nature of this process). I strongly believe that international 
standards on public assemblies and IHRL should have greater traction in hybrid regimes and 
that ratification of the ICCPR and its first Optional Protocol must be the first step in ensuring 
that individuals are able to enjoy freedom of assembly. Of-course, any such developments may 
themselves signal a broader trajectory of transition towards ‘democratic’ forms of governance. 
However, a hybrid regime will not become a democracy by only ratifying the ICCPR and its 
first Optional Protocol (or else Russia and Belarus would be classified as democracies just 
because they were parties to these instruments). To enhance freedom of assembly in hybrid 
regimes, one should pay more attention to the particular image of democracy enshrined in IHRL 
(as explored in chapter 2). Therefore, while the thesis has primarily sought to illustrate the ways 
in which law shapes the nature of political contention in hybrid regimes, it might also be 
concluded that the reforms needed to afford greater protection to freedom of assembly are the 
same reforms that might catalyse the transformation of politics in these jurisdictions.  
 
8 For example, the constitution of Turkey empowers domestic judges to give priority to obligations under 
IHRL over domestic law. The Constitution of Turkey article 90, para 5 states:  International agreements 
duly put into effect have the force of law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court shall be made with regard 
to these agreements, on the grounds that they are unconstitutional. (Sentence added on May 7, 2004; Act 
No. 5170) In the case of a conflict between international agreements, duly put into effect, concerning 
fundamental rights and freedoms and the laws due to differences in provisions on the same matter, the 
provisions of international agreements shall prevail.  
9 Gullermo O’Donnell, ‘Afterword’ in Sieder, Schjolden, and Angell (n 5) 294. 
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